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Abstract 
This dissertation is motivated by recent changes in financial reporting regulation effected 
by the adoption of IFRS in Europe, Australia, and Canada, and SFAS 142 (FASB 2001) and 
SFAS 157 (FASB 2007 and 2011) in the U.S., that significantly increased users’ exposure to fair 
values. The implementation of the fair value hierarchy, as well as the switch from amortization 
to impairment testing of goodwill, highlighted problems with auditing highly complex, 
judgment-dependent and inherently uncertain fair values. There is a concern that such fair values 
may not always be auditable, and that requiring auditors to provide positive assurance on them 
may necessitate changes to the financial reporting model. 
The dissertation consists of two parts, the process study and the elicitation study. The 
process study, using the audit of goodwill/cash generating unit (CGU) impairment under IFRS as 
a specific example, provides quasi-experimental evidence about the fair value auditing process 
which can help to better understand and improve the auditing of complex fair values. The study 
relies on an analysis of verbal protocols to develop an understanding of how auditors and 
valuation specialists deal with the task. The study finds that for all of the participants who 
developed an auditor’s range, the width of the range is many times the audit materiality, and 
intervals for the experienced auditors are narrower on average than those for junior auditors. 
There are signs of possible issues with both interpretation and application of fair value auditing 
and accounting standards across all groups of the participants. At least some of the issues with 
application of the standards appear to be related to judgmental shortcuts (heuristics) which have 
not been researched in a valuation task context in prior auditing literature. Some of the 
experienced and junior auditors do not appear to have a complete grasp of the applicable 
valuation methodology. Finally, the results shed light on the division of responsibilities between 
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assurance and valuation groups and the use of third party experts when auditing fair value 
impairments. The process study contributes to the literature by obtaining direct quasi-
experimental evidence on auditors’ and valuation specialists’ process when they perform a fair 
value auditing task, and investigating the process differences among auditors with different 
levels of experience and experts.  
The objective of the elicitation study is to develop techniques that can be used by auditors 
and valuation specialists when auditing complex fair values, by experimentally testing elicitation 
methods for fair value models’ parameters. The study tests two probability distribution elicitation 
methods - the cumulative distribution function (CDF) method and the credible interval (CI) 
method. Quantitative analysis performed in this study indicates that the CDF method has a 
potential to improve the participants’ unaided judgment regarding fair value intervals, at least for 
junior auditors, while the CI method does not yield similar improvement. When the two methods 
are compared to each other, the CDF method proves to be more effective for experienced and 
junior auditors, while the opposite is true for valuation specialists. The distributions developed 
with the help of the CDF method are subjected to the effects of anchoring heuristic to a lesser 
degree than those built using the CI method. Qualitative analysis based on verbal protocols in the 
elicitation study indicates that the CDF distribution elicitation method surpasses the CI method 
for the purposes of quantification of uncertainty inherent in complex fair value estimates. The 
study contributes to the literature by combining auditing and elicitation research in fair value 
auditing settings, and has a potential to improve the practice of auditing of goodwill and possibly 
other complex fair values, by providing information for the development of relevant decision 
aids. 
  
 v 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have been possible without Efrim Boritz’s (dissertation supervisor) 
invaluable advice, constant attention, and patient support. I am also grateful for guidance, 
insightful comments, and challenging questions of the members of my dissertation committee, 
Alan Webb, Brad Pomeroy, and Joanne Wood. I thank Dave Vert for his help with developing 
and validating the experimental instrument. Louise Hayes provided excellent research assistance. 
The thesis benefited from comments of anonymous reviewers, discussants, and participants at the 
2016 European Accounting Association Annual Congress, 2016 Canadian Academic Accounting 
Association Annual Conference, and 2016 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. I 
would also like to mention Joan Muir, Christine Hampton, and Ann Bisch who supplied highest 
quality transcription services. I thank the University of Waterloo and CGA-Canada for their 
financial support and the Canadian Public Accountability Board for the Keith Boocock Doctoral 
Scholarship funding. All errors are my own.  
Finally, this dissertation would never have been completed had it not been for the support 
of my father, Mikhail Timoshenko.  
  
 vi 
 
Dedication 
To the memory of my mother, Galina Timoshenko. 
 vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Author's Declaration .............................................................................................................................................. ii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................... v 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................................... x 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 CGU (CASH GENERATING UNIT) IMPAIRMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF FV TASK ........................................................................ 3 
1.3 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS .............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review .............................................................................................................................. 15 
2.1 FV FINANCIAL REPORTING AND AUDITING STANDARDS .................................................................................................. 15 
2.2 ARCHIVAL STUDIES ON AUDITABILITY OF FVS ............................................................................................................... 16 
2.3 BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON FV AUDITING ................................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Biases in Auditors’ Judgment When Evaluating FV Estimates ................................................................... 18 
2.3.2 The Use of Valuation Experts ..................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.3 Studies of FV Audit Process ........................................................................................................................ 21 
Chapter 3 - How Are FV Impairments Audited? A Study of Auditors and Valuation Specialists ............................ 24 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 24 
3.2 MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.1 Characteristics of FVs Affecting Their Auditability ..................................................................................... 26 
3.2.2 The Impact of Audit Quality on Representational Faithfulness of FVs ....................................................... 27 
3.2.3 The Influence of Information Uncertainty/Imprecision of Complex FVs on Auditors’ Judgment ............... 28 
3.2.4 Studies of FV Audit Process ........................................................................................................................ 29 
3.2.5 The Use of Valuation Experts in FV Auditing .............................................................................................. 31 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................... 33 
3.3.1 FV Audit Process Map and Development of Research Questions............................................................... 33 
3.3.2 Expected Process Differences Between Auditors and Valuation Specialists .............................................. 40 
 viii 
 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................................................................. 41 
3.4.1 Research Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 41 
3.4.2 Participants ................................................................................................................................................ 43 
3.4.3 Quasi-Experimental Instrument ................................................................................................................. 45 
3.4.4 Administration of the Quasi-Experiment – Quasi-Experimental Session ................................................... 49 
3.5 RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................................... 51 
3.5.1 Annual Impairment Testing and the Source of Goodwill (RQ 1 and 2)....................................................... 51 
3.5.2 The Determination of CGUs (RQ 3) ............................................................................................................ 52 
3.5.3 Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement and Estimation Uncertainty (RQ 4 and 5) ................... 53 
3.5.4 Choice Between Fully Substantive vs. Combined Approach (RQ 6) ............................................................ 54 
3.5.5 Choice Between Testing Management’s vs. Developing Auditor’s Estimate (RQ 7) .................................. 54 
3.5.6 Use of Alternative Assumptions vs. Use of Alternative Model (RQ 8) ........................................................ 57 
3.5.7 Reasoning for the Application of the Alternative Assumptions and/or Model (RQ 9) ............................... 58 
3.5.8 Sources of Information for and Issues Considered When Developing Alternative Assumptions/Model (RQ 
10) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 58 
3.5.9 Participants’ Range and its Relation to Materiality (RQ 11) ...................................................................... 59 
3.5.10 Participants’ Consideration of FVLCS vs. VIU of the CGU (RQ 12) ............................................................ 60 
3.5.11 Participants’ Consideration of Management’s Bias (RQ 13 and 14) ........................................................ 61 
3.5.12 Participants’ Heuristics When Selecting Alternative Model and/or Assumptions (RQ 15)....................... 62 
3.5.13 Participants’ Heuristics When Narrowing Participants Own Range (RQ 16) ........................................... 67 
3.5.14 Use of Internal Specialists (RQ 19) ........................................................................................................... 67 
3.5.15 Division of Labor Between Auditors and Valuation Specialists (RQ 19) ................................................... 68 
3.5.16 Use of 3rd Party Valuation Specialists (RQ 19) ........................................................................................ 68 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 69 
Chapter 4 - Can Probability Distribution Elicitation Methods Increase the Precision of FV Estimates? ................. 76 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................................................... 80 
4.2.1 Characteristics of FVs Affecting Their Auditability ..................................................................................... 81 
4.2.2 The Influence of Information Uncertainty/Imprecision of Complex FVs on Auditors’ Judgment ............... 82 
4.2.3 Eliciting Probability Distribution Information from Individuals .................................................................. 85 
4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................... 86 
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................................................................. 92 
4.4.1 Research Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 92 
4.4.2 Participants ................................................................................................................................................ 98 
 ix 
 
4.4.3 Experimental Instrument ........................................................................................................................... 99 
4.5 RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................................. 102 
4.5.1 Implied Confidence Levels for the Unaided Intervals (RQ 3) .................................................................... 102 
4.5.2 Comparison of the Unaided Judgment to Assisted Judgment with the Elicitation Methods (RQ 1) ........ 103 
4.5.3 Comparison of the Effectiveness of CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods (RQ 2) .............................. 105 
4.5.4 Comparison of the CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods with Regard to Their Susceptibility to the 
Anchoring Heuristics (H 1) ................................................................................................................................. 106 
4.5.5 Comparison of the CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods with Regard to Their Ability to Assist With 
Quantification of Uncertainty (RQ 4) ................................................................................................................ 107 
4.5.6 Between-Participants Comparison of the Elicited Distributions............................................................... 108 
4.5.7 Analysis of the Unaided and Aided Intervals from the Perspective of Audit Materiality ......................... 109 
4.5.8 Other Findings Resulting From Concurrent Verbal Protocols Analysis ..................................................... 110 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................ 112 
Chapter 5 - Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 117 
5.1 CONTRIBUTION .................................................................................................................................................... 117 
5.1.1 Contribution to Academic Literature ........................................................................................................ 117 
5.1.2 Contribution to Audit Practice .................................................................................................................. 118 
5.1.3 Contribution to Regulation and Standard Setting .................................................................................... 120 
5.1.4 Contribution to Education ........................................................................................................................ 121 
5.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...................................................................................................................... 122 
5.3 LIMITATIONS........................................................................................................................................................ 125 
References ......................................................................................................................................................... 201 
Appendices ........................................................................................................................................................ 211 
 
  
 x 
 
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1 Case Instruction (Process Study) ................................................................................................ 46 
FIGURE 2 Levered vs Debt Free Valuation Approaches ............................................................................. 66 
FIGURE 3 Example of the Elicitation Method Template (CDF Elicitation Method) ................................. 101 
 
  
 xi 
 
List of Tables 
 
TABLE 1 Current Financial Reporting and Auditing Regulation on Fair Values ............................................ 137 
TABLE 2 Behavioral Studies on Fair Value Auditing ..................................................................................... 139 
TABLE 3 Detailed Audit Process Information for Impairment Testing of Goodwill and 
Related Research Questions ........................................................................................................................ 145 
TABLE 4 Selected Demographic Information for the Participants – Process Study ..................................... 170 
TABLE 5 Outline of the Experimental Case Content .................................................................................... 172 
TABLE 6 Factors Influencing Test Management’s Estimate vs. Develop Auditor’s Estimate or Range 
Choice........................................................................................................................................................... 174 
TABLE 7 Reasons for Developing an Alternative Model and Assumptions .................................................. 175 
TABLE 8 Information Used to Evaluate/Develop Alternative Model Assumptions ..................................... 177 
TABLE 9 Width of the Participants' Range and Its Relation to Audit Materiality ........................................ 180 
TABLE 10 Probability Distribution Elicitation Methods ............................................................................... 182 
TABLE 11 Illustration of the Elicitation Methods Used in the Study ............................................................ 183 
TABLE 12 Selected Demographic Information for the Participants – Elicitation Study ............................... 185 
TABLE 13 Comparison of Elicited Intervals to Unaided Intervals for Each Group of Participants ............... 188 
TABLE 14 Implied Confidence Levels for the Unaided Auditor’s Intervals  
for the CGU Recoverable Amount Computed via Comparison to the Assisted Auditor’s Intervals ............ 191 
TABLE 15 Valuation Model Input Parameters for Which Elicited Distributions Were Developed  
While Point Estimates Where Used for the Unaided Auditor’s Interval ..................................................... 199 
TABLE 16 Comparison of Elicitation Methods for Each Group of Participants ............................................ 201 
TABLE 17 Comparison of Frequency of Words Pointing to Quantification of Uncertainty ......................... 204 
  
 1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1  Motivation 
Recent changes in financial reporting regulation effected by the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe, Australia, and Canada, as well as the 
introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 142 (FASB 2001) and 
SFAS 157 (FASB 2007 and 2011) in the U.S. significantly increased users’ exposure to fair 
values (FVs) and thus made the issue of fair value auditing extremely important for the 
stakeholders. The new standards introduced a three-level hierarchy of FV types based on the 
observability of inputs, as well as annual goodwill impairment testing, replacing goodwill 
amortization. These changes highlighted problems with auditing highly complex, judgment-
dependent and inherently uncertain fair values at the higher levels of the hierarchy. There is a 
concern that in some circumstances such complex FVs may not be auditable, and that requiring 
auditors to provide positive audit-level assurance on them may necessitate changes to the current 
financial reporting model, e.g., reporting ranges or confidence intervals, rather than point 
estimates (Christensen, Glover, and Wood 2012).  
Given the increased significance of FV reporting to the stakeholders, understanding of 
the various aspects of FV auditing process is an important objective of auditing research. Recent 
studies of FV auditing process (Cannon and Bedard 2015; Glover, Taylor, and Wu 2016; 
Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2012 and 2015) rely predominantly on interview- and survey- 
based methodologies, which provide an understanding of a broad scope of issues that the 
auditors face when dealing with complex FVs. However, the lack of specific context in interview 
and/or survey settings does not always permit to perform a more in-depth investigation of the 
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issues in question. A qusi-experimental study based on methodology such as verbal protocol 
analysis (Biggs and Mock 1983) and employing a uniform task across all of the participants may 
be better suitable to achieve the latter objective. The first part of this study applies concurrent 
verbal protocols analysis methodology to an experimental case based on goodwill impairment to 
obtain knowledge about the details of FV auditing process related to auditing and reporting 
standards, auditing and valuation methodological aspects, and judgmental shortcuts employed by 
the participants. 
Another major motivation for the study is the absence of direct evidence on valuation 
specialists’ involvement in fair value audits.1 As many fair values are based on highly technical 
models with unobservable input parameters and rely on complex judgment calls (Christensen et 
al. 2012; Ramanna and Watts 2012), they often require involvement of specialists. Current 
assurance standards define a specialist as "a person (or firm) possessing special skill or 
knowledge in a particular field other than accounting or auditing" (AU sec. 336, paragraph .01), 
or “an individual or organization in a field of expertise other than accounting or auditing” (ISA 
620), so persons/firms possessing such skill or knowledge in fair valuation field are called 
valuation specialists. As mentioned above, current FV auditing literature provides primarily 
indirect evidence on the involvement of valuation specialists in FV audits.  For example, in 
Cannon and Bedard (2015), of 96 FV auditing experiences analyzed by the authors, only three 
are supplied by valuation experts. Both Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015) are based solely on 
interviewing 24 experienced auditors with no feedback from valuation specialists. Similarly, 
Glover’s et al. (2016) sample consists exclusively of auditor participants. This concern is also 
applicable to Griffith (2014, 2015, and 2016), where only auditors’ perspective is taken into 
                                                     
1
 “Direct” (vs. “indirect”) evidence on the involvement of valuation specialists is defined as evidence obtained from 
the valuation specialists themselves. Indirect evidence is secondary type of evidence obtained from other parties 
involved in FV audits, such as auditors. 
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account, even though the studies concern the use of valuation experts. This study obtains direct 
evidence of valuation specialists’ involvement in FV audits as 22% of its total sample (or 30% of 
the experienced participants sub-sample) is represented by practicing valuation specialists 
employed with major public accounting firms. 
Finally, extant analytical, archival, and behavioral studies on FV auditing identify a 
number of problems in audits of complex FVs related, but not limited to, high estimation 
uncertainty, difficulty with developing auditors’ ranges, and auditors’ possible preference to 
follow the management’s approach when auditing FV estimates instead of developing their own 
estimate or ranges (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Griffith et al. 2012 and 2015; Smieliauskas 
2012). At the same time, the extant studies recommendations are mostly concerned with a 
modification to current auditing guidance (Cohen, Gaynor, Montague, and Wayne 2016; 
Maksymov, Nelson, and Kinney 2015) or auditor’s mindset intervention (Griffith, Hammersley, 
Kadous, and Young 2014) which would change auditors’ behavior in some way, leaving decision 
aid-related solutions out of consideration. This opens an avenue for future research on decision 
aids which might assist auditors with developing auditor’s ranges for complex FVs. As 
Smieliauskas (2012) notes, a systematic method needs to be found which would help auditors 
with quantifying accounting risk and improve the FV estimates ranges calibration. The second 
part of this study offers and tests one class of decision aids which auditors can use for developing 
FV auditor’s ranges – decision aids based on probability distribution elicitation methods. 
1.2 CGU (Cash Generating Unit) Impairment as an Example of FV Task  
There are several potential candidates available to be the exemplar FV audit task in a 
behavioral study. These are financial instruments, pension liabilities, as well as impairments of 
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assets arising from business combinations valued at FV under IFRS (including goodwill, 
intangibles, and fixed assets). As impairments arising from business combinations are 
determined via CGU(s) impairment according to IAS 36 (IASB 2004a), the terms “CGU 
impairment” and “goodwill impairment” can and will be used interchangeably in this study. The 
selection of the audit task for this study has been influenced by three main factors: 1) The level 
of overall complexity, and particularly estimation uncertainty, inherent in the task; 2) Importance 
of the task for the stakeholders; and 3) Novelty and scale of the contribution. Below, I discuss 
each of these factors in more detail.  
Goodwill impairment is a multi-step process requiring extensive use of professional 
judgment by both client management and the auditors, which creates a potential for “judgmental 
misstatements” discussed previously. According to IAS 36 (IASB 2004a), goodwill impairment 
testing involves identifying the organization’s cash generating units (CGUs), allocating the 
goodwill balance to the identified CGUs, and comparing the carrying value of each CGU to it 
recoverable amount to quantify the impairment, if any. Neither of these steps is straightforward. 
Identification of CGUs is challenging because under IAS 36 (IASB 2004a) management needs to 
find (and the auditors need to verify) the smallest possible subset of assets that produces 
independent cash inflows for the company.
2
 IAS 36 (IASB 2004a) explicitly states that the 
CGUs identification process requires judgment, while goodwill allocation to CGUs depends on 
the expected synergies of the business combination and does not directly depend on the 
allocation of other assets or liabilities acquired in a business combination, which makes the 
allocation a subjective and difficult judgmental task. Determination of a CGU’s recoverable 
amount involves calculating its FV less costs to sell and/or its value in use, which includes the 
                                                     
2
 This is different from identification of CGUs under SFAS 142 (FASB 2001), which permits the use of 
management’s reporting structure to define the CGUs – a much more straightforward approach. 
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identification of appropriate active markets, the determination of the amount and timing of future 
cash flows and the estimation of relevant discount and growth rates. In line with this reasoning, 
Cannon and Bedard (2015) in their field study find that the impairments are most frequently 
characterized by the highest level of estimation uncertainty among other FV auditing tasks 
(about 41%), while 83% of those impairments with the highest estimation uncertainty relate to 
goodwill.
3
 Ramanna and Watts (2012) state that estimation uncertainty inherent in goodwill 
impairments may render them unauditable, while their empirical results indicate that goodwill 
impairments are related to debt covenants that rely on the goodwill balance and the CEO’s 
protecting their reputation (agency theory rather than information signaling goals), which is not a 
desired situation for users of the financial statements. 
While goodwill balances are certainly difficult to audit, recent research demonstrates that 
they represent an important issue for both auditors and users of financial statements. Ayres, Neal, 
Reid, and Shipman (2016) document that material goodwill impairments are significantly 
associated with subsequent auditor switches. Also, the auditor switch becomes more likely when 
the relative magnitude of the impairment charge is higher. These results highlight the importance 
of the goodwill impairment issue to both audit firms and public companies. It appears that 
auditing of goodwill balances is an area which generates a high level of business risk to the 
auditors and affects auditor-client relationship. Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel, and Theis (2015) 
experimental results suggest that a discussion of goodwill impairment issues, such as the 
magnitude of assumptions changes leading to goodwill impairment, when included in key audit 
matters (KAM) paragraph in auditor’s report, significantly influences users’ decisions with 
regard to the company. 
                                                     
3
 This statistics is reported in the 2013 version of the study, while it is not included into the current 2015 version. 
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Despite the complexity of the task and the heavy demands it places on the professional 
judgment of the accountants and auditors, as well as the importance of goodwill reporting and 
auditing to the stakeholders, prior auditing research on goodwill is relatively undeveloped and 
predominantly limited to archival methodology papers. For example, the series of studies by 
Carlin et al. (2007 and 2008) and Carlin and Finch (2008) concentrate on public companies’ 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of IAS 36 (IASB 2004a) related to goodwill 
impairment, and the ability of their auditors to enforce the compliance requirement. Shepardson 
(2013) finds that that the audit committee member (ACM) contextual experiences with goodwill 
impairment issues (proxied by interlocks with companies that likely went through the 
impairment testing process in the past) is associated with a higher likelihood of goodwill write-
off, and the effect is the most pronounced when the experience is obtained in a manager’s (vs. a 
monitor’s) capacity. Stokes and Webster (2009) find that higher audit quality (measured by Big 
4/non-Big 4, switches to Big 4, and other proxies) contributes to representational faithfulness of 
goodwill balances under IFRS. The result highlights a disparity in goodwill impairment audit 
outcomes between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, while it is not entirely clear whether the 
disparity is due to differences in the audit process, the audit effort, or both. Shipman, Carcello, 
and Neal (2016) investigate the impact of non-audit fees on auditor’s independence in the 
context of goodwill impairment and find an inverse relationship of the non-audit fees to the 
likelihood of impairment in a situation where goodwill is likely to be impaired, meaning that 
non-audit services may compromise the independence.   
Favere-Marchesi and Emby (2005) is one of the few experimental auditing studies on 
goodwill impairment, which establishes that a new concurring audit partner is more likely to 
recommend a write-down of purchased goodwill than a continuing concurring audit partner, 
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highlighting the issue of auditor’s independence for this type of audit task. Recently, Griffith 
(2014) uses a goodwill impairment task (in the U.S. GAAP context) to investigate the interaction 
of audit-team specialists’ caveats and client source credibility when auditing complex estimates 
and finds that auditor’s review of evidence with regard to a biased complex estimate and related 
audit judgments incorporate a caveat if the estimate originates from a source which is perceived 
to have low credibility (if the preparer’s source credibility is perceived as high, the caveat is 
disregarded). In a related study, the author investigates how relational ques in specialists’ work 
interact with client source credibility when considered by auditors (Griffith 2016). 
1.3 Summary of the Main Findings 
The process study is a quasi-experiment with the objective of describing currently under-
researched process of auditing complex FV estimates. The reliance on quasi-experimental 
methodology based on concurrent verbal protocols (Blocher and Cooper 1988, Biggs and Mock 
1983, and Biggs et al. 1988) is justified by the fact that it produces much more detailed 
information on the FV auditing process than the extant interview-based research (Cannon and 
Bedard 2015, Glover et al. 2016, and Griffith et al. 2012 and 2015). This is achieved by 
providing a concrete context of the experimental case, which helps the participants to think about 
fine details of the FV auditing and FV estimation processes, leading to collection of rich process 
information which would not be possible to obtain in lacking specific context interview 
methodology studies. The use of the uniform experimental case also allows for valid process 
comparisons among different participant groups (experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and 
junior auditors). The experimental case used is CGU/goodwill impairment case under IFRS/IAS. 
The particular focus of the process study is obtaining qualitative information related to three 
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areas: 1) methodological aspects of the auditing and fair valuation processes, 2) interpretation, 
application, and interaction of reporting, auditing, and valuation standards, and 3) judgmental 
shortcuts arising within the auditing process, including those arising from uncertainties inherent 
in complex FVs.   
 In addition to qualitative results, the process study also provides some quantitative 
findings. The main such finding is related to the width of the participants’ intervals, its relation to 
audit materiality, and its dependence on the participants’ expertise (proxied by the work 
experience). Particularly, it is discovered that for all groups of the participants, the width of their 
auditors’ intervals is multiple times the audit materiality. This result confirms concerns raised by 
Christensen et al. (2012) about auditors’ ability to provide positive-level assurance on complex 
FV balances. The participants’ intervals developed in the process study fall under Smieliauskas’ 
(2012) “estimate nightmare” scenario, so that all points inside or outside of the participants’ 
ranges have a significant risk. While the number of available observations does not permit to 
come to any conclusion for valuation specialists, a negative relationship is found between the 
auditors’ expertise and the width of the auditors’ intervals. Particularly, the width of the 
experienced auditors’ intervals is narrower on average than the width of the junior auditors’ 
intervals. 
As mentioned, a set of results of the process study includes issues related to interpretation 
and application of relevant auditing and financial reporting guidance (primarily ISA 540 and IAS 
36). One such finding is how the participants classify their audit approach under two mutually 
exclusive categories prescribed by ISA 540, testing management’s estimate vs. developing 
auditor’s own estimate or range. It appears that participants across all of the groups have 
difficulty with classifying their actions under the above categories. Additionally, a pluralism of 
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opinions exists on exactly what audit procedures are encompassed by each of the two categories. 
Some participants define developing auditor’s own estimate or range as completely disregarding 
the management’s work and creating a new valuation model along with its inputs from the 
scratch, while others suggest less radical interpretations such as altering the timing and amount 
of the management’s cash flows, or performing a sensitivity analysis using the management’s 
model. These findings provide a basis for reconciling conflicting results in prior interview-based 
studies of FV auditing process regarding the relative number of auditors choosing to test 
management’s estimate vs. develop their own estimate or range (Cannon and Bedard 2015, 
Glover et al. 2016, and Griffith et al. 2012 and 2015). 
The process study also sheds light on the participants’ motives when classifying their 
actions as either testing the management’s estimate or developing their own estimate or range. 
Particularly, senior-level participants suggest that since it is not possible to recognize the 
auditor’s estimate on the face of financial statements due to independence considerations, 
developing auditor’s own estimate or range represents an inefficient option. An efficient option 
is to guide/coach the management to correctly develop their own estimate, which can then be 
audited and reported on the balance sheet. The participants also suggest that this course of action 
benefits the audits in subsequent years, as the management acquires a skill to perform valuation 
tasks. At the same time, another reason for the majority of valuation specialists to classify their 
actions as testing the managements estimate may be grounded in the interaction between audit 
and valuation standards. The Canadian valuation standards place all of the valuation 
engagements into two exhaustive “buckets”: a comprehensive valuation (assuming an extensive 
amount of work) and an estimate (assuming a limited amount of work). Since valuation 
specialists are likely to view a comprehensive valuation engagement as the only way to develop 
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a true independent estimate, and since valuation for financial reporting purposes falls into the 
estimate category, valuation specialists may tend to classify an audit engagement they participate 
in as testing management estimate under ISA 540. 
The application of auditing standards is found to be affected by judgmental shortcuts 
employed by the participants. Some of these shortcuts have not been well researched in the FV 
audit task context in the extant literature. For example, many experienced and junior auditors use 
the midpoint of their auditor’s range to arrive at a point estimate for the CGU RA. This approach 
to determining a FV point estimate is not recommended in the auditing standards and may be a 
manifestation of the availability heuristics. It also runs contrary to the results in Griffin (2014), 
who finds that auditors use the nearest bound of their FV interval to calculate the amount of 
suggested adjustment to the management’s estimate. An additional problem discovered is that 
many participants do not recognize the necessity to narrow down their range given the audit 
materiality when arriving at a conclusion about the material misstatement in FV estimates, which 
represents a non-ISA 540 approach. At the same time, the participants who do recognize such 
necessity do not seem to offer a specific/systematic procedure(s) for narrowing down the range. 
They most frequently cite a general discussion with management as a way to reduce the range’s 
width. 
Another instance of the availability heuristics identified in the FV auditing process is the 
use of “+/-10% rule” by some valuation specialists in order to develop an auditor’s range from a 
point estimate of the CGU RA, which is not suggested in either auditing or valuation standards.  
Moreover, since the “+/-10% rule” leads to auditor’s ranges which are many times the amount of 
the audit materiality, its application by valuation specialists imply that this group of participants 
considers FV estimation uncertainty in isolation from the audit materiality. This approach may 
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be a consequence of valuation specialists acting primarily as business advisors in their 
professional practice, leading to a treatment of technical auditing concepts (i.e., audit materiality) 
different from that of auditors, who act primarily as assurance providers. 
The process study also reveals methodological problems in the FV audit and valuation 
processes, including (but not limited to) insufficient understanding of valuation methodology by 
some of the experienced and junior auditors. A good illustration of such problem is that auditors 
do not always distinguish between two different approaches to discounted cash flow valuation – 
levered vs. unlevered (debt-free) methods. This may lead to application of an inappropriate 
discount rate in the analysis, which produces a highly material difference in the resulting CGU 
RA estimate. 
As discussed, the process study demonstrates the difficulties that the participants 
experience with producing a reasonable range for the CGU RA. The issue encompasses several 
distinct problems, including: 1) Participants not recognizing the necessity to narrow down the 
range given the amount of audit materiality; 2) Participants relying on judgmental shortcuts to 
arrive at a point estimate (e.g., using a midpoint of the range as a point estimate); 3) Participants 
not having a systematic method of reducing the range given the audit materiality. One of the 
ways to alleviate the above problems is to introduce a decision aid to help the auditors and 
valuation specialists to produce a reasonable range for complex FV estimates.  
The elicitation study tests probability distribution elicitation methods as a candidate for 
such a decision aid. More precisely, two elicitation methods – cumulative distribution function 
method (CDF) and credible interval method (CI) – are tested and compared between each other 
as well as to the unaided judgment in an experiment using the same CGU/goodwill impairment 
case and the same groups of participants as in the process study. The reason for choosing the 
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CDF and CI methods is that they are very often used to elicit individuals’ probability 
distributions in business settings, as shown in the extant literature.  
One of the results of the elicitation paper is calculating “implied confidence levels”, 
which are levels of confidence exercised by the participants in their unaided intervals for the 
model input parameters, determined through comparisons to the assisted intervals developed 
with the help of elicitation methods. The averaged implied confidence levels for experienced 
auditors are in 55% – 62% range, while implied confidence levels for junior auditors are in 59% 
– 66% range.4 Therefore, experienced auditors appear to require a lower level of confidence for 
the input parameter intervals for FV models, implying a negative relationship between the level 
of confidence and auditor’s expertise (proxied by experience). 
The investigation of effectiveness of probability distribution elicitation methods for 
improving unaided judgment indicates that the CDF method has such ability, while the CI 
method does not. Particularly, if a 50% percent confidence level is chosen for the valuation 
model input parameters, the use of the CDF method yields a smaller standard deviation of the 
interval widths (and thus more consistency among the participants) than unaided judgment.
5
 The 
use of the CI method does not lead to a similar result. 
A direct comparison of the CDF distribution elicitation method to the CI method also 
demonstrates a higher effectiveness of the CDF method. For both experienced and junior 
auditors, for the comparable intervals (25% to 75% cumulative distribution under the CDF and 
50% confidence interval under the CI), the CDF method produces a set of intervals which 1) 
result in narrower (on average) intervals for the resulting FV, and 2) have a smaller standard 
deviation of the interval widths and lower and upper bounds for the resulting FV, than the CI 
                                                     
4
 The implied confidence levels for valuation specialists are difficult to estimate reliably due to the small number of 
observations. 
5
 This finding is mostly due to the junior auditors.  
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method. In other words, the use of the CDF method leads to a better compliance with IAS 540 
and to a higher consistency of judgment among auditors, compared to the CI method. For 
valuation specialists, however, interval widths for the resulting FV, as well as their standard 
deviations and the standard deviations of their lower and upper bounds are smaller for the CI 
method, compared to the CDF method. This may be explained either by a small sample size 
available for this group of participants, or alternatively by valuation specialists being more 
skillful than auditors with the use of probability distributions. 
The results in the verbal protocols suggest that the CDF distribution elicitation method 
surpasses the CI method for the purposes of quantification of uncertainty inherent in complex FV 
estimates. For the group of words characteristic of the quantification of uncertainty process, the 
CDF method has higher frequencies of occurrence for a larger number of individual words, as 
well as has a higher composite index based on equal weighting of frequencies for all of the 
words in the group, compared to the CI method. 
Finally, I hypothesize and find that the CDF distribution elicitation method, compared to 
the CI method, has smaller susceptibility to the anchoring heuristics. This prediction is based on 
the fact that the CI method routine operates in “interval” terms, while the CDF method routine 
operates in “value” (a distributional fractile) terms. Thus, the participants’ prior-held beliefs 
about the parameter intervals may enter the elicitation process more easily when the CI method 
is used rather than when the CDF method is used. 
The elicitation study thus contributes to the academic literature by bringing together 
auditing research and elicitation research in a FV auditing setting. From a practical perspective, 
the paper has the potential to improve current audit practices related to auditing of goodwill 
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impairment and possibly other complex FVs. This is accomplished by providing information 
valuable for the development of decision aids useful in FV audits.  
1.4 Outline of the Study  
This dissertation study consists of five chapters. The Introduction chapter (Chapter 1) 
provides general motivation for the study, discusses the reasons for choosing goodwill/CGU 
impairment as a basis for the experimental case, as well as outlines the main results of the two 
studies comprising the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review which 
includes both FV reporting, auditing, and valuations standards and academic studies related to 
the FV auditing subject. The literature review focuses on the auditing research since the 
introduction of the new FV reporting standards (circa 2007). Archival and behavioral papers are 
addressed in separate sections. Chapter 3 is the first of the two studies comprising the 
dissertation. As mentioned above, it is called the “process study” because it relies on the process 
analysis methodology based on concurrent verbal protocols. Chapter 4 is the second dissertation 
study, called the “elicitation study” since it experimentally tests probability distribution 
elicitation methods as a means to assist auditors with constructing reasonable ranges for complex 
FVs. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation study. It contains a discussion of the study’s 
contributions to academic research, regulation and standard settings, as well as education. It also 
provides suggestions for future research arising from the dissertation’s findings, and lists the 
limitations of both of the studies comprising the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
2.1 FV Financial Reporting and Auditing Standards  
Table 1 summarizes current financial reporting and auditing rules on FVs both in the 
U.S. and IFRS-adopting countries. It demonstrates that under both of the regimes, the systems of 
relevant standards are complex and evolving. In IFRS jurisdictions, IFRS 13 “Fair Value 
Measurement” (IASB 2011) governs the use of FVs for financial and nonfinancial assets and sets 
up a three-level hierarchy based on the observability of inputs to the valuation, while 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 and 39 (IASB 2004a and 2004b) prescribe rules for 
impairment of assets (including goodwill) and financial instruments, respectively.
6
  Both IFRS 
13 and SFAS 157 define the levels of as in a parallel way, whereby Level 1 inputs represent 
“quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can 
access at the measurement date”, Level 2 inputs represent “inputs other than quoted prices 
included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly”, 
and Level 3 inputs represent “unobservable inputs for the asset or liability” (IASB 2009, pp. 23, 
25, 26). With regard to goodwill, U.S. rules are different from IFRS because SFAS 142 permits 
reliance on management’s reporting structure to define the business units used in the assessment 
of goodwill, whereas IAS 36 defines a cash generating unit (CGU) as the smallest possible 
subset of assets that produces independent cash inflows for the company. 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 540 “Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including 
FV Accounting Estimates, and Related Disclosures” (IAASB 2008) guides the auditing of 
                                                     
6
 In the U.S., SFAS 142 (FASB 2001) changed the measurement of goodwill from amortization of acquisition cost 
to valuation based on periodic impairment testing, which entails fair value determination of business units. 
Subsequently, SFAS 157 (FASB 2007 and 2011) established a framework for measuring fair values (with three 
levels, as in IFRS 13) and expanded the disclosures. 
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estimates, including FVs, for IFRS adopters.
7
 As discussed below, these auditing standards have 
been criticized for applying legacy methods used for auditing historical cost financial statements 
to FVs such as Level 2 and 3 FVs or the value of goodwill impairment, which are subject to a 
much higher level of uncertainty.  
Canadian CICBV practice standards
8
 include 18 valuations standards which are intended 
to encompass different valuations engagements such as valuations for issuing a fairness opinion, 
valuations for financial reporting (auditing), valuations for litigation support, etc. Valuation 
engagements for financial reporting purposes are governed by Practice Standard No. 110 
“Valuation Report Standards and Recommendations” and Appendix B to Practice Standard No. 
110 “Valuation for Financial Reporting”. 
2.2 Archival Studies on Auditability of FVs  
Using financial statements of Wells Fargo and General Motors as examples, Christensen t 
al. (2012) demonstrate that a small change in one of the inputs to a Level 3 FV can produce a 
highly material “swing” in the reported FV. The authors question whether positive assurance on 
such balances can be obtained and suggest that negative review-level assurance or positive 
assurance on the ranges seem more realistic (Christensen et al. 2012, p. 140).  
These concerns are echoed in Smieliauskas (2012), who introduces three scenarios:  1) 
“Accounting estimate nirvana” occurs when the width of the reasonable range of an estimate 
does not exceed the material misstatement, implying that any point in the reasonable range does 
                                                     
7
 For audits of U.S. issuers, AU Section 328 “Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures” (AICPA 2002) 
guides auditing fair values belonging to the hierarchy. The U.S. Public Company Accountability and Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) (2013) states that besides AU Section 328, three other relevant standards are AU Section 332 
(AICPA 2001), AU Section 336 (AICPA 1998), and AU Section 342 (AICPA 1997), which relate to auditing 
derivatives, hedges, and investment securities, reliance on a specialist, and auditing accounting estimates, 
respectively. 
8
 In Canada, valuation practitioners are member of Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators (CICBV). 
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not have a significant estimation risk, as defined in ISA 540 (IAASB 2008); 2) “Estimate 
problem” exists when the width of the reasonable range is greater than the material misstatement 
but does not exceed twice the material misstatement, meaning there is at least one estimate with 
no significant risk. 3) “Estimate nightmare” takes place when twice the material misstatement is 
smaller than the width of the reasonable range, so that all points inside or outside of the 
reasonable range have significant risks (Smielauskas 2012, p. 279), under which a change to 
another financial reporting framework is necessary. 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) comment that SFAS 142 (FASB 2001), in contrast with prior 
standards, derives the goodwill impairment amount from unverifiable management estimates of 
its current value. They find
9
 that management’s private information (measured by share 
repurchases, insider trading, 10-K tone, and one-year-ahead returns) does not bear on goodwill 
impairments, while agency-based predictions have some grounds (debt covenants that rely on the 
goodwill balance and the CEO’s tenure are (weakly) linked to non-impairments).   
Summarizing, some complex FV balances are very sensitive to small variations in input 
model parameters. This may lead to situations when it is not possible to provide positive 
assurance on a point estimate of a complex FV. Also, management appear to use subjectivity in 
complex FVs to meet debt covenants and/or protect their reputation rather than signal insider 
information. This increases the importance of auditing for such balances. 
2.3 Behavioral Research on FV Auditing  
While archival studies primarily deal with issues around the reporting outcomes of FV 
audits, the experimental and interview-based studies shed light on the underlying audit process. 
                                                     
9
 The sample consists of firms with strong market signs of goodwill impairment, specifically when a firm’s book 
value exceeds its market value (BTM>1) for two years in a row in 2003-2006. 
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These studies are summarized in Table 2. They provide information about behavioral aspects 
related to FV audits such as biases and reliance on experts.  
2.3.1 Biases in Auditors’ Judgment When Evaluating FV Estimates 
Montague (2010) shows that auditors are subjected to more confirmation bias (i.e., 
auditor seeks more confirming than disconfirming evidence) when they are asked to counter (vs. 
support) management’s estimate or generate their own estimate, while this bias increases the 
professional skepticism.
10
 Additionally, the confirmation bias is the highest in 
“counter/disconfirm” condition with high estimation uncertainty. Cohen et al. (2016) follow 
Monatgue (2010) in investigating the procedure frame
11
 on the auditor’s actions. In a single-
factor experiment the authors find that a balanced frame (vs. a positive or negative ones) causes 
auditors to use more evidence countering, rather than supporting management’s assertions, 
resulting in higher perceived RMM, and leading to lower FV balances, implying that revising 
current audit standards from positive to balanced frame leads to more conservative FV audits. 
Maksymov et al. (2015) investigate how audit procedure positive vs. negative frame 
(defined as the need to ascertain whether management’s assumptions are reasonable vs. not 
reasonable, respectively), efficiency pressure (high vs. low), and the extent posterior verifiability 
of audit quality (rated by the participants) bear on budgeted time for Level 3 FVs audit 
procedures. The authors find that the negative frame leads to planning for more audit hours, 
especially for procedures that are perceived as less verifiable. This implies that re-framing audit 
procedures from the (typical in practice) positive frame to a negative one is expected to increase 
audit effort. 
                                                     
10
 In Montague (2010), the professional skepticism is measured via skeptical judgment and action (the risk of 
material misstatement of the estimate and the quantum of recommended adjustment, respectively). 
11
 Three levels of procedure frame are considered, where “support” represents a positive frame, “support and 
oppose” represents a balanced frame, and “oppose” represents a negative frame. 
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Griffin (2014) experimentally manipulates subjectivity (Level 2 vs. 3 FV), imprecision 
(narrow vs. wide estimate range), and footnote disclosure about estimate inputs (present vs. 
absent) and finds that the interaction between subjectivity and imprecision makes an adjustment 
more likely, while disclosure reduces the interaction. Griffin (2014) also discovers that auditors 
calculate the FV adjustment quantum by comparing management’s FV estimate to the nearest 
bound (vs. the midpoint) of the auditors’ range, implying a strict application of auditing 
standards. 
Earley, Hoffman, and Joe (2014) experimentally investigate whether auditors 
experienced in the FV auditing task exercise skepticism about the management's SFAS 157 
(FASB 2007) Level 2 vs. 3 classification judgments, because they may subconsciously gravitate 
towards the management's classification, as happens with Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 internal 
control judgments (Earley et al. 2008). They find that auditors do exercise skepticism, especially 
when the management settles on the less conservative FV reporting alternative.  
Summarizing, auditing complex FVs is a process which can be subjected to a number of 
biases. Estimation uncertainty/imprecision appears to be an important feature of FV balances, 
which influences both auditors’ biases and the amount of adjustment suggested by the auditors. 
2.3.2 The Use of Valuation Experts 
Carpentier, Labelle, Laurent, and Suret (2008) observe that auditing FV assets with no 
liquid active market can be made easier by obtaining help from outside experts and by 
introducing valuation standards by practitioner bodies. Carpentier et al. (2008) ask a group of 43 
Chartered Business Valuators (CBVs) to follow the Canadian Venture Capital Association’s 
(CVCA’s) recommendations to value a small, private, pre-IPO high tech firm and find that, 
despite the uniform guidance provided by the CVCA, the respondents rely on a variety of 
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methods and utilize different multiples in the valuation process.  Carpentier et al. (2008) note 
that these differences in the valuation process translate into a very wide range of resulting FMVs, 
and that the post-IPO value verification reveals overstatement.  
Jamal, Marshall, and Tan (2011) experimentally gauge the effectiveness of two means for 
reducing the bias of professional accountants (e.g., acting as auditors or business valuators) 
arising from the desire to please a fee-generating client, disclosure and certification, by asking 
161 participants to value a business for issuing a fairness opinion. The participants are placed 
either into a “no conflict” control condition or into conditions created by manipulating the type 
of conflict (with the selling party, or with both the buying and the selling parties) and the bias 
reduction mechanism (no mechanism, disclosure, certification, or the combination of both). The 
authors discover that when only the selling party is present, conflict disclosure is dysfunctional 
as it produces bias. When both the buying and the selling parties are present, the biased is 
observed across all of the conditions. The authors conclude that the certification mechanism of 
bias reduction is ineffective, but the disclosure mechanism is dysfunctional. 
Joe et al. (2015) conduct an experiment with 92 audit seniors employed with a “Big 4” 
firm, in which the evidence quantification level (low vs. high) and control environment risk (low 
vs. high) are manipulated with the proportional effort allocated to FV audit procedures serving as 
a dependent variable. The authors find that the auditors allocate less proportionate effort to 
testing the subjective inputs of management’s FV estimate when both the quantification evidence 
level and control risk are high. In a supplemental experiment, an introduction of a regulatory 
practice alert (re: focus audit effort on FV inputs that are subject to management bias) is not 
resulting in a change of effort allocation documented in the first study. 
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Griffith (2015) analyzes interview data with 28 auditors who used valuation specialists 
and establishes that they apply auditing standards’ guidance for external specialists to internal 
valuation specialists. Further, if there is no relevant guidance, the auditors lead the specialists to 
comply with the audit team’s prevailing position. Griffith (2015) finds that main issues in the 
area are related to the complex FVs’ inherent uncertainty, which causes the auditors to rely on 
reports of valuation specialists that they cannot competently review or even understand.   
Griffith (2014) notes that audit-team valuation specialists often produce caveats to let the 
auditors know about reservations on certain assumptions (while the overall conclusion on the 
estimate is “clean”). The author, using an experiment with 78 experienced auditors, finds that 
their review of evidence with regard to a biased complex estimate and related audit judgments 
incorporate a caveat if the estimate originates from a source which is perceived to have low 
credibility (prepared by the client in-house). If the preparer’s source credibility is perceived as 
high (prepared by a third party), the caveat is disregarded.  
Summarizing, the body of research evidence regarding valuation specialists’ performance 
in audit and/or valuation tasks is at present fairly limited. For the purpose of this study, the most 
important finding from the extant literature implies that current professional 
recommendations/standards for business valuators may not be effective in helping them to deal 
with uncertainty inherent in complex FVs, and that valuation processes used by the valuators are 
far from being uniform. A modification to the existing recommendations as well as their 
supplementation with relevant decision aids might be necessary to achieve an improvement. 
2.3.3 Studies of FV Audit Process 
Griffith et al (2012) expect that the audit process for complex estimates will not be 
similar to the one for historical cost numbers, since the two tasks have different goals and 
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structures, and call for a framework for understanding the process. The authors interview 24 
auditors experienced with complex estimates, and conclude that the auditors rely less on their 
own models but rather prefer to test management’s (or specialist-developed) models for complex 
estimates, which leads to underweighting of external evidence. Griffith et al. (2012) suggest that 
this underweighting can be corrected via modifications to the auditing standards, changes to their 
implementation, as well as staffing valuation tasks with auditors who have a suitable cognitive 
processing style. The authors also find that auditors’ decision to verify management’s estimate 
may be based on effort and efficiency consideration, given their investment in understanding 
management’s model. Also, better communication with the valuation specialists and using more 
experienced auditors may decrease their excessive reliance on the specialists, because it likely 
stems from auditors not understanding the specialists’ models. 
Griffith et al. (2015), based on the same interview data, find that auditors most frequently 
elect to verify the management’s estimate, rather than to develop an auditor’s own estimate or 
review subsequent events, and that they examine separate elements of management’s estimates 
in isolation without looking at the “big picture”.  Based on institutional theory, the authors name 
two root causes of this situation: excessive focus on verifying management’s estimates in the 
standards and audit firms’ current distribution of knowledge between auditors and specialists, 
whereby the auditors do not know enough about valuation.  
Cannon and Bedard (2015) conduct a survey-based field investigation of auditing of 
complex FV estimates and find that uncertainty in the estimates is positively related to the 
assessed inherent risk, but in a number of cases the estimate’s inherent risk is assessed below 
maximum even though the uncertainty leads to ranges that are larger than materiality. They find 
that use of a valuation specialist by the client triggers the reliance on a specialist by the auditors. 
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In their sample of engagements, the auditors most frequently (in 53% of the cases) choose to 
develop their own independent estimate or range for a FV, instead of testing managements 
estimate or evaluating subsequent realizations. Cannon and Bedard (2015) observe that obtaining 
positive assurance on complex FVs may not always be possible. 
Griffith’s et al. (2014) experiment shows that a deliberative mindset intervention helps 
auditors to detect unreasonable estimates because such intervention assists them in finding 
conflicting information from other audit areas and including it into the analysis. The authors 
suggest that the intervention forces the auditors think broader instead of working harder, thus 
improving audit quality of complex estimates.  
Summarizing, while the above studies shed some light on the auditing process of 
complex FVs, they do not offer any structured decision aids that can help to overcome the 
process shortcomings. Additionally, there is not enough information on how and why the 
processes are different between the auditors and valuation specialists. 
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Chapter 3 - How Are FV Impairments Audited? A Study of Auditors 
and Valuation Specialists 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent changes in financial reporting regulation effected by the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe, Australia, and Canada, as well as the 
introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 142 (FASB 2001) and 
SFAS 157 (FASB 2007 and 2011) in the U.S. significantly increased users’ exposure to FVs and 
thus made the issue of FV auditing extremely important for the stakeholders. The new standards 
introduced a three-level hierarchy of FV types based on the observability of inputs, and moved 
from goodwill amortization to its impairment testing. These changes highlighted problems with 
auditing highly complex, judgment-dependent and inherently uncertain items such as FVs at the 
higher levels of the hierarchy and goodwill impairments. There is a concern that in some 
circumstances such FVs may not be auditable, and that requiring auditors to provide positive 
audit-level assurance on them may necessitate changes to the current financial reporting model, 
e.g. reporting ranges or confidence intervals, rather than point estimates (Christensen et al. 2012; 
Smieliauskas 2012). Current auditing standards have been criticized for applying legacy methods 
used for auditing historical cost balances to complex FVs, which are subject to a much higher 
level of uncertainty, and regulators point to numerous problems with FV audits in recent years 
(IFIAR 2014).  
The complexity and novelty of FV auditing tasks to the auditors, the proliferation of 
problems with FV auditing discovered by the regulators, together with the importance of FV 
reporting and audit quality to capital markets, make the understanding of the underlying FV 
auditing process a promising avenue for research. This paper provides quasi-experimental 
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evidence about the process of FV auditing obtained based on verbal protocols methodology, 
which helps to better understand and improve the auditing of complex FVs (using goodwill 
impairment task as a specific example). Particularly, the study investigates the ways in which 
auditors deal with uncertainty inherent in the goodwill impairment audit task, and compares 
process differences between the auditors and valuation specialists. 
The following section provides motivation and literature review that focuses on the 
auditing research since the introduction of the new FV reporting standards (circa 2007). It also 
looks at the suitability of goodwill impairment as an exemplar FV auditing task. It is followed by 
a discussion of relevant theory and the development of research questions. The next section 
outlines the research methodology, followed by a discussion of quasi-experimental results. The 
conclusion summarizes academic and practical contributions of the study. 
3.2 Motivation and Literature Review  
The literature review focuses on several unexplored areas that a quasi-experimental study 
of the FV auditing process can help to address. First, a discussion of the features of complex FV 
estimates which make them difficult to audit highlights a necessity to investigate how auditors 
deal with these problematic areas. Second, prior archival results establish a relationship between 
audit quality and the quality of reported FVs. These results suggest a need to understand 
differences in the auditing process among auditors of different quality, since these differences 
have a bearing on the resulting FVs’ reliability and representational faithfulness. Third, there is 
evidence that the features of complex FVs that make them difficult to audit influence a number 
of auditors’ biases as well as key audit judgments, e.g. the suggested adjustment. Since little is 
known about the mechanisms of such influence, a process study will be useful for uncovering 
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these mechanisms. Forth, extant interview based studies of the auditing process, while helpful 
with identifying the difficult areas, provide little information on how auditors deal with them 
when obtaining assurance. Finally, a review of the papers on valuation specialists’ involvement 
with FV audits indicates a lack of direct evidence about the specialists’ auditing process. 
3.2.1 Characteristics of FVs Affecting Their Auditability   
Prior archival papers shed light on the characteristics of FV reporting that contribute to 
the difficulty of providing assurance on such balances. For complex model-based FVs, a major 
problem appears to lie in very high sensitivity of resulting FVs to variations in the input 
parameters. Christensen et al. (2012) demonstrate this on the examples of Wells Fargo’s 
mortgage-backed securities and General Motors’ pension liabilities, whereby very small changes 
in interest and discount rates respectively cause material swings in the reported amounts. The 
authors question whether positive assurance on such balances can be obtained, as negative 
review-level assurance or positive assurance on the ranges may be more realistic. These concerns 
are echoed in an analytical paper by Smieliauskas (2012), who introduces three scenarios:  1) 
“Accounting estimate nirvana” occurs when the width of the reasonable range of an estimate 
does not exceed the material misstatement, implying that any point in the reasonable range does 
not have a significant estimation risk, as defined in ISA 540 (IAASB 2008); 2) “Estimate 
problem” exists when the width of the reasonable range is greater than the material misstatement 
but does not exceed twice the material misstatement, meaning there is at least one estimate with 
no significant risk. 3) “Estimate nightmare” takes place when twice the material misstatement is 
smaller than the width of the reasonable range, so that all points inside or outside of the 
reasonable range have significant risks (Smieliauskas 2012, p. 279), under which a change to 
another financial reporting framework is necessary. 
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This research points to the necessity to understand how auditors deal with such input 
parameter-sensitive models while providing assurance on complex FVs. Does the auditing 
process adequately address the underlying challenges? 
3.2.2 The Impact of Audit Quality on Representational Faithfulness of FVs  
Extant archival research demonstrates that audit quality (measured by different proxies) 
has a positive relationship with representational faithfulness of reported complex FVs, both 
perceived and actual. Stokes and Webster (2009) find that higher audit quality (measured by Big 
4/non-Big 4, switches to Big 4, and other proxies) contributes to representational faithfulness of 
goodwill balances
12
 under IFRS. Vergauwe, Gaeremynck, and Stokes (2011) document that 
during 2007-2009, for European real estate firms valuing investment property based on model 
estimates, the investors perceive that greater audit effort (measured via unexpected audit fees or 
audit delay) adds to the FVs reliability (measured using the bid-ask spread). Bratten, Caushiolli, 
and Myers (2012a), using a sample of U.S. bank holdings during 2000-2008, discover that the 
effect of auditor industry specialization
13
 on the earnings management methods of such 
companies is influenced by their exposure to FV accounting. They find that specialist auditors 
reduce transaction-based earnings management through timing of the realization of gains and 
losses on sales of investments, because clients of such auditors make more conservative 
estimates (possibly due to the knowledge possessed by the industry specialist auditors).  
These results pose a question of what drives the disparity in FV audit outcomes between 
the auditors of different quality: differences in the audit process, the audit effort, or both. If effort 
                                                     
12
 FASB and IASB Conceptual Frameworks define the representational faithfulness property in a similar way, e.g. 
SFAC 8 (FASB 2010) states that to be representationally faithful, financial information “must … represent the 
phenomena that it purports to represent” in “complete, neutral, and free from error” manner (p. 17). Economic 
goodwill is a part of the firms’ investment opportunity set (IOS), where Chalmers, Godfrey, and Webster’s (2009) 
IOS composite measure is based on factor analysis of market-to-book, price-to-earnings, and other ratios. 
13
 The effect is weakened in the presence of a Big 4 auditor. 
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is the key to improving representational faithfulness of FVs, and the auditor’s process is not a 
significant determinant of the audit quality for such audits, creating incentives for more hours 
spent on auditing FVs (such as raising penalties for audit firms) will solve the problem. If the 
process does matter, it is important to determine what aspects of it distinguish a high-quality 
auditor from a low quality one. 
3.2.3 The Influence of Information Uncertainty/Imprecision of Complex FVs on Auditors’ 
Judgment 
While papers discussed above demonstrate that certain features inherent in complex FVs 
contribute to the difficulty of auditing of such balances, a number of experimental articles look at 
how these features affect the auditors’ biases and judgments such as the amount of proposed 
adjustment. Montague (2010) shows that auditors are subjected to more confirmation bias (i.e., 
auditor seeks more confirming than disconfirming evidence) when they are asked to counter (vs. 
support) management’s estimate or generate their own estimate, while this bias increases the 
professional skepticism. Additionally, the confirmation bias is the highest in 
“counter/disconfirm” condition with high estimation uncertainty.  
Griffin (2014) experimentally manipulates subjectivity (Level 2 vs. 3 FV), imprecision 
(narrow vs. wide estimate range), and footnote disclosure about estimate inputs (present vs. 
absent) and finds that the interaction between subjectivity and imprecision makes an adjustment 
more likely, while disclosure reduces the interaction. Griffin (2014) also discovers that auditors 
calculate the FV adjustment quantum by comparing management’s FV estimate to the nearest 
bound (vs. the midpoint) of the auditors’ range, implying a strict application of auditing 
standards. 
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Maksymov et al. (2015) investigate how audit procedure frame (an auditor judges 
whether management’s assumptions are reasonable vs. not reasonable), efficiency pressure (high 
vs. low), and the extent posterior verifiability of audit quality (rated by the participants) bear on 
budgeted time for Level 3 FVs audit procedures. The authors find that the negative frame leads 
to planning for more audit hours, especially for procedures that are perceived as less verifiable. 
This implies that re-framing audit procedures from the (typical in practice) positive frame to a 
negative one is expected to increase audit effort. 
The above papers offer evidence that features of complex FVs such as estimation 
uncertainty/imprecision and difficult ex-post verifiability bear both on the auditors’ biases and on 
the key audit judgments, e.g. on the amount of adjustment suggested by the auditors. However, 
they provide a limited insight into the mechanisms of such influence. A process study that sheds 
light on these mechanisms will produce information useful for assisting the auditors when they 
deal with uncertainty/imprecision and proposing any corrective actions, if necessary. 
3.2.4 Studies of FV Audit Process 
Griffith et al. (2012) interview 24 auditors experienced with complex estimates and 
identify the steps that the auditors follow in the process and the issues that are problematic in the 
auditors’ view. They conclude that the auditors rely less on their own models but rather prefer to 
test management’s (or specialist-developed) models, which leads to underweighting of external 
evidence. Griffith et al. (2012) suggest that this can be corrected via modifications to the auditing 
standards, changes to their implementation, staffing valuation tasks with auditors who have a 
suitable cognitive processing style, as well as better communication with the valuation specialists 
and using more experienced auditors. The authors also find that auditors’ decision to verify 
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management’s estimate may be based on effort and efficiency consideration, given their 
investment in understanding management’s model. 
Griffith et al. (2015), based on the same interview data, find that auditors most frequently 
elect to verify management’s estimate, rather than to develop an auditor’s own estimate or 
review subsequent events, and that they examine separate fragments of management’s estimates 
in isolation without looking at the “big picture”.  Based on institutional theory, the authors 
suggest two root causes of this situation: excessive focus on verifying management’s estimates in 
the standards and audit firms’ current distribution of knowledge between auditors and specialists, 
whereby the auditors do not know enough about valuation.  
Cannon and Bedard (2015) conduct a survey-based field investigation of auditing of 
complex FV estimates and find that uncertainty in the estimates is positively related to the 
assessed inherent risk, but in a number of cases the estimate’s inherent risk is assessed below 
maximum even though the uncertainty leads to ranges that are larger than materiality. They find 
that use of a valuation specialist by the client triggers the reliance on a specialist by the auditors. 
In their sample of engagements, the auditors most frequently (in 53% of the cases) choose to 
develop their own independent estimate or range for a FV, instead of testing managements 
estimate or evaluating subsequent realizations. Cannon and Bedard (2015) observe that obtaining 
positive assurance on complex FVs may not always be possible. 
Griffith et al. (2014) experiment shows that a deliberative mindset intervention helps 
auditors to detect unreasonable estimates because such intervention assists them in finding 
conflicting information from other audit areas and including it into the analysis. The authors 
suggest that the intervention forces the auditors to think broader instead of working harder, thus 
improving audit quality of complex estimates.  
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The existing studies of the FV auditing process based on interview methodology provide 
important information about the steps that auditors follow while attending to FV auditing tasks 
and the elements of the process that they see as problematic. These studies also offer advice on 
how certain aspects of the auditors’ behavior can be changed in a desired way. This includes 
encouraging auditors to purse the development of independent estimates rather than verifying 
management’s estimates and getting them to take a broader perspective to incorporate evidence 
from other audit areas. However, the extant process studies of FV auditing leave out questions 
about how auditors handle FV features that make the FV balances difficult to audit, that is 
information uncertainty and imprecision.  
3.2.5 The Use of Valuation Experts in FV Auditing 
Recent PCAOB consultation papers (PCAOB 2014 and 2015) highlight the interest of 
regulators and standard setters in the use of specialists during the audit, witch a particular 
emphasis on the use of valuation specialists given the increasing importance of FV audits. 
However, one of the limitations of the existing studies of the FV auditing process is that they 
provide little direct evidence of how valuation specialists approach FV auditing tasks. The 
interview-based studies discussed above have very limited input from valuation specialists. For 
example, in Cannon and Bedard (2015), of 96 FV auditing experiences analyzed by the authors, 
only three are supplied by valuation experts. Both Griffith et al. (2012) and Griffith et al. (2015) 
are based solely on interviewing 24 experienced auditors with no feedback from valuation 
specialists. Similarly, Glover’s et al. (2016) sample consists exclusively of auditor participants. 
This concern is also applicable to Griffith (2015), where only auditors’ perspective is 
taken into account, even though the study concerns the use of valuation experts. Griffith (2015) 
analyzes interview data with 28 auditors who used valuation specialists and establishes that they 
 32 
 
apply auditing standards’ guidance for external specialists to internal valuation specialists. 
Further, if there is no relevant guidance, the auditors lead the specialists to comply with the audit 
team’s prevailing position. Griffith (2015) finds that main issues in the area are related to the 
complex FVs’ inherent uncertainty, which causes the auditors to rely on reports of valuation 
specialists that they cannot competently review or even understand.   
One of the few studies directly addressing valuation specialists’ involvement in FV 
auditing is Carpentier, Labelle, Laurent, and Suret (2008). The authors observe that auditing FV 
assets with no liquid active market can be made easier by obtaining help from outside experts 
and by introducing valuation standards by practitioner bodies. Carpentier et al. (2008) ask a 
group of 43 Chartered Business Valuators (CBVs) to follow the Canadian Venture Capital 
Association’s (CVCA’s) recommendations to value a small, private, pre-IPO high tech firm and 
find that, despite the uniform guidance provided by the CVCA, the respondents rely on a variety 
of methods and utilize different multiples in the valuation process.  Carpentier et al. (2008) note 
that these differences in the valuation process translate into a very wide range of resulting FMVs, 
and that the post-IPO value verification reveals overstatement.  
Griffith (2014) investigates some aspects of reliance of auditors on valuation specialists 
when auditing complex FVs. She notes that audit-team valuation specialists often produce 
caveats to let the auditors know about reservations on certain assumptions (while the overall 
conclusion on the estimate is “clean”). The author, using an experiment with 78 experienced 
auditors, finds that their review of evidence with regard to a biased complex estimate and related 
audit judgments incorporate a caveat if the estimate originates from a source which is perceived 
to have low credibility (prepared by the client in-house). If the preparer’s source credibility is 
perceived as high (prepared by a third party), the caveat is disregarded.  
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Thus, extant research on valuation specialists’ involvement in FV auditing provides 
limited information on how the specialists handle such tasks. It appears that current professional 
recommendations/standards for business valuators are not effective in helping them to deal with 
uncertainty inherent in complex FVs, and that valuation processes used by the valuators are far 
from being uniform. These results call for obtaining direct evidence on how valuation experts 
perform FV auditing tasks, analysis of which can lead to a modification to the existing 
recommendations as well as their supplementation with relevant decision aids to achieve an 
improvement. 
3.3 Development of Research Questions  
3.3.1 FV Audit Process Map and Development of Research Questions  
While Cannon and Bedard (2015) and Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015) provide important 
evidence about the FV auditing process using field study and interview methodologies, an quasi-
experimental study in this area using a uniform task across all of the participant (which include 
both auditors and valuation specialists) is useful for a more precise description of the process, as 
well as for uncovering the differences between the auditors and the specialists.  The specific 
focus of the process study is on investigating how the participants deal with estimation 
uncertainty and imprecision in FVs, given the audit materiality. Smieliauskas (2012) notes that 
the main difficulty with auditing FVs is related to the possibility of judgmental misstatements
14
, 
which can arise either from inaccuracies in forecasting of future events (e.g., estimating growth 
and discount rates, timing and amount of future cash flows, etc.), or from other judgmental 
                                                     
14
 ISA 540 (IAASB 2008) defines judgmental misstatements as “differences arising from management’s judgments 
concerning accounting estimates that the auditor considers unreasonable, or the selection or application of 
accounting policies that the auditor considers inappropriate”. 
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inaccuracies related mostly to present events (subjective determinations such as adjusting the 
price of an asset with an active market to find the price of the original asset without an active 
market, or establishing CGUs for the purpose of goodwill impairment). From the audit theory 
standpoint, a unique problem specific to future event uncertainties is that the ranges associated 
with future events are dependent on the possible states of the economic environment, and 
obtaining more evidence on those possible states may increase the expected volatility and 
therefore widen the associated range rather than narrow it (Smieliauskas 2012, p. 266).  The 
presence of this estimation uncertainty (what Smieliauskas (2012) calls “accounting risk”) is the 
principal factor distinguishing the audit of FVs from the audit of other accounting transactions or 
balances based on historical cost, because of the necessity for the auditors to obtain assurance on 
future or hypothetical present economic transactions rather than past transactions (Smieliauskas 
2012; IAASB 2008). The analytical argument in Smieliauskas (2012) is supported by field data 
in Cannon and Bedard (2015), who discover that the primary factors that make FVs challenging 
to audit
15
 are all directly related to estimation uncertainty. In a similar vein, Menzefricke and 
Smieliauskas (2012a), using their simple model of a pension fund, demonstrate that disregarding 
the uncertainty in the return rate can lead to a material misstatement of the funding status. They 
also warn that the uncertainty around the funding status is multifaceted, and includes the 
uncertainty around mortality assumptions and outcomes of the future management-employee 
negotiations. Thus, of particular interest in a FV auditing process study is how the auditors deal 
with the uncertainty inherent in FV estimates. 
                                                     
15
 The three most frequently mentioned factors are “number of significant and/or complex assumptions associated 
with the process”,” high degree of subjectivity associated with these assumptions and factors used in the process”, 
and “high degree of uncertainty associated with the future occurrence or outcome of events underlying the 
assumptions” (mentioned by 64.6, 63.6, and 42.4% of the respondents, respectively).  
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Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra (2013) note that adequate inclusion of 
the fundamental uncertainty underlying complex FVs into auditing judgments is hampered by 
individual information processing limitations. They cite extant judgment and decision making 
research to suggest that individuals tend to lower their cognitive load when faced with difficult 
and/or uncertain tasks, producing simplified strategies (heuristics) that often lead to ignoring or 
misusing relevant information. At the same time, prior psychology literature on quantitative 
estimation, which lies at the heart of auditing complex FVs, suggests that the process of such 
estimation is influenced by information cues based on cognitive biases/heuristics and/or the use 
of domain-specific knowledge, as well as on intuitive statistical knowledge (Brown and Siegler 
1993; von Helversen and Rieskam 2008). 
The study’s research questions are formulated around the most important audit judgments 
and decisions identified in a process analysis of the FV accounting and auditing processes, with a 
particular focus on the audit of goodwill (the analysis is available from the author upon request). 
There are several reasons for choosing goodwill impairment as the accounting and auditing task 
to focus on this study. First, goodwill impairment is a multi-step process requiring extensive use 
of professional judgment by both the client’s management and the auditors, which creates a 
potential for judgmental misstatements, including those arising from estimation uncertainty. 
Second, goodwill impairment appears to be the issue most common to the general population of 
publicly listed firms, both worldwide and in Canada, when compared to other valuation tasks. 
Third, goodwill impairments appear to be an issue of importance
16
 to both audit firms and public 
companies.  
                                                     
16
 E.g., Ayres, Neal, Reid, and Shipman (2016) document that material goodwill impairments have a significant 
association with subsequent auditor switches. Also, the auditor switch becomes more likely when the relative 
magnitude of the impairment charge is higher. This finding points to the fact that auditing of goodwill balances is an 
area which generates a high level of business risk to the auditors.  
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The process analysis, presented in Table 3, Panel A, is prepared based on the current 
international accounting and auditing standards governing goodwill impairments (IAS 36; ISA 
540), as well as extant interview-based papers on FV auditing process (Cannon and Bedard 
2015; Griffith et al. 2012 and 2015). The study’s research questions are therefore formulated 
around the most important audit judgments and decisions identified in the process analysis, with 
a particular focus on those judgments and decisions which involve uncertain information and 
which are the most likely to give rise to certain cognitive biases. For the reader’s convenience, 
all of the research questions are listed in Table 3, Panel B. 
According to the process analysis, the initial step in the process of a CGU/goodwill 
impairment audit is identifying assets that may be impaired. While ISA 540 does not provide 
explicit guidance related to this step, IAS 36 suggests that the participants should identify the 
necessity to test goodwill for impairment every year (whether or not any indicators of 
impairment are present), leading to RQ 1. The participants should as well as verify the source of 
goodwill (as self-developed goodwill is not be recognized on the balance sheet). This leads to 
RQ 2, which investigates whether the participants perform the above action. 
The second step the participant is expected to perform is to verify the identification of 
CGU(s) to make sure that the CGU(s) identified by management are in accordance with the IAS 
36 definition. RQ 3 investigates whether the participants acknowledge the issue of CGU 
determination as a part of the auditing task and comes to the appropriate conclusion based on the 
case facts. This question is very important because under IFRS, compared to U.S. GAAP, the 
CGU determination is generally much more challenging and cannot be based on management’s 
internal reporting structure. It is based purely on objective economic considerations such as 
identifying the smallest part of the company producing independent cash flows. 
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The next step in the process of auditing of FV estimates is assessing the risk of material 
misstatement (RMM) for the estimate, which entails understanding of the audit client and its 
environment, including its internal controls (ISA 540, 8), as well as of the underlying 
assumptions (ISA 540.A31). The risk assessment also involves evaluating the degree of 
estimation uncertainty associated with the accounting estimate (ISA 540, 10). This stage is 
critical because it is the information uncertainty surrounding the assumptions which makes FV 
estimates difficult to audit (Christensen et al. 2012; Smieliauskas 2012). Therefore, the research 
questions which provide for the understanding of the risk assessment stage ask how the 
participants assess the RMM related to the CGU impairment amount, including the inherent and 
control risk (RQ 4), and whether the participants determine whether the impairment amount is a 
source of high estimation uncertainty (RQ 5).  
The next step in the auditing process is audit testing undertaken in response to the 
assessed RMM. Prior auditing literature does not come to a definitive conclusion about two 
major auditor decisions relevant to the audit testing step, which are 1) selecting between a pure 
substantive and combined approach and 2) selecting between testing the management’s estimate 
and developing the auditor’s own estimate or range (Cannon and Bedard 2015; Griffith et al. 
2012 and 2015). Therefore, obtaining process information about both of them is important.
17
 
This is accomplished by answering RQ 6 and RQ 7 which ask, respectively, whether the 
participants elect to use a combined or fully substantive approach, and whether they choose to 
test the management’s estimate for the goodwill/CGU impairment amount as opposed to 
developing their own estimate or range, and investigate the factors influencing both of those 
                                                     
17
 Verification against the actual outcome or other subsequent-event-type verification is only possible for simple 
accounting estimates such as provisions for bad debts or warranties. Therefore, the participants are unlikely to place 
significant weight on ISA 540, 13(a), which is based on determining whether events occurring up to the date of the 
auditor’s report provide audit evidence regarding the fair value estimate. 
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decisions. The next set of research questions investigate what alternatives to the management’s 
assumptions and/or valuation model the participants consider when either testing the 
management’s estimate or developing their own estimate or range for the goodwill/CGU 
impairment amount. RQ 8 inquires whether the participants’ elect to either consider alternative 
set of assumptions, or an alternative valuation model, or to do both. RQ 9 investigates the 
participants’ reasoning for the development of alternative assumptions and/or model, while RQ 
10 looks at the sources of information used by the participants when developing such 
assumptions and/or models.  
Additionally, the development of a participant’s own range involves narrowing the range 
if it is not considered reasonable. RQ 11 investigates whether and based on what audit evidence 
the range is narrowed down, as well as  how the participants factor in materiality when 
narrowing the range down and making the conclusion about its reasonableness.  
Further, IAS 36 defines an asset’s recoverable amount (RA) as the maximum of FV less 
costs to sell (FVLCS) and value in use (VIU). RQ 12 investigates whether the participants 
recognize the need to calculate FVLCS of the envelope business CGU in addition to VIU, to 
determine the RA. 
ISA 540.21 requires the auditor to consider indicators of possible management bias. RQ 
13 investigates whether the participants factor in any indicators of management’s bias that in 
their view are present when drawing their conclusion about the reasonableness of management’s 
estimate or developing their own estimate or range. RQ 14 enquires whether the participant 
reviews management’s compensation information when considering indicators of possible 
management bias.
18
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 ISA 540.A125does not explicitly discuss management compensation in relation to possible management’s bias, 
but rather speaks in more general terms of “management objectives” that may result in a bias. 
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While recognizing the possibility of management bias being present in reported FV 
estimates due to various incentives, ISA 540 is silent with regard to possible auditor’s biases 
which may arise in the process of auditing such estimates. The auditor’s biases may include 
unconscious cognitive biases which result from short-cut heuristics in the auditor’s judgment 
(Bratten et al. 2013) as well as deliberate biases arising from the desire to produce a valuation 
that would please a fee-generating client (Jamal, Marshall, and Tan 2011), compared to 
deliberate management’s biases discussed in ISA 540. Also, prior psychology literature on 
quantitative estimation (Brown and Siegler 1993; von Helversen and Rieskam 2008) suggests 
that the process of such estimation is influenced by information cues based on cognitive 
biases/heuristics. Therefore, RQ 15 helps to gauge the susceptibility of the participants’ process 
to the use of such cues when considering alternative assumptions and/or valuation model, while 
RQ 16 investigates the same issue in the participants’ process when narrowing down their own 
range.  For example, a participant may develop the alternative assumptions (model) by 
“adjusting away” from the initial assumptions (model) suggested by management (serving as a 
cognitive anchor). A different manifestation of anchoring may arise when a participant decides to 
use an alternative valuation model which is typical of their usual practice (but is not necessarily a 
model more appropriate in the circumstances than management’s model), or when a participant 
develops alternative assumptions for management’s model based on the features of a typical 
model reflective of their usual practice, rather than the model actually used by management. RQ 
17 and 18 investigates the possibility of deliberate participants’ bias when developing an 
alternative model and/or assumptions, and when narrowing down their own range, respectively. 
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An additional research question (RQ 19) refer to the auditors’ use of internal valuation 
specialists (including the division of responsibilities between assurance and valuations groups) 
and the auditors’ and valuation specialists’ use of third party (external) specialists in the process 
of FV auditing. This research question is warranted due to the lack of current research on the 
topic and due to interest to this issue from the regulators and standard setter (PCAOB 2014 and 
2015). 
In general, in a process analysis study (whether or not based on concurrent verbal 
protocols methodology) the expected participants’ process map plays the  role of the theoretical 
framework around which the research questions and/or hypotheses are developed and formulated 
and against which the participants’ actual process is compared and analyzed. Therefore, the FV 
audit process map developed above serves as the primary theoretical framework for this part of 
the study.  
3.3.2 Expected Process Differences Between Auditors and Valuation Specialists 
It is expected, based on the extant literature, that valuation specialists’ process while 
performing the task will be different from that of regular auditors. Particularly, it appears that 
valuation specialist are more likely than auditors to elect developing an independent estimate or 
range (rather than verifying the management’s estimate), and they tend to test model assumptions 
and the model itself rather than verify the underlying data (Cannon and Bedard 2015; Griffith et 
al. 2012 and 2015). Developing an independent estimate or range for a model-based FV may 
involve either creating alternative point estimates or ranges of the input parameters or building a 
new model altogether, or even a set of models integrated with a system of weights (Bratten et al. 
2013). As DCF (discounted cash flow) models are generally accepted for business valuation 
purposes, the valuation specialists are unlikely to switch to a different class of models, but may 
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elect to develop an alternative model within the class (e.g., using debt-free model as opposed to 
the management’s levered model). The choice between the two methods may depend on the size 
of the audit firms, where non-Big 4 firms’ specialists may gravitate towards the use of the 
unlevered method as they tend to deal with smaller clients with little or no debt financing in their 
capital structure. The case materials also allow for application of other types of DCF valuation 
methods, such as earnings capitalization technique (which may rely either on levered or 
unlevered approaches). It is difficult to predict when the valuation specialists may elect to use 
such alternative techniques as there is no prior auditing literature on this issue. 
Additionally, since dealing with FVs is likely viewed as a less difficult task by valuation 
specialists (when compared to auditors) due to their extensive training and knowledge in the 
area, the specialists are less likely than auditors to rely on simplified strategies. Therefore, it is 
predicted that the valuation specialists are less likely than the auditors to suffer from unconscious 
biases in their audit process. 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Research Methodology  
The study is a quasi-experiment, since a random assignment is difficult to accomplish due 
to the nature of the participants recruitment process. An expertise manipulation (with three 
conditions, “junior auditors”, “experienced auditors” and “valuation experts”) can be viewed as 
an experimental manipulation. The methodology is the verbal protocol analysis, a method that 
has been used in the extant auditing literature to obtain detailed evidence about and 
understanding of the processes that auditors follow when performing various types of tasks. 
Particularly, the verbal protocol analysis has been employed for studying the analytical review 
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process (Blocher and Cooper 1988; Biggs et al. 1988) and internal control evaluation process and 
audit scope determinations (Biggs and Mock 1983). The method requires subjects to “think 
aloud” when performing the task, and their thinking is captured using voice and potentially other 
recording equipment (e.g., tracking information searches, etc.)
19
. The process information is then 
coded and analyzed by the researcher(s) conducting the study.  
The concurrent verbal protocols are a good methodology fit for a process analysis study 
because they provide behavioral information about the underlying process, and render rich data 
especially valuable for analyzing complex tasks (Biggs and Mock 1983, p. 237), such as the FV 
auditing task. Biggs and Mock’s (1983) methodological note discusses potential validity threats 
inherent in the method as well as relevant safeguards. The note implies that the validity threats 
can be effectively countered by the respective safeguards, and therefore the concurrent verbal 
protocols are expected to generate an accurate description of the underlying process. The validity 
threats as well as relevant safeguards and their implementation in the study are summarized in 
Table 3B.  
This quasi-experimental study based on the concurrent verbal protocols method is 
different from the semi-structured, open-ended type interviews as well as questionnaires used in 
prior studies of FV auditing (Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015), Cannon and Bedard (2015)) in 
several respects. First, the reliance on a specific experimental case provides a context which 
allows for a more precise and detailed description of the process. Second, using a uniform task 
across all of the groups of participants (which include both experienced and junior auditors and 
valuation specialists) is more suitable for uncovering similarities and differences among these 
groups. Third, behavioral information about the process obtained based on the verbal protocols is 
helpful for studying judgmental shortcuts and behavioral biases arising in the process. As 
                                                     
19
 I use Camtasia software to record the screen activity during the study. 
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outlined above, the task for the verbal protocol analysis is a CGU impairment auditing task for a 
publicly listed company which reports under IFRS. The company is in the paper products 
industry and audited by a Big 4 audit firm. A comprehensive description of the instrument is 
given in the following section.  
Analysis techniques theorized in Newell and Simon (1972) and applied in auditing 
settings in Biggs and Mock (1983) are used, whereby the analysis is done at two levels, 
microlevel
20
 and macrolevel. This study is mainly at the macrolevel.
21
. Process analysis prepared 
as a result of the quasi-experiment are compared to the process analysis formed based on the 
current accounting and auditing standards (IAS 36; ISA 540)
22
 as well as extant interview-based 
studies of the FV auditing process (Cannon and Bedard 2015; Griffith et al. 2012 and 2015). 
Through this comparison, issues with the participants’ processes are identified and analyzed.  
3.4.2 Participants 
This study is based on a sample of 21 experienced auditors, 9 valuation specialists, and 
11 junior auditors. The experienced auditors and valuations specialists are from three Big 4 
(referred to as “Big 4 firm #1”, “Big 4 firm #2”, and “Big 4 firm #3”) and one Big 6 (referred to 
                                                     
20
 Theory of data analysis introduced by Newell and Simon (1972) states that the substance of microlevel data 
analysis is to reveal evidence of “problem space”, which is represented by goals, operators, and states of knowledge, 
in the participants’ behavior reflected in verbal protocols. Once the process data has been collected, the coding rules 
are developed and the operators are coded accordingly. 
21
 The macrolevel analysis, which consists of higher-level aggregate descriptions of the subjects’ task behavior, is 
conducted in two forms, following Biggs and Mock (1983): (1) episode abstracts and (2) process tables. Biggs and 
Mock (1983) use flowcharts instead of process tables. 
22
 In IFRS jurisdictions, International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 (IASB 2004a) prescribe rules for impairment of 
assets (including goodwill). U.S. rules differ from IFRS is several respects, e.g. SFAS 142 (FASB 2001) permits 
reliance on management’s reporting structure to define the business units used in the assessment of goodwill, 
whereas IAS 36 defines a cash generating unit (CGU) as the smallest possible subset of assets that produces 
independent cash inflows for the company. International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 540 “Auditing Accounting 
Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting Estimates, and Related Disclosures” (IAASB 2008) guides the auditing 
of estimates, including fair values, for IFRS adopters. In the U.S., AU Section 328 “Auditing Fair Value 
Measurements and Disclosures” (AICPA 2002) is relevant. 
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as “Big 6 firm #1”) public accounting firms,23 while the group of 11 junior auditors consists of 
MAcc students from a medium-size university possessing public accounting experience and 
particularly, experience with auditing goodwill or intangible assets. The study obtained ethics 
approval from the office of research ethics at the author’s university. The experienced auditors 
and valuation specialists were recruited using personal networking, while junior auditors were 
recruited by advertising the study in class. The junior auditors were remunerated at the rate of 
$30CAD an hour, while the rest of the participants were not remunerated. Table 4 presents 
selected demographic information of the current group of participants. The table suggests that the 
experienced auditors, the valuations specialists, and the junior auditors on average performed 
4.3, 9.3, and 2.5 impairment analyses in the last two years, respectively.
24
  
While efforts wwere made to obtain an equal number of participants in the junior 
auditors, experienced auditors, and valuation specialists groups of participants, it was not 
possible to achieve this objective with regard to the study’s sample. The number of valuation 
specialist participants is smaller than the number experienced auditor participants since the 
general population of valuation specialists in North American public accounting firms (the 
number of employees in the firms’ valuations practice) is smaller than the general population of 
experienced auditors (the number of employees in the firms’ assurance practice), so that the 
number of volunteers in the two groups would vary given approximately the same participant 
response rate. The number of junior auditor participants is smaller than the number experienced 
auditor participants since the recruitment of junior auditors was restricted to one medium-size 
university, and since of the requirement that they possess prior experience with auditing FV 
                                                     
23
 All of Big 4 and Big 6 participants are employed in central Canadian offices of their public accounting firms.  
24
 The two experienced auditors and one valuation specialist who report no impairment analyses performed in the 
last two years performed impairment analyses in previous years. 
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estimates narrowed the pool of potential participants significantly, compared to the number of 
potential participants with general audit experience.  
3.4.3 Quasi-Experimental Instrument 
As discussed above, the principal component of the quasi-experimental instrument is a 
CGU (goodwill) impairment case. The case was developed by the researcher and is not adapted 
from any prior academic or professional publication or any other source. It involves a public 
company in the paper products sector. A concise summary of the experimental instrument is 
provided in Table 5, whereas the case selection criteria are discussed in Appendix 1. The case 
instructions are shown in Figure 1. The case instructions were designed to make the participants 
follow their normal auditing process. 
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FIGURE 1 
Case Instruction (Process Study)  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS 
Please read the following scenario and perform the required task. During your 
participation you will be requested to think out loud.  If you fall silent, I will prompt you to 
“please think out loud” or “please say what you are thinking now”. 
Introduction 
You are a part of the engagement team assigned to audit the financial statements of Supremex, 
Inc. (“the Company” or “Supremex”) for the year ended December 31, 2012 (Fiscal 2012). 
Supremex, Inc. is a continuing audit client and its financial statements have been audited by your 
firm for several previous years. Supremex was incorporated on March 31, 2006 under the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act. The common shares of the Company are listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) under the symbol SXP. 
Supremex is Canada’s leading manufacturer and marketer of a broad range of stock and custom 
envelopes and related products. Supremex employs approximately 550 people and is the only 
national envelope manufacturer in Canada, with seven manufacturing facilities across six 
provinces. This national presence allows Supremex to meet the manufacturing needs of large 
national customers, such as large Canadian corporations, nationwide resellers and government 
bodies, as well as paper merchants and solution and process providers. 
Supremex’s management has determined that there is one cash generating unit (CGU) – the 
envelope business.   The Company has completed a detailed impairment analysis of the CGU as 
at December 31, 2012.  As a result, an impairment charge of $29,880,165 was recorded for the 
CGU.  Assume for the purposes of this case you concur with management’s identification of the 
CGUs. 
Your Task 
It is now February 2013. Your team is conducting fieldwork on the financial statements of 
Supremex for Fiscal 2012. 
The Task: 
You  are asked to perform an audit of the CGU recoverable amount (and the resulting 
goodwill impairment charge) suggested by the management. Based on the materials 
provided  on the next page of the survey: 
 
1) Please decide whether you will: 
- test the management's estimate for the CGU recoverable amount 
or 
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- develop your own auditor’s estimate or range for the CGU recoverable amount 
(as defined in ISA 540 “Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting 
Estimates, and Related Disclosures”). 
 
2) According to your decision in  1), please either: 
- test the management's estimate for the CGU recoverable amount 
or 
- develop your own auditor’s estimate or range for the CGU recoverable amount.  
Supplemental information will be provided to you to develop your own estimate or range. Also, 
the DCF spreadsheet which is a part of management’s impairment analysis contains additional 
fields to facilitate calculation of your own estimate or range for the CGU recoverable amount. 
Note: Materiality for the audit is set at 5% of Supremex’s 2012 pre-tax income before 
extraordinary items, i. e. at $600,000 (the same materiality is obtained when it is calculated as 
0.5% of Supremex’s 2012 revenue).  
The materials are provided on the next page of the survey. The source of all of the materials 
(except External Information on Significant Assumptions) is the audit working papers. 
External Information on Significant Assumptions comes from outside sources (industry 
publications, etc). 
ISA 540 “Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting Estimates, and 
Related Disclosures” and IAS 36 "Impairment of Assets" are also provided for your reference.  
Please start the task now. Click the button in the bottom right corner to go to the next page. 
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The case was developed with the help of partner-level practitioners experienced with FV 
impairment issues. The process study was pilot tested with an MAcc student at the University of 
Waterloo possessing some experience with FV audits, an Audit Senior from a Big 4 audit firm, 
and a Senior Valuations Manager and a former Valuations Partner from a Big 6 audit firm, both 
of whom are also Canadian Chartered Business Valuators (CBVs). 
The case is based on a company in the manufacturing (paper products) industry, 
Supremex Inc., which is a producer of envelopes. The industry is chosen in order not to narrow 
the participant pool as might happen if the selected company required specialized expertise from 
auditors and valuation specialists (e.g., such specialized expertise would be needed for a 
company in the resources sector, or in financial services industry). Supremex, Inc. is an actual 
Canadian public company. The information related to Supremex as well as the supplemental 
information referenced in the case is a combination of real information
25
 and information 
generated by the researcher. The real information includes the overview of the business, the 
comparative financial statements, notes to the financial statements, comparison of current 
financial information to the prior year, description of the risk factors, internal controls, 
management compensation, and corporate governance. The information generated by the 
researcher includes the management memo, external information on significant assumptions 
(industry benchmarking information), as well as the valuation model for goodwill impairment. 
The goodwill originated from acquisitions of subsidiaries by Supremex, Inc. in a number 
of preceding years. The management decided that evidence of goodwill impairment existed 
because during the fourth quarter of the year under audit, several new indicators have shown that 
the volume decrease in North America’s envelope industry was higher than expected and that 
                                                     
25
 All of the real information is obtained exclusively from publicly available sources. The researchers have no access 
to private/confidential information about Supremex and none of it is used in this study. 
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this decline was expected to continue in the upcoming years. The management’s estimate of 
goodwill impairment is $29,268,763, representing 39% of the total goodwill carrying value of 
$75,751,125 (with the audit materiality of $600,000). The case is intentionally developed so that 
the post-impairment goodwill balance is material. This is needed to trigger the generation of 
participants’ own estimates/ranges, since an immaterial remaining balance would mean that the 
entire goodwill would be written off. 
The case facts indicate that the management is reasonably competent to estimate a 
goodwill impairment for a public company of the given size and complexity. The case does not 
suggest that the management’s estimate of goodwill impairment is biased in any way. 
As indicated in Table 5, the total length of the case materials is 35 pages in 10 PDF files, 
not counting the two PDF files with relevant financial reporting (IAS 36) and auditing (ISA 540) 
standards, which are included as a reference for the participants’ convenience. The volume of the 
case materials is thus reasonable for the expected duration of the quasi-experimental session of 
about one hour.  
Readers of this dissertation are expected to understand the findings presented herein 
without reading the full set of the experimental case materials. However, they need to carefully 
study the information presented in the current section as well as in Table 5 and Appendix 1. 
3.4.4 Administration of the Quasi-Experiment – Quasi-Experimental Session 
For all of the junior auditor participants, the experimental session was administered in the 
School of Accounting and Finance behavioral laboratory at the University of Waterloo. For all of 
the experienced auditor and valuation specialist participants the experimental session was 
administered at their firms’ offices. The sessions took place either in one of the office 
boardrooms or in one of the practice offices. In all cases, the participants were isolated from their 
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colleagues or other persons who could distract them from working on the task. In the 
researcher’s opinion, the openness and other characteristics of participants’ responses did not 
vary in any noticeable way depending on where the study was administered.  
A number of steps were taken to make participants feel comfortable and be willing to 
openly discuss their judgment and decision making process with regard to the goodwill 
impairment auditing task. Before attending to the experimental task, all of the participants were 
presented with a consent/information form, which clearly stated that if they grant permission to 
use their quasi-experimental session data for research purposes, all quotations they make and 
information they provide would not be associated with their name and/or their employer 
information in any future presentation, report, and publication. They were provided complete 
assurance of confidentiality with regards to their responses. All of the quasi-experimental 
sessions were administered by the researcher personally. No research assistants were used to help 
with the administration of the quasi-experimental sessions.
26
 
In the researcher’s opinion, there was a slight difference among the participants groups 
with regard to how openly the participants were willing to discuss their judgment and decision 
making process surrounding the goodwill impairment audit. Specifically, some manager and 
senior-manager level auditor and valuation specialist participants appeared to be slightly less 
open than other participants. The reasons for this phenomenon are not known. Overall, the 
participants seemed sufficiently open to providing detailed insights into their judgment and 
decision making process. 
                                                     
26
 One of the participants enquired whether the quasi-experimental session data could be used for promotional 
purposes within their audit firm. The participant’s attention was drawn to the consent/information form, which 
clearly indicated that the consent was given for the use of the data exclusively for research purposes. 
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There were no significant unanticipated problems encountered during the quasi-
experimental sessions. A small number of minor interruptions occurred due to issues related to 
stability of the Internet connection.
27
  
3.5 Results 
The discussion in this section is organized around the research questions. Some of the 
related research questions are grouped together for a more concise discussion. The results are 
based on the coding of verbal protocols
28
 obtained from the participants during the quasi-
experimental session. Tables in this paper supporting the frequency analysis for the research 
questions are excerpts from the verbal protocols coding, while the complete coding table is 
available upon request. 
Both the author and a research assistant (who is an accounting faculty holding a CPA and 
possessing several years of auditing experience) independently coded responses for a randomly 
selected subsample of nine participants (three experienced auditors, three valuation specialists, 
and three junior auditors). Inter-rater agreement for the subsample was 85.11 percent (Cohen’s 
Kappa of 0.54).
29
  
3.5.1 Annual Impairment Testing and the Source of Goodwill (RQ 1 and 2) 
Thirteen (62%), seven (78%), and seven (64%) experienced auditors, valuation 
specialists, and junior auditors, respectively, devoted attention to considering goodwill 
impairment indicators. Industry- and company-level revenue decline due to a technology change 
                                                     
27
 The stability of the Internet connection is important for the conduct of the quasi-experimental sessions due to the 
instrument being implemented on the Internet-based Qualtrics platform. 
28
 Provalis Research QDA Miner software was used to do the coding. 
29
 Cohen’s Kappa of 0.54 may be described as “moderate” based on the authoritative literature (Landis and Koch 
1977). Further, a rule of thumb is that Kappa measures between 0.40 and 0.70 are acceptable (Neuendorf 2002).  
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is the most frequently noted indicator of impairment. Among the related factors raised are 
interconnections between goodwill and intangible assets impairment indicators, and the necessity 
to pay close attention to impairments of intangibles as a result of that. Other factors considered 
include implications for impairment of specific long-lived assets belonging to the envelope 
business CGU, consistency of the indicators of goodwill impairment with certain economic facts 
presented elsewhere in the case materials, consistency of the current indicators with those used in 
prior periods impairment testing, disclosure quality of the impairment indicators, and others.  
Only one experienced auditor, one valuation specialist, and two junior auditors mention the 
necessity for annual testing of goodwill, suggesting that the issue may be considered implicitly 
by the participants.
30
 
Four (19%), one (11%), and two (18%) of experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and 
junior auditors respectively attempt to verify the source of goodwill, i.e. that it arose from past 
business combinations. The small number of participants paying attention to the issue may be 
explained by Supremex being a continuing client, so that most of the participants implicitly 
assume that they can rely on prior audits regarding the source of recorded goodwill. 
3.5.2 The Determination of CGUs (RQ 3) 
The necessity to obtain assurance on management’s CGU determination is expressed by 
11 (52%) of the experienced auditors, two (22%) of the valuation specialists, and one (9%) of the 
junior auditors.
31
  The fact that experienced auditors pay more attention to CGU determination 
when compared to valuation specialists may be explained by another finding of this study, 
                                                     
30
 One additional experienced auditor, however, suggests the need to consult with IAS 36 re: annual impairment 
testing of goodwill. 
31
 27 remaining participants ignored the CGU determination issue, which may be due to the instructions where the 
participants are asked to accept the management’s CGU choice, and therefore is not necessarily a problem with their 
audit process. 
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whereby the division of labor between auditors and valuation specialists assumes that the former 
are primarily responsible for the issue. Why junior auditors do not consider CGU determination 
remains to be investigated. The participants pointed out that the CGU determination is a suspect 
because the company has many subsidiaries, many products/lines of business, as well as 
geographic locations, which may have different risk profiles. 
Only two senior-level participants (an experienced auditor and a valuation specialist) 
draw attention to the need to verify the level at which the management tests/monitors goodwill. 
Specifically, one of the participants mention that management may choose to monitor goodwill 
for impairment through a group of CGUs up to the level of an operating segment, before the 
application of aggregation criteria under IFRS 8 implementation guidance. 
3.5.3 Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement and Estimation Uncertainty (RQ 4 
and 5) 
The factors related to RMM are considered almost exclusively by auditors and include 
primarily internal control considerations, which is somewhat surprising given that the same 
participants suggest that pure substantive approach is most frequently used to test goodwill 
impairments and is also applicable in the case of Supremex. 12 (57%) of experienced auditors, 
two (22%) of valuation specialists, and five (45%) of junior auditors, respectively consider 
control risk (with the specific controls around the estimate preparation, such as review and 
documentation controls, most frequently cited as relevant to an impairment audit).
32
  Only three 
(14%) of experienced auditors, one (11%) of valuation specialists, and three (27%) of junior 
auditors, respectively consider inherent risk. 
                                                     
32
 One experienced auditor and one valuation specialists suggest that controls are irrelevant to an impairment audit. 
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Three (14%) of experienced auditors and one (11%) of valuation specialists elaborate on 
the issue of estimation uncertainty, which is unexpected given that the case is an audit of a 
complex accounting estimate.
33
 The most frequent consideration is that high estimation 
uncertainty requires developing a range.  
3.5.4 Choice Between Fully Substantive vs. Combined Approach (RQ 6) 
The choice between a combined and a fully substantive approach to CGU impairment 
audit is discussed by 6 (29%) senior auditors,  one (11%) valuation specialist, and one (9%) 
junior auditor. Of those, three participants propose to use a fully substantive approach in this 
case. Three
34
 of the participants also mention that a vast majority of impairment audits are 
substantive, while none of the eight propose taking a combined approach in Supremex’s case. 
Five of the eight participants observe that testing certain controls, in principle, may lead to a 
reduction of substantive work (review controls over the impairment are most frequently 
mentioned as a specific examples). 
3.5.5 Choice Between Testing Management’s vs. Developing Auditor’s Estimate (RQ 7) 
Eight (38%) of the experienced auditors, one (11%) of the valuation specialists, and five 
(45%) of the junior auditors report they decided to develop their own estimate or range for the 
CGU RA. Nine (43%) of the experienced auditors, seven (78%) of the valuations specialists, and 
six (55%) of the junior auditors said that they tested the management’s estimate. The remaining 
participants, four (19%) of the experience auditors, one (11%) of the valuation specialist, and 
                                                     
33
 Some of the participants note/investigate the sensitivity of the CGU RA to certain input parameters of the DCF 
model (which, according to ISA 540, A45 is an indicator that the estimate possesses a high degree of estimation 
uncertainty). These facts are not included in the above frequency analysis. 
34
 One of them recalled the only company (a SEC registrant) which had goodwill impairment audited using a 
combined approach. 
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none (0%) of the junior auditors suggest that they performed a combination of the two 
approaches (two of the experienced auditors emphasize that this approach is typical in their 
practice). At the same time, one experienced auditor and three valuations specialists expressed 
some uncertainty when classifying the actions that they performed into the two mutually 
exclusive categories prescribed by IAS 540, “test management’s estimate” vs. “develop auditor’s 
estimate or range”.35 In addition to that, a significant difference in opinions emerged when the 
participants elaborated on what exactly they understood to fall into the category “developing an 
auditor’s own estimate”. The spectrum of descriptions ranged from completely disregarding the 
management calculation and developing a new model and its inputs from scratch, to altering the 
timing and amount of management’s projected cash flows, to doing sensitivity on the 
management’s model. These findings reveal that ISA 540 is interpreted quite differently by 
different auditors and valuation specialists, even if they are employed within the same office of a 
Big 4 or Big 6 public accounting firm. They also demonstrate that auditors and valuation 
specialists do not always develop and implement their FV impairment audit procedures in 
conformance with the guidance suggested by ISA 540.  
There is evidence in the verbal protocols suggesting that the decision to test the 
management’s estimate is dictated by independence/efficiency factors (for four (19%) of the 
experienced auditors and four (44%) of the valuation specialists). The underlying logic is that in 
audit (vs. independent valuation) settings an auditor’s-developed estimate cannot be reported in 
the financial statements due to independence considerations, and thus the management needs to 
                                                     
35
 When answering a direct question about what type of audit procedures they have actually performed working on 
the task, some of the participants gave uncertain answers: “it is hard to say…”, “we are probably more like verifying 
or getting ourselves comfortable…”, or “if I had to pick one, I guess I’d say...”  Some of the valuation specialists 
suggest that they actually do a third approach called an “alternate calculation”, which is based in part on the 
elements of the management’s model. 
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come up with their own correct estimate even if an auditor’s estimate is developed.36 Therefore, 
the participants argue it is much more efficient to test the management’s estimate and provide the 
management some guidance on how to perform correct valuation along the way, because such 
process leads to a reported estimate which is management’s and not auditor’s.  
Another possible reason why the vast majority of valuation specialists classify they 
actions as testing the management estimate as opposed to developing their own estimate or range 
may be rooted in the interrelationship between ISA and Canadian Institute of Chartered Business 
Valuators (CICBV) guidance. One of the valuation specialists suggests that CICBV guidance 
offers two approaches to fair valuation, an “estimate” (performed for M&A, tax, and financial 
reporting (audit) purposes and assuming a limited amount of work) and a “comprehensive 
valuation” (performed for litigation support and fairness opinions and assuming an extensive 
amount of work). In the opinion of the valuation specialists, only the comprehensive valuation, 
which is never done for audit purposes, represents a “true development” of an independent FV 
estimate. 
Additional insights provided by the above findings are related to interpretation of results 
of the extant interview-based studies of FV auditing process. First, as discussed above, Cannon 
and Bedard (2015) and Glover et al. (2016) on one hand, and Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015) on 
the other,  report conflicting findings with regard to auditors electing to verify management’s 
estimate vs. developing their own estimate of reported complex FVs. The above results 
demonstrate that there is a need to clarify how the interviewed auditors understand the two 
approaches before making any further conclusions and/or comparisons. Second, there appears to 
be an alternative option of a combination of testing management’s estimate and developing 
                                                     
36
 This creates inefficiencies because two estimates (an auditor’s and a correct management’s) need to be developed 
for the same audit. 
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auditor’s own estimate or range, which is neither described in the prior studies nor mentioned in 
ISA 540. Third, for the senior-level participants (including both auditors and especially valuation 
specialists), the decision to test management’s estimate as opposed to develop auditor’s own 
estimate appears to be driven by considerations of auditor’s independence as well as efficiency, 
rather than the difficulty of developing own independent estimate or range, investment of 
time/effort in understanding the management’s estimate, or excessive focus of the current 
auditing guidance on the testing option, as suggested in some of the extant studies.  
Factors influencing testing management’s vs. developing own estimate or range choice 
are reported in Table 6. Table 6 should be interpreted considering that there is a considerable 
variation in how the participants understand what constitutes the two approaches prescribed in 
ISA 540. Nonetheless, the results in the table indicate that there is little consistency among the 
participants on what influences the test vs. develop choice, as well as reveal some of the factors 
which are applied in different directions (e.g., materiality of the estimate), or applied in the same 
direction but using different underlying logic (e.g., internal client’s risk rating). 
3.5.6 Use of Alternative Assumptions vs. Use of Alternative Model (RQ 8) 
The results demonstrate that the valuation specialists overwhelmingly elect to make 
modifications to the management’s model. On the other hand, auditors are less critical of the 
management’s model. They tend to develop alternative assumptions or verify the management-
suggested assumptions, while leaving the management-suggested model either largely intact or 
with less significant modifications than those proposed by the valuation specialists.  
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3.5.7 Reasoning for the Application of the Alternative Assumptions and/or Model (RQ 9) 
Table 7, Panel A lists the most frequent reasons for the suggested modifications of the 
management’s model: the use of alternative types of discounting methods, the need to include 
certain items omitted from the forecast such as capital expenditure cash outlays, CCA tax 
shield/tax amortization benefits, and working capital changes, and  the application of debt-free 
(vs. levered) valuation approach.  
The participants’ reasons for developing an alternative set of assumptions are provided in 
Table 7, Panel B. The reasons vary depending on the input parameter, e.g. for the discount rate 
the most frequently cited reasons for modification include insufficient support for the equity risk 
premium calculation, the use of CAPM (vs. build-up) method, the need to recalculate the 
discount rate, the need to include company specific (projection, forecast) risk into the discount 
rate, and others.  Table 7, Panel B shows that the valuation specialists are most involved with 
the discount and growth rate input parameters, whereas the rest of the parameters are attended 
primarily by the experienced and junior auditors.  
3.5.8 Sources of Information for and Issues Considered When Developing Alternative 
Assumptions/Model (RQ 10) 
The main source of information for all of the participants who develop an alternative 
model appears to be their general valuation knowledge. The valuation specialists’ sources choice 
is wider compared to the auditors, as they draw on the firm’s pool of valuation methods and 
techniques, such as pre-set valuation model templates. 
With regard to the assumptions, both auditors and valuation specialists use multiple 
sources of information, including but not limited to external information not originating from the 
company (industry information), long time-series of the company-specific comparatives 
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(historical information),  and internal sources such as management’s memo or management’s 
analysis of risk factors. The most frequently mentioned sources are reported in Table 8, Panel 
A.
37
 
An interesting pattern emerged during the analysis of how the participants use industry 
sources when developing alternative assumptions for their own auditor’s range. As Table 8, 
Panel B demonstrates, only six (24%) of 25 participants who developed a range for the CGU RA 
did not use any provided industry information for the lower or upper bound of the respective 
input parameters’ ranges. The industry ranges related to short- and long-term variable operating 
expenses, discount rate, tax rate, and short-term growth rate were most often applied as lower 
and upper bounds of the auditors’ ranges. At the same time, the following factors were 
frequently discussed by the participants when deciding whether/how to apply the industry 
information: the company “fit” into the industry benchmarking, industry information not being 
current, as well as credibility of the industry information (Table 8, Panel B). 
3.5.9 Participants’ Range and its Relation to Materiality (RQ 11) 
For all of the participants who developed a range (with no exceptions), the width of the 
range is many times the audit materiality of $600,000, consistent with concerns raised in 
Christensen et al. (2012) about the auditability of complex FVs (see Table 9).  The average 
width of the interval is $42M, $45M, and $52M (69, 76, and 86 times the audit materiality) for 
experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and junior auditors respectively. Since there is only 
one interval available for the valuation specialists, a reliable comparison of this group of 
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 The discount rate stands apart from other input parameters in the sense that multiple outside sources are cited as 
relevant for this input parameter (even though the citations are not frequent and are limited to one or two 
participants). Those include Capital IQ, S&P 500, Bloomberg, Bank of Canada data, etc. For the growth rate, fixed 
operating expenses, and SG&A expenses, an important outside source in addition to the industry information 
appears to be macroeconomic data such as inflation and GDP parameters. 
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participants to the other two groups is problematic. However, data in Table 9 suggests that 
auditor’s intervals for the experienced auditors are narrower on average than those for junior 
auditors, both when all observations are included ($42M vs. $52M) and when the sample for 
each group is winsorized by excluding the two extreme observations ($35M vs. $46M).
38
 These 
appear to indicate that increase in auditor’s expertise leads to narrowing of the auditor’s range. 
Overall, the results are best characterized by the “Estimate nightmare” scenario, which takes 
place when twice the materiality is smaller than the width of the reasonable range, meaning that 
all points inside or outside of the reasonable range have a significant risk (Smieliauskas 2012, p. 
279). 
3.5.10 Participants’ Consideration of FVLCS vs. VIU of the CGU (RQ 12) 
Six, five, and three (29%, 56%, and 27%, respectively) of experienced auditors, valuation 
specialists, and junior auditors recognize the necessity to calculate VFLCS of the CGU in 
addition to its VIU calculation, as prescribed by IAS 36. The limited attention to this issue from 
the auditors may possibly be explained by the majority of case facts pertaining to calculation of 
VIU, indicating that the auditors may be anchoring on management’s method of calculation of 
the RA. The valuation specialists, on the other hand, are less likely to anchor since they are more 
familiar with the different ways to calculate FVs. A competing explanation would be that the 
auditors are generally less concerned with a possible overstatement of the impairment, compared 
to its understatement, thus creating a leeway for the management to take a “big bath” or to 
implement an income smoothing strategy.  
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 This result is not significant at conventional levels. However, when the data is winsorized by excluding two 
extreme observations in each category, to remove the effect of outliers, it is significant at a 10% level. 
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One experienced auditor and three valuation specialists suggest “market cap 
reconciliation” as an alternative procedure to calculating FVLCS, whereby the CGU’s VIU is 
compared to the company’s market capitalization, which strictly speaking represents a non-IFRS 
approach.  Furthermore, one experienced auditor and two valuation specialists imply that there is 
a choice between VIU and FVLCS calculation, depending on the circumstances (e.g., the volume 
of trading and the number of CGUs). 
3.5.11 Participants’ Consideration of Management’s Bias (RQ 13 and 14) 
Participants across all of the groups appear to factor-in, to some degree, information 
about management’s compensation when considering possible management’s bias (this is the 
case for 18 (86%) of experienced auditors, five (56%) of valuation specialists, and six (55%) of 
junior auditors, respectively). Only one participant (an experienced auditor) states that the 
compensation is irrelevant. However, a significant proportion of the auditors do not appear to 
fully recognize how the goodwill impairment impacts certain drivers of management 
compensation. Particularly, there is not always a clear understanding that the impairment does 
not affect earnings before income taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), while it 
increases return on capital employed (ROCE) both in the short and long terms, so that a larger 
impairment increases the management’s bonuses based on the EBITDA/ROCE ratio. The effect 
is equally pronounced for the experienced and junior auditors, whereby about 1/3 of the 
participants in each of the two categories incorrectly suggest that the management is incentivized 
to understate the impairment because of its effect on the compensation. Overall, the auditors 
seem to over-focus on the impairment impact on one compensation component, the net income, 
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which might be an indication of availability heuristics as pro-forma accounting measures such as 
EBITDA and ROCE are less readily available when compared to the profit measure.
39
  
Seven (33%) experienced auditors, three (33%) valuation specialists, and four (36%) 
junior auditors consider possible management’s bias due to factors other than management’s 
compensation (making the company look better due to a possible acquisition from Clarke is a 
most frequently cited reason). One of the valuation specialists also suggests a possibility of the 
Board’s bias due to Clarke’s presence on the Board of Supremex (subject to the Board’s 
involvement into goodwill valuation process). 
3.5.12 Participants’ Heuristics When Selecting Alternative Model and/or Assumptions 
(RQ 15) 
The results reveal that both the experienced auditors and the valuation specialists tend to 
gravitate toward their firm’s commonly used methodology. One example of availability 
heuristics (as well as of an apparent deficiency in the current valuation methodology application 
in audit settings) is the use of “+/- 10%” interval when determining the valuation specialists’ 
range for a FV, which is developed based on their point estimate for that FV. This method of 
calculating the range is mentioned by three (33%) of the valuation specialists, all of them 
employed by the same Big 4 audit firm.
40
  In addition to being a possible example of availability, 
the application of the “+/-10% rule” demonstrates that some of the valuation specialists consider 
uncertainty inherent in FVs as a concept separate from that of audit materiality, as the rule’s 
application typically leads to FV ranges wider than the materiality. The above finding may be a 
manifestation of a larger problem arising from the fact that valuation specialist are a part of 
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 This is supported by the fact that two experienced auditors and one junior auditor observe that the management’s 
motivation to overstate the impairment appears unusual to them. 
40
 It is also mentioned by one experienced auditor from the same firm in relation to the current valuation specialists 
practice. 
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business advisory (vs. assurance) practices of international as well as national audit firms, with 
the financial reporting (audit) work representing only a fraction of their engagements (e.g., as 
discussed above, an “estimate” engagement may be performed for M&A, tax, and financial 
reporting purposes). This may lead to differences in the application of certain technical auditing 
concepts by the members of assurance and valuation (advisory) groups. On the other hand, 
higher-level auditing concepts such as auditor’s independence appear to be well-taken by the 
valuation specialists, possibly because they serve as main distinguishing factors between 
assurance and advisory engagements. 
The other instance of the availability heuristics is related to the auditors/valuation 
specialists adhering to their firm’s practice of including/excluding the forecast risk in/from the 
discount rate.
41
 While one experienced auditor and four valuation specialists suggest that the 
forecast risk is to be included in the discount rate (see Table 7, Panel B), an experienced auditor 
from another firm suggest that it should be included in the CF forecast. Two experienced 
auditors and three valuation specialists mention that the inter-firm differences with regard to 
forecast risk treatment result in incomparable discount rates among different audit firms. Thus, in 
this case availability may lead to decreased comparability. 
The use of after-tax discount rate applied to after-tax cash flows, in contrast with the 
management’s before-tax treatment of both the discount rate and the cash flows, suggested by 
one experienced auditor and seven valuation specialists (see Table 7, Panel A) is based on the 
availability of economic data (since “market input for equity”, which is a major element of the 
equity discount rate determination, is usually available on the after-tax basis). This leads to the 
                                                     
41
 The risk of changes in revenues/operating costs (projection or forecast risk) should be included either in the CF 
forecast or into the discount rate to avoid double counting. 
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IFRS-consistent management’s approach being replaced with a non-IFRS approach with a 
subsequent reconciliation to IFRS rules. 
Yet another example of availability may be related to the switch from the management’s 
end-of-year CF discounting method to the mid-period discounting,
42
 suggested by six (67%) of 
the valuation specialists (see Table 7, Panel A).  While the proposed change to the mid-period 
discounting does not necessarily represent a problem (as mentioned by four valuation specialists, 
it is applied in order to better approximate the timing of the projected CFs), what may represent a 
problem is that the they implement it without investigating the management’s assumptions 
underlying the timing of the CFs. 
In addition, some of the auditors appear to have limited knowledge of valuation 
methodology, compared to the valuation specialists, who possess a uniformly adequate grasp of 
the methodology. The distinction is clearly revealed by the participants’ understanding of 
differences between the levered and unlevered (debt-free) approaches to business valuation
43
. 
While the case facts assume that management applied the levered method when calculating the 
RA of the CGU, under which the cash flows are discounted using an equity discount rate, the 
case content also includes some information about the parameters which would have been used if 
the unlevered method was chosen to do the valuation (see Figure 2 for a schematic outline of the 
two approaches and their similarities and distinctions). Among these parameters is the 
company’s WACC, which is used to discount cash flows under the unlevered method. The verbal 
protocol analysis reveals that some of the auditors (6 (29%) of the experienced and 4 (36%) of 
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 The switch produces a highly material difference with the management’s estimate, of which the valuation 
specialists are fully aware when they are performing the audit. Specifically, it results in a difference between the 
revised estimate and the management’s estimate of nearly $15 million, given the audit materiality of $600 thousand. 
43
 On the difference between the two methods, see Larrabee and Voss (2013). Equity discount rate used under the 
levered approach is also sometimes called unlevered WACC, while the WACC used under debt-free approach is the 
levered WACC (Larrabee and Voss 2013, p.267).  
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the junior auditors, respectively) do not understand the difference and either attempt to apply the 
WACC to discount the CFs under the levered approach, or suggest a treatment of debt/financing 
costs inconsistent with the definition of the levered approach, which represents a misapplication 
of the methodology. The valuation specialists understand the distinction. 
44
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 While a similar facts pattern was observed in the pilot study, the difference with the main sample study is that one 
of the two valuation specialists involved in the pilots also overlooked the distinction between the levered and debt-
free valuation methods (which caused a significant difficulty to that participant when verifying the DCF model’s 
input parameters). This may be explained by the fact that the valuation specialists involved in the pilots were 
employed at smaller offices of Big 6 (non-Big 4) public accounting firms. Since such offices deal with smaller 
private companies’ valuations which typically rely on variations of the debt-free method, the valuation specialist 
could have fallen victim to the availability bias with regard to their most frequently use methodology. With the main 
sample drawn from the population of auditors and valuation specialists employed at large offices of Big 4 and Big 6 
firms, the observed misapplication of the levered vs. unlevered method cannot be explained by availability, and is 
more likely attributable to a superficial knowledge of valuation methodology by some of the auditors. 
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FIGURE 2  
Levered vs Debt Free Valuation Approaches  
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3.5.13 Participants’ Heuristics When Narrowing Participants Own Range (RQ 16) 
One of the heuristics that arises in the process of arriving from the auditor’s range to a 
point estimate of the CGU RA is taking the average of the range as a point estimate. This is 
reported by six experienced auditors and five junior auditors, i.e. by almost half of the 25 
participants who developed a range for the CGU RA.
45
 This strategy appears to be based on 
availability and is not suggested in auditing or accounting standards, except for IAS 36 allowing 
the use of averages as a simplified strategy in certain situations.
46
 Four experienced auditors and 
five junior auditors of the 25 participants who developed a range do not mention that the 
auditor’s range should be narrowed down to be within the AM, and use a range which is many 
times the size of the materiality to arrive at their conclusion about the management’s estimate, 
which is not aligned with the approach suggested in ISA540.A94 and .A95. Additionally, even 
those participants who recognized that the range should be narrowed down given the AM do not 
identify any specific or systematic procedure for doing so (the most frequent suggestion 
mentioned by seven participants is an inquiry/discussion with the management). 
3.5.14 Use of Internal Specialists (RQ 19) 
Seven (33%) and two (22%) of the experienced auditors and valuation specialists, 
respectively report that they will involve tax specialists to examine the tax rate.
47
 A smaller 
number of participants suggest they will use tax specialists for other tax-related parameters such 
                                                     
45
 One more junior auditor suggest taking an average of three numbers (lower and upper bounds of the auditor’s 
estimate and the management’s estimate), while one valuation specialist suggest using averages for all of the input 
parameters intervals except for the discount rate. 
46
 The only reference to computing the averages is in ISA 36.23, stating that “In some cases, estimates, averages and 
computational short cuts may provide reasonable approximations of the detailed computations illustrated in this 
Standard for determining fair value less costs to sell or value in use.” 
47
 One of the issues uncovered when investigating the use of internal and external specialists during a CGU 
impairment audit is a very low level of understanding of the role of such specialists by the junior auditors. This is 
illustrated by the issues surrounding the specialists’ use discussed almost exclusively by the experienced auditors 
and valuation specialists. 
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as CCA groups and R&D tax credit relevant to the CF forecast. One (5%) of the experienced 
auditor and two (22%) of the valuation specialists propose to involve their actuarial specialists to 
examine the pension liability, while one (5%) of the experienced auditor and one (11%) of the 
valuation specialists suggest to use their complex securities specialists to deal with the financial 
liability. The use of internal valuation specialists is discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
3.5.15 Division of Labor Between Auditors and Valuation Specialists (RQ 19) 
Three (14%) and three (33%) of the experienced auditors and valuation specialists, 
respectively report that examining the management’s CF forecast is auditors’ responsibility. 
Another most frequently mentioned responsibility of the auditors is examining the expenses, 
which is reported by four (44%) of the valuation specialists. Some of the participants suggest that 
auditors are better equipped to examine the CF forecast and expenses since they know the 
company and/or the industry better than valuation specialists. On the other hand, the primary 
responsibility of valuation specialists appear to be examining (reported by 10 (48%) of the 
experienced auditors and one (11%) of the valuation specialist) or developing (reported by 3 
(14%) of the experienced auditors) the discount rate. The second most frequently cited 
responsibility of the valuation specialists is examining the valuation model, as suggested by 7 
(33%) of the experienced auditors, one (11%) of the valuation specialists, and one (9%) of the 
junior auditors.  
3.5.16 Use of 3rd Party Valuation Specialists (RQ 19) 
The involvement of 3
rd
 party (external) valuation specialists is primarily discussed by the 
valuation specialists. Three (33%) of the valuation specialists report that they will ask the client 
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to hire an external valuator if the management lacks qualifications to do their own valuation. 
Some of the valuation specialists suggest that this request will be communicated to the 
management/audit committee and that they will have a conversation with the 3
rd
 party specialists 
regarding the shortcomings of the management’s analysis.48  
Three (33%) of the valuation specialists suggest that a report from a 3
rd
 party valuator 
would add credibility but is not automatically relied upon. The reliance is influenced by factors 
such as the identity of the 3
rd
 party valuator (e.g., Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), as well as by the personal 
acquaintance with the external valuator. 
Table 9B provides, in a summary form, the findings of the study for each of the 19 
research questions formulated around the expected FV audit process map. 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study describes the currently under-researched process of auditing complex FV 
estimates, using CGU/goodwill impairment as an example of the auditing task. This is 
approached by using the verbal protocols analysis methodology, with a particular focus on 
researching the methodological aspects of the auditing and fair valuation processes, investigating 
how FV reporting, auditing, and valuation standards are interpreted and applied, determining 
relevant judgmental shortcuts arising within the auditing process, and understanding how the 
auditors and valuation specialists deal with uncertainties (i.e., unobservable judgmental inputs) 
inherent in the task.  The unobservable inputs that have been considered include discount rates, 
growth rates, cost structure trends, etc.  
                                                     
48
 These results are aligned with the finding that the valuations specialists (particularly, senior valuation specialists) 
insist on testing the management’s estimate instead of developing their own estimate or range for the public clients, 
primarily due to the independence considerations. If the management is incapable of developing their own estimate, 
the valuation specialists would propose hiring a third party valuator to help the management to come up with their 
own estimate which can subsequently be tested. 
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As expected, the quasi-experimental study of the FV auditing process appears to supply 
much more detailed process information when compared to the extant interview-based research. 
One of the main reasons for this is that a concrete context of the impairment case provides the 
participants an opportunity to think about fine details of the auditing and FV estimation 
processes, resulting in obtaining rich process information which is not possible to collect in 
interview studies which are lacking specific context.  
For all of the participants who developed a range, the width of the range is many times 
the audit materiality. Auditor’s intervals for the experienced auditors are narrower on average 
than those for junior auditors, indicating that increase in auditor’s expertise leads to narrowing of 
the auditor’s range. Overall, the results are consistent with concerns raised in Christensen et al. 
(2012) about the auditability of complex FVs, and are best characterized by the Smieliauskas’ 
(2012) “Estimate nightmare” scenario, meaning that all points inside or outside of the reasonable 
range have a significant risk. 
There are signs of possible issues with interpretation and application of FV auditing and 
accounting standards across all groups of the participants. One characteristic example is the 
difficulty many of the participants experience with classifying their approach within the two 
categories prescribed by ISA 540 (testing management’s vs. developing auditor’s own estimate 
or range), as well as the wide variation in interpreting these categories. Some of the participants 
report performing a combination of the two approaches or a different approach (developing an 
“alternate estimate”) which do not appear to fall neatly into any of the ISA 540-prescribed 
categories. These findings help to interpret conflicting results in the prior interview-based studies 
(Cannon and Bedard (2015), Glover et al. (2016), and Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015)) regarding 
auditors’ choice to verify the management’s estimate vs. develop their own estimate for complex 
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FVs. They also reveal that for the senior-level participants (including both auditors and 
especially valuation specialists), the decision to test management’s estimate as opposed to 
develop auditor’s own estimate is driven by considerations of auditor’s independence as well as 
efficiency of the current and subsequent audits,
49
 rather than the difficulty of developing own 
independent estimate or range, investment of time/effort in understanding the management’s 
estimate, or excessive focus of the current auditing guidance on the testing option, as suggested 
in some of the extant studies.  The interplay between the ISA and CICBV guidance, which 
assumes the use of an “estimate” (vs. “comprehensive valuation”) technique for audit purposes, 
may also have a bearing on how valuation specialists classify their approach under ISA 540. 
Some of the issues with application of the auditing standards appear to be related to 
judgmental shortcuts (heuristics) of the participants which have not been researched in a 
valuation task context in prior auditing literature. A significant proportion of both experienced 
and junior auditors are subject to a heuristic in the process of arriving from the auditor’s range to 
a point estimate of the CGU RA, whereby the median of the range is assigned as a point 
estimate. The above strategy appears to be based on availability and is not suggested in auditing 
or accounting standards, as well as is not aligned with the findings in Griffin (2014), who 
suggests that auditors calculate the FV adjustment quantum by comparing management’s FV 
estimate to the nearest bound (vs. the midpoint). This is combined with the fact that many of the 
auditors use a range which is many times the size of the materiality to arrive at their conclusion 
about the management’s estimate (without an attempt to narrow the range), which is not aligned 
to the approach suggested in ISA540. Additionally, those participants who recognized that the 
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 The efficiency here is understood as a possibility not to do the same work on the auditors’ side and on the 
management’s side. Performing independent valuation by the auditors does not relieve the management from doing 
their own valuation. Guiding the management to do a correct valuation in the current fiscal year may allow them to 
do the valuation in the following years without guidance from the auditors. 
 72 
 
range should be narrowed down given the AM do not identify any specific or systematic 
procedure for doing so. 
The tendency of some of the valuation specialist to develop their auditor’s range from a 
point estimate using the “+/- 10% approach” , which may lead to ranges far in excess of the audit 
materiality, appear to demonstrate that valuation specialists apply the concepts of estimation 
uncertainty and audit materiality in isolation. One possible cause for this phenomenon is 
valuation specialists’ involvement in business advisory practice, which may affect the way they 
apply technical auditing concepts such as materiality when performing assurance engagements. 
The results of the study show that inter-firm differences in accounting for the forecast 
(projection) risk in projected CFs lead to difficulties in comparing discount rates used in fair 
valuation models by different audit firms. It appears that the practice may benefit from 
introducing a degree of standardization in the treatment of the forecast risk, to increase 
comparability among firms. Another area where the standards may be revisited is the IFRS 
requirement to apply a pre-tax discount rate in VIU models. The practice appear to demonstrate 
that using a post-tax discounting may represent a more natural choice, given the availability of 
observable economic inputs into the valuation process. 
The majority of both of the experienced and junior auditors does not elaborate on the 
requirement of IAS 36 with regard to determining the RA as a maximum of VIU and FVLCS, 
and omit FVLCS calculation, potentially resulting in an understatement of the RA. This may be 
due to 1) anchoring on management’s method of calculation of the RA, whereby auditors are 
more likely to anchor than valuation specialists, since valuation specialists are better familiar 
with the different ways to calculate FVs or 2) auditors (vs. valuation specialists) being generally 
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less concerned with a possible overstatement of the impairment, compared to its understatement 
(creating a leeway for the management to take a “big bath” or implement income smoothing).  
When addressing the possible management’s bias from the compensation perspective, 
some of the auditors fail to understand how FV impairments affect pro-forma measures such as 
EBITDA/ROCE (the effect is equally pronounced for the experienced and junior auditors). This 
may be a manifestation of the availability heuristics (whereby the pro-forma accounting 
measures are less readily available when compared to the more mainstream profit measure) and 
leads to incorrect assessment of the impairment impact on the compensation drivers and 
eventually the amount of compensation. The reason why valuation specialists are not susceptible 
to this heuristics is a topic to the future research. 
Applying potentially inappropriate firm guidance to the case setting of this study is 
characterized as participants relying on the availability heuristic. However, it can be argued that 
following firm guidance is not a heuristic. If that is the case, then some of the findings in this 
section relating to the participants’ reliance on the availability heuristic would need to be 
reinterpreted. At least some of the experienced and junior auditors do not appear to have a 
complete grasp of the applicable valuation methodology and do not attempt to gain an in-depth 
understanding of management’s model, which might lead to misunderstanding of management’s 
valuation approach and misinterpreting the model’s assumptions and input parameters. It appears 
that this pattern may be corrected by either introducing decision aids or by educating auditors on 
the valuation issues. To give an example, the decision aid response may entail developing a 
checklist asking the auditors to explicitly identify the specifics of the management’s valuation 
approach. 
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Finally, the results suggest that the division of responsibilities between assurance and 
valuation groups when auditing FV impairments entails the valuation specialists working on the 
model and certain model input parameters such as the discount rate and, to a lesser extent, the 
growth rate. The auditors are involved with the CF forecast and the rest of the input parameters, 
mainly related to expenses of the business, due to their better familiarity with both the industry 
and the particular company. Also, the valuation specialists request an audit client to retain a third 
party valuator if in their opinion the management is not capable to produce a correct valuation. 
This is done in order to preserve the independence, given the valuation specialists preference to 
test the management’s estimate rather than develop their own. 
The study contributes to the academic literature by obtaining direct quasi-experimental 
evidence on auditors’ and valuation specialists’ process when they perform a FV auditing task, 
and investigating the process differences between the auditors and experts. The paper highlights 
several issues which may warrant future research. One such issue is how to assist auditors with 
narrowing their range for complex FV estimates to meet ISA 540 requirements. The other issue 
is searching for the ways to alleviate dysfunctional behavioral shortcuts revealed in the auditing 
process. The findings in the paper may also be of interest to policy makers, regulators, and 
standard setters. Particularly, they point out to the components of ISA 540 and IAS 36 which 
may require clarification. This includes, but is not limited, to the part of the standard which 
describes options available to assurance provider when auditing complex FVs (testing 
management’s vs. developing auditor’s estimate or range). The results also demonstrate that 
CICA and CICBV standards may interact in an unexpected way in the course of FV audits 
involving experts. Furthermore, some findings in the paper indicate that valuation specialists’ 
involvement in business advisory services have a possible bearing on how they approach the 
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assurance engagements. Finally, the paper may be helpful for auditing and valuation educators as 
it identifies difficult areas of FV audits which may be addressed in the classroom. One such area 
is the application of valuation methodology in audit settings, while another is educating 
accounting students about the role of valuation and other specialists.  
A limitation of the study is that its results may not fully generalize to FV auditing tasks 
involving types of valuation models different from DCF models, such as valuation models for 
complex financial instruments. Additionally, since the study uses a single case, it produces 
idiosyncratic inferences about how auditors and valuation specialists attend to auditing of FV 
estimates, which depend on the particulars of the case used.  This is not a concern regarding the 
results based on the manipulation (differences among the expertise conditions).  However, the 
results regarding the detail about what auditors and valuation specialists did in response to case 
details (i.e., levels) are affected by the particulars of the case.   
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Chapter 4 - Can Probability Distribution Elicitation Methods Increase 
the Precision of FV Estimates? 
4.1 Introduction  
Recent changes in financial reporting regulation effected by the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe, Australia, and Canada, as well as the 
introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 142 (FASB 2001) and 
SFAS 157 (FASB 2007 and 2011) in the U.S. significantly increased users’ exposure to FVs and 
thus made the issue of FV auditing extremely important for the stakeholders. The new standards 
introduced a three-level hierarchy of FV types based on the observability of inputs, and moved 
from goodwill amortization to its impairment testing. These changes highlighted problems with 
auditing highly complex, judgment-dependent and inherently uncertain items such as FVs at the 
higher levels of the hierarchy and goodwill impairments. There is a concern that in some 
circumstances such FVs may not be auditable, and that requiring auditors to provide positive 
audit-level assurance on them may necessitate changes to the current financial reporting model, 
e.g. reporting ranges or confidence intervals, rather than point estimates (Christensen et al. 2012; 
Smieliauskas 2012). Current auditing standards have been criticized for applying legacy methods 
used for auditing historical cost balances to complex FVs, which are subject to a much higher 
level of uncertainty, and regulators point to numerous problems with FV audits in recent years 
(IFIAR 2014). At the same time, extant archival research documents that audit quality affects 
earnings management involving FVs, their reliability as well as representation faithfulness, both 
actual and perceived by market participants (Stokes and Webster 2009; Vergauwe, Gaeremynck, 
and Stokes 2011; Bratten et al. 2012a).   
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The complexity and novelty of FV auditing tasks to the auditors, the proliferation of 
problems with FV auditing discovered by the regulators, together with the importance of FV 
reporting and audit quality to capital markets, make the understanding of possible improvements 
to the underlying FV auditing process a promising avenue for research. This study follows the 
process study, which provides quasi-experimental evidence about the process of FV auditing 
obtained based on verbal protocols methodology (using a goodwill impairment task as a specific 
example). It investigates the ways in which auditors and valuation specialists can be assisted 
when dealing with estimation uncertainty inherent in the goodwill impairment audit task and 
constructing their own auditor’s ranges for the impairment amount.  
Smieliauskas (2012) suggests that the high estimation uncertainty (accounting risk) 
inherent in complex FVs leads to consideration of ranges of their possible outcomes by the 
auditors, rather than dealing with their point estimates. Prior research, as well as the process 
study, demonstrates that the quantitative impact of the problem is highly material for many 
categories of FVs (Christensen et al. 2012; Menzefricke and Smieliauskas 2012a and 2012b). 
This raises a question on how to assist auditors with constructing a reasonable range for a 
complex FV estimate. Smieliauskas (2012) calls for a search for systematic methods which 
would help with quantifying accounting risk and improve the FV estimates ranges calibration (p. 
282). This study uses probability distribution elicitation techniques for this purpose, which are 
defined in the literature as methods helpful for constructing a probability distribution of a 
random variable(s) that “properly represents the expert’s [individual’s] knowledge/uncertainty”50 
                                                     
50
 While O’Hagan et al. (2006) refers to eliciting probability distribution information from “experts”, eliciting 
probability distribution information from “individuals” may be a more appropriate choice of words. Indeed, the 
extant elicitation literature suggests that probability distribution information may be elicited from individuals with 
varying degrees of expertise. In this study, valuation specialists may be classified as individuals possessing an 
expert-level knowledge in the field of valuation (i.e., the “experts”), while experienced and junior auditors may be 
classified as individuals with some level of knowledge in the field of valuation (i.e., non-expert knowledgeable 
individuals). 
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about the variable(s) (O’Hagan , Buck, Daneshkhah, and others 2006, p. 9). Two probability 
distribution elicitation methods (cumulative distribution function method (CDF) and credible 
interval method (CI)) are experimentally tested and compared in goodwill impairment audit 
settings using experienced and junior auditors and valuation specialists as participants. These 
methods are chosen because they are most frequently used in prior literature to elicit individuals’ 
probability distributions in business settings such as accounting (auditing), economics, and 
finance (e.g., Crosby 1980 and 1981; Dominitz 1998; Laws and O'Hagan 2002; Budescu and Du 
2007). The other family of elicitation methods representatives of which may have been 
considered as potential candidates for the study are elicitation methods for which elicited 
probabilities are influenced by individuals' utility functions, such as procedures-lotteries, scoring 
rules, and promissory note (Kadane and Winkler 1988). However, since such methods involve 
real or hypothetical payoffs, and are subject to utility-related effects, they are not the best choice 
for the valuation task in audit settings. Finally, elicitation methods dealing with judgmental point 
forecasting (Lawrence et al. 2006) are not suitable since they disregard to the consideration of 
ranges of possible outcomes.  
 A search of the academic literature did not find criteria for judging the effectiveness of 
elicitation methods as means of quantifying accounting risk and improving the calibration of FV 
estimates ranges. Therefore, this study introduces three sets of criteria against which the 
effectiveness of elicitation methods can be compared and evaluated. These criteria are based on 
an econometric method, an expert panel method, and a content analysis method based on the 
analysis of verbal protocols.  
The criteria based on the econometric method compare the participant’s interval widths 
as well as the standard deviations of their widths and standard deviations of their upper and 
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lower bounds for either aided or unaided FV interval judgments. They establish whether a 
particular elicitation method improves the consistency of FV interval judgment among the 
participants. The criteria based on the expert panel method are concerned with whether the use of 
a particular elicitation method brings the participant’s FV interval judgment closer to that of a 
certain reference group; e.g., that of valuation specialists. Finally, the criteria based on the 
content analysis of verbal protocols consider how the relative frequencies of words indicative of 
quantification of uncertainty compare between different elicitation methods. 
The CDF elicitation method proves to be superior to the CI elicitation method for both 
experienced and junior auditors based on the econometric method of comparison (for intervals 
with the same confidence level, the CDF method provides for a smaller average interval width as 
well as for smaller standard deviation of interval widths and their upper and lower bounds). 
However, the opposite result is established for valuation specialists. A comparison of aided 
auditor’s intervals developed with the help of elicitation methods to participants’ unaided 
auditor’s intervals developed in the process study reveals a significant variation in confidence 
levels placed by the participants on their unaided intervals, indicating lack of consistency. This 
comparison also indicates that when all groups of the participants are considered together, the 
CDF method provides for an improvement over unaided judgment (a smaller standard deviation 
of the interval widths for the aided intervals vs. the unaided intervals). On the other hand, the CI 
method is not helpful for improving the consistency of the participants’ judgments. The results 
concerning the effectiveness of both the CDF and the CI methods are primarily driven by the 
junior auditors. The analysis of verbal protocols and screen recordings obtained in the study 
indicates that the CDF elicitation method has an advantage over the CI method with regard to its 
susceptibility to the anchoring bias. The data in the verbal protocols also points out the fact that 
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both experienced and junior auditors as well as valuation specialists do not have a clear idea of 
what the required level of confidence for the input parameters for model-based FVs should be in 
audit settings. Also, it appears that none of the currently used in practice decision aids for the fair 
valuation models input parameters explicitly quantify the parameters confidence levels, while 
some of them do take into consideration probabilistic characteristics of those parameters. Finally, 
the participants’ subjective opinion about the usefulness of the two elicitation methods indicates 
a generally positive attitude. The study has a potential to improve the practice of auditing of 
goodwill and possibly other complex FVs, by providing information for the development of 
relevant decision aids. The main contribution of the study to the academic literature is in 
combining auditing and elicitation research in FV auditing settings, while in prior auditing 
research, elicitation methods application have been limited to historical cost balances and audits 
of internal controls (Crosby 1980 and 1981, Solomon 1982, Tomassini et al. 1982, Solomon et 
al. 1985). 
The following section provides motivation and literature review that focuses on the 
auditing research since the introduction of the new FV reporting standards (circa 2007). It is 
followed by a discussion of relevant theory and the development of research questions. The next 
section outlines the research methodology, followed by a discussion of experimental results. The 
conclusion summarizes academic and practical contributions of the study.  
4.2 Motivation and Literature Review   
The literature review demonstrates a necessity to develop a decision aid for helping 
auditors and valuation specialists with FV audits. A discussion of the features of complex FV 
estimates which make them difficult to audit when compared to historical cost balances 
 81 
 
(information uncertainty and imprecision) highlights the problematic area which requires 
attention. A review of extant research on how the uncertainty and imprecision affect auditors’ 
and valuation specialists’ judgment provides understanding of which aspects of these judgments 
may require correction or assistance to provide for a higher quality audit. 
4.2.1 Characteristics of FVs Affecting Their Auditability 
Prior archival papers shed light on the characteristics of FV reporting that contribute to 
the difficulty of providing assurance on such balances. For complex model-based FVs, a major 
problem appears to lie in very high sensitivity of resulting FVs to variations in the input 
parameters. Christensen et al. (2012) demonstrate this on the examples of Wells Fargo’s 
mortgage-backed securities and General Motors’ pension liabilities, whereby very small changes 
in interest and discount rates respectively cause material swings in the reported amounts. The 
authors question whether positive assurance on such balances can be obtained, as negative 
review-level assurance, or positive assurance on the ranges may be more realistic. Similar results 
are obtained by Menzefricke and Smieliauskas (2012a and 2012b) for input parameters into 
pension liability valuation models such as return rates. These concerns are echoed in an 
analytical paper by Smieliauskas (2012), who introduces three scenarios: 1) “Accounting 
estimate nirvana” occurs when the width of the reasonable range of an estimate does not exceed 
the material misstatement, implying that any point in the reasonable range does not have a 
significant estimation risk, as defined in ISA 540 (IAASB 2008); 2) “Estimate problem” exists 
when the width of the reasonable range is greater than the material misstatement but does not 
exceed twice the material misstatement, meaning there is at least one estimate with no significant 
risk; 3) “Estimate nightmare” takes place when twice the material misstatement is smaller than 
the width of the reasonable range, so that all points inside or outside of the reasonable range have 
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significant risks (Smieliauskas 2012, p. 279), under which a change to another financial reporting 
framework is necessary. This research demonstrates that sensitivity to uncertain input parameters 
to valuation models makes complex FV balances more difficult to audit compared to historical 
cost balances.  
4.2.2 The Influence of Information Uncertainty/Imprecision of Complex FVs on Auditors’ 
Judgment 
While papers discussed above demonstrate that certain features inherent in complex FVs 
contribute to the difficulty of auditing of such balances, a number of experimental articles look at 
how these features affect the auditors’ biases and judgments such as the amount of proposed 
adjustment. Montague (2010) shows that auditors are subjected to more confirmation bias (i.e., 
auditor seeks more confirming than disconfirming evidence) when they are asked to counter (vs. 
support) management’s estimate or generate their own estimate, while this bias increases the 
professional skepticism. Additionally, the confirmation bias is the highest in 
“counter/disconfirm” condition with high estimation uncertainty.  
Griffin (2014) experimentally manipulates subjectivity (Level 2 vs. 3 FV), imprecision 
(narrow vs. wide estimate range), and footnote disclosure about estimate inputs (present vs. 
absent) and finds that the interaction between subjectivity and imprecision makes an adjustment 
more likely, while disclosure reduces the interaction. Griffin (2014) also discovers that auditors 
calculate the adjustment quantum by comparing management’s FV estimate to the nearest bound 
(vs. the midpoint) of the auditors’ range, implying a strict application of auditing standards. 
Maksymov et al. (2015) investigate how audit procedure frame (an auditor judges 
whether management’s assumptions are reasonable vs. not reasonable), efficiency pressure (high 
vs. low), and the extent posterior verifiability of audit quality (rated by the participants) bear on 
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budgeted time for Level 3 FVs audit procedures. The authors find that the negative frame leads 
to planning for more audit hours, especially for procedures that are perceived as less verifiable. 
This implies that re-framing audit procedures from the (typical in practice) positive frame to a 
negative one is expected to increase audit effort. 
Cannon and Bedard (2015) conduct a survey-based field investigation of auditing of 
complex FV estimates and find that uncertainty in the estimates is positively related to the 
assessed inherent risk, but in a number of cases the estimate’s inherent risk is assessed below 
maximum even though the uncertainty leads to ranges that are larger than materiality. They find 
that use of a valuation specialist by the client triggers the reliance on a specialist by the auditors. 
In their sample of engagements, the auditors most frequently (in 53% of the cases) choose to 
develop their own independent estimate or range for a FV, instead of testing managements 
estimate or evaluating subsequent realizations. Cannon and Bedard (2015) observe that obtaining 
positive assurance on complex FVs may not always be possible. 
Griffith (2015) analyzes interview data with 28 auditors who used valuation specialists 
and finds that main issues in the area are related to the complex FVs’ inherent uncertainty, which 
causes the auditors to rely on reports of valuation specialists that they cannot competently review 
or even understand. The author identifies the following problems arising from the uncertainty in 
complex FVs: inadequate transfer of information from audit clients to auditors and valuation 
specialists, uncertainty on the part of the auditors about the amount of audit evidence required 
from the specialists, and subjectivity in the valuation field that can lead to alternative valuation 
outcomes. 
Carpentier, Labelle, Laurent, and Suret (2008) observe that auditing FV assets with no 
liquid active market can be made easier by obtaining help from outside experts and by 
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introducing valuation standards by practitioner bodies. The authors  ask a group of 43 Chartered 
Business Valuators (CBVs) to follow the Canadian Venture Capital Association’s (CVCA’s) 
recommendations to value a small, private, pre-IPO high tech firm and find that, despite the 
uniform guidance provided by the CVCA, the respondents rely on a variety of methods and 
utilize different multiples in the valuation process. Carpentier et al. (2008) note that these 
differences in the valuation process translate into a very wide range of resulting FMVs, and that 
the post-IPO value verification reveals overstatement.  
Finally, the process analysis study (Chapter 3) based on concurrent verbal protocols 
method reports details of the FV auditing process of auditors and valuation specialists related to 
auditing and accounting standards, audit and valuation methodology, and behavioral aspects such 
as judgmental shortcuts. It discovers that auditor’s ranges developed by both the participating 
auditors and valuation specialists exceed the audit materiality by multiple times, primarily due to 
wide intervals for the input parameters entering the valuation model. The study finds that while 
specialists are more proficient with technicalities of the underlying valuation models, they share 
similar difficulties with auditors when estimating the input model parameters. The process study 
also finds that auditors do not always attempt to narrow their auditor’s interval when developing 
a point estimate for the FV. 
The above studies offer evidence that features of complex FVs such as estimation 
uncertainty/imprecision and difficult ex-post verifiability bear both on auditors’ and valuation 
specialists’ biases and on their key audit judgments, e.g. on the suggested amount of adjustment. 
They also indicate that certain audit judgments in FV settings require an improvement. However, 
these papers provide a limited insight into how to produce information useful for assisting 
auditors’ and valuation specialists’ judgment when dealing with the uncertainty/imprecision.  
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4.2.3 Eliciting Probability Distribution Information from Individuals 
The above studies of complex FVs indicate a necessity to develop structured decision 
aids capable of assisting auditors and valuation specialists to deal with the estimation uncertainty 
inherent in such FVs, and especially with constructing auditor’s intervals. One candidate is a 
decision aid (or a family of decision aids) based on elicitation methods which may help auditors 
and valuation specialists build distributions of input parameters for fair valuation models. This 
section reviews literature on elicitation of distributions from experts both in general settings and 
in financial statements audit settings.  
Probability distribution elicitation methods are defined in the literature as methods 
helpful for constructing a probability distribution of a random variable(s) that “properly 
represents the expert’s [individual’s] knowledge/uncertainty” about the variable(s) (O’Hagan et 
al. 2006, p. 9). They include a wide spectrum of techniques which vary along a number of 
dimensions, including the type of questions that the experts are asked, the number of experts 
participating in the process (a single expert vs. a panel), the number of iterations (single step vs. 
iterative process), etc. 
This literature is based on findings from psychology and statistical sciences and pertains 
to several fields such as psychology, business and economics, medicine, agriculture, weather 
forecasting, nuclear power generation, and others and deals with the theories, mechanisms and 
best practices of obtaining probability distribution information from the experts in the field 
(O’Hagan et al. 2006; Lawrence, Goodwin, Connor, and Onkal 2006). According to the review 
studies cited above, prior elicitation papers provide results on the methods useful for eliciting 
probability distributions and for their calibration, the factors contributing to biases such as 
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overconfidence, the ways to reduce the biases, the effect of expertise level and other factors on 
distribution elicitation, and related topics. 
Probability distribution elicitation has been researched in the auditing context using 
experimental methodology. Crosby (1980) investigates the impact of two alternative elicitation 
techniques on the choice of an attribute sample size, while Crosby (1981) evaluates the two 
techniques from the perspective of consistency of the elicited priors. Solomon (1982) compares 
distributions elicited from individual auditors with those elicited from audit teams, in terms of 
their verification against the actual outcome. Tomassini et al. (1982) measure the calibration of 
the auditors’ prior probability distributions of account balances, while Solomon et al. (1985) 
research how contextual factors bear on the calibration of probabilistic judgments by the 
auditors. All of above studies apply elicitation methods in relation to historical cost, rather than 
FV accounts. This study tests probability distribution elicitation methods in FV audit settings. 
4.3 Development of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Smieliauskas (2012) notes that the main difficulty with auditing FVs is related to the 
possibility of judgmental misstatements
51
, which can arise either from inaccuracies in forecasting 
of future events (e.g., estimating growth and discount rates, timing and amount of future cash 
flows, etc.), or from other judgmental inaccuracies related mostly to present events (subjective 
determinations such as adjusting the price of an asset with an active market to find the price of 
the original asset without an active market, or establishing CGUs for the purpose of goodwill 
impairment). From the audit theory standpoint, a unique problem specific to future event 
uncertainties is that the ranges associated with future events are dependent on the possible states 
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 ISA 540 (IAASB 2008) defines judgmental misstatements as “differences arising from management’s judgments 
concerning accounting estimates that the auditor considers unreasonable, or the selection or application of 
accounting policies that the auditor considers inappropriate”. 
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of the economic environment, and obtaining more evidence on those possible states may increase 
the expected volatility and therefore widen the associated range rather than narrow it 
(Smieliauskas 2012, p. 266). The presence of this estimation uncertainty (what Smieliauskas 
(2012) calls “accounting risk”) is the principal factor distinguishing the audit of FVs from the 
audit of other accounting transactions or balances based on historical cost, because of the 
necessity for the auditors to obtain assurance on future or hypothetical present economic 
transactions rather than past transactions (Smieliauskas 2012; IAASB 2008). 
According to the analysis in Smieliauskas (2012), the high estimation uncertainty 
(accounting risk) inherent in complex FVs leads to consideration of ranges of their possible 
outcomes by the auditors, rather than dealing with their point estimates. As mentioned, these 
ranges differ from the ranges (confidence intervals) arising from sampling risk in the statistical 
sampling procedures applied to historical cost accounts, in that obtaining more evidence does not 
automatically yields a narrower range. Prior archival auditing research (discussed above) 
demonstrates the quantitative magnitude of the problem: even very small changes to the 
assumptions and input parameters of model-based FVs produce a very wide variation in the 
resulting FV estimates for many categories of FVs starting from financial instruments and ending 
with retirement benefits obligations (Christensen et al. 2012; Menzefricke and Smieliauskas 
2012a and 2012b). While there is no “generally accepted terminology” in this relatively new 
auditing area, Griffin (2014) refers to the fact that estimated FVs are picked from a possible 
range as “imprecision”. Accordingly, for the purpose of making a materiality assessment, the 
auditors need to consider reasonable ranges of estimated FVs rather than their point estimates 
(Smieliauskas 2012). This is also reflected, to a certain extent, in the auditing standards in both 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP jurisdictions.  ISA 540 (IAASB 2008) suggests that developing an 
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auditor’s range is one of the alternatives to audit FV estimates, while AU Section 328 (AICPA 
2002) mentions management’s range of “significantly different FV measurements”. However, 
the standards provide little guidance on developing or auditing the ranges, e.g. on how to deal 
with situations when a scenario realizes that the reasonable range width exceeds twice the 
material misstatement (what Smieliauskas (2012) calls “an accounting estimate nightmare”).52 
A question thus arises on how to assist auditors with constructing a reasonable range for a 
complex FV estimate. Smieliauskas (2012) calls for a search for systematic methods which 
would help with quantifying accounting risk in a way similar to sampling risk, and improve the 
FV estimates ranges calibration (p. 282). I attempt to use probability distribution elicitation 
techniques for this purpose. Specifically, FV estimates require uncertain inputs (e.g., growth 
rates, discount rates, future cost structure), and uncertainty in these inputs leads to consideration 
of ranges for the resulting estimates (Christensen et al. 2012; Menzefricke and Smieliauskas 
2012a and 2012b). As each such input represents a random variable, elicitation of individuals’ 
probability distributions of random variables becomes relevant to the task at hand. Bratten et al. 
(2013) note that adequate inclusion of the fundamental uncertainty underlying complex FVs into 
auditing judgments is hampered by individual information processing limitations. They cite 
extant judgment and decision making research to suggest that individuals tend to lower their 
cognitive load when faced with difficult and/or uncertain tasks, producing simplified strategies 
that often lead to ignoring or misusing relevant information. Thus, as elicitation methods are 
intended quantify the uncertainty, they have a potential to produce higher quality audit evidence 
for complex FV balances. 
                                                     
52
 Under this scenario, the reasonable range also becomes relevant to financial reporting, meaning that a point 
estimate for the fair value may not be auditable according to the current auditing standards. 
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A brief summary of various probability distribution elicitation methods described in prior 
literature can be found in Table 10. The table demonstrates that there are several classes of 
elicitation methods tested in auditing context (in relation to historical cost, rather than FV 
accounts) as well as in other fields such as economics and finance, which may be considered as 
candidates to be used in this study. Of the methods listed in Table 10, two probability 
distribution elicitation methods (cumulative distribution function method (CDF) and credible 
interval method (CI)) are most frequently used in prior literature to elicit individuals’ expert 
probability distributions in business settings such as accounting (auditing), economics, and 
finance (e.g., Crosby 1980 and 1981; Dominitz 1998; Laws and O' Hagan 2002; Budescu and Du 
2007). The other family of elicitation methods is the methods for which the elicited probabilities 
depend on the individuals' utility functions, e.g. lotteries, scoring rules, and promissory notes 
(Kadane and Winkler 1988). Judgmental point forecasting methods (Lawrence et al. 2006) are 
also included in Table 10. For the parameters entering fair valuation process such as discount 
and growth rates and future cost structure, the branch of elicitation literature dealing with 
interval elicitation/forecasting has the highest relevance. Lawrence et al. (2006) provides a 
literature review on point forecasting vs. interval forecasts (prediction intervals), which they 
define as “prediction bounds that specify upper and lower forecast limits within which the future 
value of the predicted variable is expected to lie with a specified probability” (p. 505). The 
authors observe that point forecasting may create “false assumptions of precision”, while 
elicitation formats such as prediction intervals and probability forecasts make the uncertainties 
explicit (Lawrence et al. 2006, p. 501). Thus, the judgmental point forecasting is not likely to be 
suitable for the FV auditing task. Also, since lotteries, scoring rules, and promissory notes 
methods involve real or hypothetical payoffs, and are subject to utility-related effects, they are 
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not the best candidate for a decision aid for a valuation task in audit settings. Therefore, of the 
methods listed in Table 10, the CDF and CI methods are chosen to be tested. As the 
effectiveness of the two selected methods in FV audits is unknown, the following research 
question may be formulated: 
RQ 1. Are the CDF and CI elicitation methods useful (effective) for obtaining 
information about uncertain inputs into the calculation of FV estimates from the auditors 
and valuation specialists, particularly those helping to construct the reasonable ranges? 
As extant elicitation literature describes a variety of elicitation techniques which prove to 
lead to different outcomes in terms of resulting distributions (e.g., Shapir, Shavit, and Benzion 
2015), it is reasonable to expect that some of the elicitation methods will be more effective for 
the purposes of building distributions for complex FV estimates than the others. This argument 
leads to the following research question: 
RQ 2. Which of the CDF and CI elicitation methods is more useful (effective) for 
obtaining information about uncertain inputs into the calculation of FV estimates from the 
auditors and valuation specialists? 
Probability distribution elicitation methods also provide a way to estimate the degree of 
confidence placed by the auditors and valuation specialists on the fair valuation model input 
parameters, if the information about unaided intervals is available in addition to the information 
about assisted intervals (developed with the help of elicitation methods). Obtaining such 
information is important since no current reporting, auditing, or valuation standards provide any 
guidance on either the required degree of confidence for the parameters entering valuation 
models, or its relationship to other parameters such as audit materiality. This motivates the 
following research question: 
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RQ 3. What is the degree of confidence placed by the auditors and valuation 
specialists on the model input parameters for fair valuation models? 
Prior literature on elicitation of probability distributions suggests that the elicitation 
process may suffer from certain behavioral biases such as overconfidence, anchoring, and others 
(O'Hagan et al. 2006; Lawrence et al. 2006). In the context of FV auditing task, the anchoring 
heuristics can be argued to have high importance since auditors and valuation specialists may 
have prior-held beliefs on the ranges of parameters entering the fair valuation model before 
attending to the elicitation task.  
Since the CI method questions operate in “interval” terms, making it easier for the 
participants prior-held beliefs about the parameters intervals to enter the elicitation process, 
while the CDF method questions wording is based on a “value” (a distributional fractile) concept 
instead of the “interval” concept, making it more difficult to incorporate such beliefs, the CDF 
method is expected to be less susceptible to the anchoring heuristics than the CI method. In other 
words, the use of the CDF method provides more certainty that any prior-held beliefs will not 
influence the elicited parameters distributions. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H 1. The CDF (E1) probability distribution elicitation method is less susceptible to 
the anchoring effect than the CI (E2) probability distribution elicitation method. 
According to Griffin (2011), complex FVs have a quality of imprecision, which means 
that there is a range of possible future outcomes, with wider (more imprecise) ranges resulting 
from higher variability of the outcomes. As discussed above, addressing imprecision is critically 
important for auditors, because under current reporting standards financial statements must 
contain point estimates of complex FVs, subject to audit materiality (Smieliauskas 2012). 
Probability distribution elicitation methods help the auditors and valuation specialists to build 
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distributions of the uncertain input parameters for FV estimates, thus facilitating the 
quantification of uncertainty in the input parameters. However, different elicitation method may 
have differential impact on the quantification of uncertainty. Therefore, the following research 
question can be formulated: 
RQ 4. Which elicitation methods better facilitates the quantification of uncertainty 
in the input parameters for complex model-based FV estimates?  
4.4 Research Design   
4.4.1 Research Methodology 
In this study I expose the participants to elicitation methods which will help them to 
construct distributions of the input parameters used in the DCF model based on the external and 
internal information provided in the experimental case. One of the methods I use is cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) method (see Table 1), also called “variable interval method” 
(O’Hagan et al. 2006, p. 133). A brief illustration of the method is presented in Table 11, Panel 
A. Under this method, participants are asked to specify selected fractiles of the cumulative 
distribution function for an elicited parameter, such that the .X fractile represents the value X 
such that there is a X% chance that the true value of the parameter is actually lower than the 
value and a (1-X)% chance that it is actually higher (e.g., Tomassini et al. 1982). The selection of 
the CDF method is in part dictated by its relative simplicity, which is important given the limited 
time available to the participants to perform the task. Additionally, the method has been 
successfully tested in prior auditing studies (Crosby 1980; Crosby 1981; Solomon 1982; 
Tomassini et al. 1982; Solomon et al. 1985), even though in the context of less complex tasks 
such as building auditors’ prior distributions of account balances.  
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I also use another elicitation method to evaluate the differences among elicitation 
techniques that can potentially be used to assist with FV audits. One candidate is the credible 
interval (CI) elicitation method (see Table 10), which has been applied in management, 
psychology, and economics, but to my knowledge has never been tested in auditing settings. 
Under this method, participants are asked to specify a “low value” and a “high value” for an 
elicited parameter, such that they are X% confident the true value is inside the resulting interval 
(e.g., McKenzie, Liersch, and Yaniv 2008). A brief illustration of the credible interval elicitation 
method is presented in Table 11, Panel B. Subjects are assigned to the two elicitation methods to 
provide for a sufficient number of observations for each method to perform a comparison. 
This study is implemented during the same experimental session with the process study 
with the same participants. This is necessitated by three important factors. First, there is a limited 
number of valuation specialists involved with FVs employed by Canadian audit firms, making it 
problematic to extend the sample. Second, it is important to utilize advantages arising from the 
fact that the researcher is present during the study. Extant auditing studies on elicitation suggest 
that the researchers should preferably be present during the experimental sessions for consulting 
the subjects and for reviewing the assessed probability distributions with them to ensure the 
correct calibration (e.g., Tomassini et al. 1982, p.395)
5354
. Third, the proposed study features a 
much more involving and time consuming task than prior elicitation papers, making it difficult to 
achieve similar recruitment of the participants.  
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 Generally, in-person elicitation interviews provide for a much higher quality of responses than questionnaires 
delivered in the absence of the researcher (O’Hagan et al. 2006, pp. 25, 26). 
54
 In the elicitation study, the review with participants of the assessed probability distributions to ensure correct 
calibration was performed after the completion of the session. It was made to ensure that the distributions produced 
by the participants conform to the general rules of probability theory. For example, a 75%/25% distributional fractile 
value is supposed to be always larger or equal to the median value. If a problem with the calibration was discovered, 
a correction was made by the participants themselves. 
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As the process study, the study is a quasi-experiment, since a random assignment is 
difficult to accomplish due to the nature of the participants recruitment process, which is 
described below. The use of the two elicitation methods can be considered a between-subjects 
experimental manipulation. The experimental case is identical to the one used in the process 
study, with the task being a CGU impairment auditing task for a publicly listed company which 
reports under IFRS. The company is a manufacturing company in the paper products industry. 
However, the elicitation study adds an elicitation aid implemented in Excel intended to help the 
participants to develop intervals for the input parameters to the DCF valuation model used to 
determine the recoverable amount of the CGU. A more comprehensive description of the 
instrument is given in one of the following sections.  
The verbal protocol analysis methodology is used to understand the details of the 
participants’ elicitation process. The verbal protocols method have been used in the extant 
auditing literature to obtain detailed evidence about and understanding of the processes that 
auditors follow when performing various types of tasks. Particularly, the verbal protocol analysis 
has been employed for studying the analytical review process (Biggs, Mock, and Watkins 1988; 
Blocher and Cooper 1988) and internal control evaluation process and audit scope 
determinations (Biggs and Mock 1983). The method requires subjects to “think aloud” when 
performing the task, and their thinking is captured using voice and potentially other recording 
equipment (e.g., tracking information searches, etc.)
55
. The process information is then coded 
and analyzed by the researcher(s) conducting the study.  The concurrent verbal protocols are a 
good methodology fit for a process analysis because they provide behavioral information about 
the underlying process, and render rich data especially valuable for analyzing complex tasks 
(Biggs and Mock 1983, p. 237), such as the FV auditing task. The main purpose of verbal 
                                                     
55
 I use Camtasia software to record the screen activity during the study. 
 95 
 
protocol analysis in this study is to understand whether elicitation methods help to quantify 
uncertainty inherent in model input parameters for fair valuation models. 
To the best of my knowledge, prior literature does not provide any definitive guidance on 
how to establishing the quality of auditors’ judgments related to ranges for complex FVs. In 
other word, there is no previously tested way to gauge the effectiveness of elicitation methods in 
FV auditing settings. Therefore, three new methods for establishing their effectiveness are 
suggested in this paper:  an econometric method, an expert panel method, and a method based on 
the analysis of verbal protocols. These methods are discussed in detail below. Unfortunately, in a 
typical CGU impairment scenario (like the one considered in this study), verification of the 
recoverable amount against the actual outcome is problematic because this outcome is unknown, 
in the sense that each year the CGU impairment judgment incorporates a considerable amount of 
uncertainty.
56
 As a consequence, the method based on comparison to the actual outcome is not 
feasible in complex FV audit settings. 
The econometric method is based on the use of econometric analysis to examine 
distribution properties of the participants’ intervals. Such distribution properties include (but are 
not limited to) the average width of the intervals and the variance/standard deviation of widths of 
the intervals, their upper and lower bounds, or their midpoints.  
The econometric method can be used both in the context of comparison between the two 
elicitation methods and in the context of comparison of participants’ unaided judgment intervals 
to their assisted judgment intervals.
57
  For the purpose of comparison between the CDF and CI 
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 This is also generally applicable to other complex fair value estimates. Verification against the actual outcome is 
only possible for simple accounting estimates such as provisions for bad debts or warranties. Complex fair values 
are difficult to verify against their outcomes due to significant time lags and possible intervening events (e.g., 
IAASB 2011). 
57
 The set of auditors’ intervals for the CGU recoverable amount produced by the participants using unaided 
judgment in the process study, can be called “unaided judgment intervals”, while the set of auditors’ intervals 
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elicitation methods, econometric analysis can be used to examine similarities/differences of the 
distribution properties of intervals produced under each of the methods. One elicitation method is 
deemed more effective than the other method if participants’ aided judgment intervals produced 
under the first method are on average narrower and have smaller variance/standard deviation of 
their widths, upper and lower bounds, etc. than equivalent
58
 participants’ intervals produced 
under the second method. A smaller average width of equivalent participants’ intervals for one of 
the elicitation methods indicates a higher effectiveness of that method since ISA 540.A94 
requires that “ordinarily, a range that has been narrowed to be equal to or less than performance 
materiality is adequate for the purposes of evaluating the reasonableness of management’s point 
estimate.” A smaller variance/standard deviation of the interval widths and upper and lower 
bounds indicates a higher effectiveness since it reflects more consistency among the participants 
using the elicitation method, compared to the other method.
59
 
For the purpose of comparing participants’ unaided judgment intervals to their assisted 
judgment intervals, econometric analysis can be used to compare variance/standard deviation of 
the interval widths and upper and lower bounds for a given level of confidence. As is the case 
with the comparison of different elicitation methods, when comparing aided interval judgments 
to unaided interval judgments, a smaller variance/standard deviation of the interval widths and 
upper and lower bounds when relying on elicitation means more consistency among the 
participants’ aided judgments, compared to their unaided judgments. On the other hand, if the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
produced by the participants using the suggested elicitation techniques in this study can be called “assisted judgment 
intervals”. 
58
 The intervals in question should be equivalent to produce meaningful results. For example, in the context of this 
study, an interval between .25 and .75 fractiles under the CDF method is equivalent to 50% confidence interval 
under the CI method, as both intervals provide for the same confidence level (50%).  
59
 It remains to be investigated whether the increase in consistency (which is a key point of the econometric method-
based comparison criteria for the distribution elicitation methods) move the participants’ FV interval judgment in the 
correct direction (meaning that the more problematic FV interval judgments rest with the outliers). This is a topic for 
future research. 
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above parameters are smaller for the unaided judgments, the elicitation method does not provide 
any advantage over such judgments in terms of increasing consistency among the participants. 
The expert panel method is based on the postulate that valuation specialists represent a 
type of expert panel whose judgments regarding intervals for the valuation model input 
parameters can be used as a benchmark of outcome quality. Thus, the valuation specialists’ 
judgments represent a benchmark against which experienced auditors’ and novices’ judgments 
can be evaluated. According to this logic, elicitation methods that bring auditors’ (non-
specialists’) judgments closer to valuation specialists’ judgments can be considered effective, 
whereas elicitation methods that have no impact or exacerbate the differences between 
specialists’ and non-specialists’ judgments can be considered ineffective. However, it is also 
possible that the experimental results will provide evidence consistent with valuation specialists’ 
judgments and estimates not representing a defensible set of judgment outcomes for the purpose 
of evaluating non-specialists’ judgment outcomes. 
Under the method based on the analysis of verbal protocols, an elicitation method is 
considered effective if evidence can be obtained that it facilitates quantification of uncertainties 
involved in the goodwill impairment auditing task. As discussed above, these uncertainties are 
related to unobservable input parameters to the valuation model such as growth rates, discount 
rates, and future cost structure. The evidence is obtained directly from the verbal protocols and 
visual data collected during this study (the elicitation study) and the process study. The data 
collected during the elicitation study can be analyzed either separately on its own, or in 
comparison with that obtained during the process study.
60
 The method based on verbal protocols 
can be used in conjunction with either the first (the econometric analysis) or the second (the 
expert panel) suggested methods. 
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 Provalis Research QDA Miner software was used to do the coding. 
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The specifics of the verbal protocol method include analyzing the frequencies of words 
and/or phrases which are indicative of the quantification of uncertainty process. One probability 
distribution elicitation method is considered to be more effective than the other elicitation 
method for the purpose of quantification of uncertainty if the related verbal protocols for the first 
method are characterized by a higher relative frequency of such words, compared to the second 
method. These relative frequencies can be calculated for each specific word. Alternatively, 
composite frequency measures can be used with a system of weights assigned to the words 
according to their importance in the quantification of uncertainty process.  
The verbal protocols method operates under the assumption that the frequency of 
words/phrases related to a certain topic in the verbal protocols reflects the frequency with which 
the participants think about this topic in the process of performing the task. Therefore, a higher 
relative frequency of words indicative of quantification of uncertainty under a particular 
elicitation points to the participants thinking to a greater extent about how to quantify uncertainty 
under that elicitation method. 
4.4.2 Participants 
This study is based on a sample of 18 experienced auditors
61
, 6 valuation specialists, and 
11 junior auditors, providing for a total sample size of 35 participants.
62
 This is comparable with 
other elicitation studies performed in audit settings which used about 30 to 40 participants (e.g. 
Crosby 1980, Tomassini et al. 1982).The sample involves experienced auditors and valuations 
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 One of the 18 experienced auditors who performed elicitation did not fill up some of the elicitation cells for the 
widest aided interval. Therefore, this participant is excluded from the analysis related to the widest aided interval. 
62
 Even though the process and elicitation studies were run in a single experimental session, the sample size for the 
elicitation study is slightly smaller than the one for the process study, as some of the participants were not able to 
complete the elicitation part due to a time constraint. The total sample size for the process study is 41 (21 
experienced auditors, 9 valuation specialists, and 11 junior auditors), meaning that 3 experienced auditors and 3 
valuation specialists did not complete the elicitation part. 
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specialists from three Big 4 (referred to as “Big 4 firm #1”, “Big 4 firm #2”, and “Big 4 firm 
#3”) and one Big 6 (referred to as “Big 6 firm #1”) public accounting firms,63 while the group of 
11 junior auditors consists of MAcc students from a medium sized university possessing public 
accounting experience and particularly, experience with auditing goodwill or intangible assets. 
The study obtained ethics approval from the office of research ethics at the author’s university. 
The experienced auditors and valuation specialists were recruited using personal networking, 
while junior auditors were recruited by advertising the study in class. The junior auditors were 
remunerated at the rate of $30CAD an hour, while the rest of the participants were not 
remunerated. Table 12 presents selected demographic information of the participants. The table 
suggests that the experienced auditors, the valuations specialists, and the junior auditors on 
average performed 4.3, 9, and 2.5 impairment analyses in the last two years, respectively.
64
 As 
discussed above, the involvement of valuation specialists is warranted because, at this time, there 
is little direct evidence on how they approach FV auditing tasks, because existing interview-
based studies of the FV auditing process have had very limited input from valuation specialists. 
4.4.3 Experimental Instrument 
As discussed above, the principal component of the experimental instrument is a CGU 
(goodwill) impairment case. It involves a public company in the paper products sector. A concise 
summary of the experimental instrument is provided in Table 5, whereas the case selection 
criteria are discussed in Appendix 1. 
As discussed in the previous section, this study (“elicitation study”) attempts to find a 
systematic way to elicit information from auditors (experienced as well as junior) and valuation 
                                                     
63
 All of Big 4 and Big 6 participants are employed in central Canadian offices of their public accounting firms. 
64
 The two experienced auditors and one valuations specialist who report no impairment analyses performed in the 
last two years performed impairment analyses in previous years. 
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specialists when they audit complex FV estimates. Therefore, the case is supplemented with a set 
of instructions intended to test the two different elicitation methods described above, cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) method (also referred to as “E1” in this study) and credible interval 
(CI) elicitation method (also referred to as “E2”), for helping auditors to come up with an 
auditor’s range for the CGU recoverable amount. More precisely, the participants are provided 
with an instructions page on how to use their elicitation method and with an additional Excel 
spreadsheet which facilitates the process of entering the parameters of the probability 
distributions of the DCF valuation model input variables. An illustration of the elicitation 
template is presented in Figure 3. 
The case was developed with a help of partner-level practitioners experienced with FV 
impairment issues. The study was pilot tested with  a pilot sample of one auditor (an Assurance 
Senior Staff Accountant employed by a Big 4 public accounting firm, possessing prior 
experience with auditing FV impairments), two valuation specialists (a Senior Valuations 
Manager and a former Valuations Partner employed by a national (Big 6) public accounting 
firm), who are also Canadian Chartered Business Valuators (CBVs), and a junior auditor (a 
Masters student possessing some experience with FV audits). 
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FIGURE 3 
Example of the Elicitation Method Template (CDF Elicitation Method)  
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Implied Confidence Levels for the Unaided Intervals (RQ 3) 
Table 13 contains a comparison of assisted auditor’s intervals for the CGU recoverable 
amount developed with a help of an elicitation method applied to the DCF model input 
parameters, to the unaided auditor’s intervals produced without application of an elicitation 
method. As discussed above, the unaided interval is produced in the course of the process 
analysis study, which is run before the elicitation study during the same experimental session. 
Panels A and B in Table 13 present the comparison of the unaided intervals to the assisted 
auditor’s intervals for the CDF (E1) and CI (E2) elicitation methods, respectively.  
One of the insights provided by data in Table 13 is estimating the degree of confidence 
placed by the participants on the model input parameters when developing their unaided 
intervals. The estimation can be performed via a comparison of the widths of aided intervals 
developed with the use of elicitation methods (for which the confidence levels are known
65
) to 
the widths of unaided intervals (for which the confidence levels need to be estimated). The 
results of the comparison are reported in Table 14.
66
 As can be seen from the table, there is a 
wide variation in the estimated degree of confidence placed by the experienced and junior 
auditors
67
 on the model input parameters when developing their unaided intervals. There seem to 
be no clear preference among the auditors towards any single degree of confidence. This result 
                                                     
65
 While under the CI (E2) elicitation method the confidence levels are explicit at 90%, 50%, and 25% for the 
widest, middle, and narrowest intervals respectively, under the CDF (E1) method they can be calculated using the 
general probability rules at 98%, 80%, and 50% for the widest, middle, and narrowest intervals respectively. 
66
 Table 14 contains four panels. Panels A and B report implied confidence levels using unadjusted assisted ranges, 
while Panels C and D report confidence levels using adjusted assisted ranges. The adjusted assisted range differs 
from the unadjusted assisted range in such a way that it includes ranges for those and only for those input parameters 
for which ranges where developed when developing the unassisted range for the CGU recoverable amount.  
67
 The number of observation for the valuation specialists is too small to estimate the variation. 
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demonstrates a general lack of consistency regarding the confidence level placed on the model 
input parameters by the auditors when developing their unaided intervals. Table 14 also reports 
imputed levels of confidence for the unaided intervals calculated using OLS imputation method 
based on the three known observations corresponding to the elicited intervals.
68
  The average 
imputed levels of confidence for the unaided intervals for experienced and junior auditors using 
the CDF (E1) elicitation method are 49% and 54% (55% and 59% for the adjusted assisted 
intervals), respectively, while the average imputed levels of confidence for the same participant 
groups using the CI (E2) method are 50% and 57% (62% and 66% for the adjusted assisted 
intervals), respectively. The similarity in the two pairs of numbers between the participants using 
E1 and E2 is expected given that the confidence level for the unaided interval should not depend 
on the elicitation method used by a participant. When the participants using the CDF (E1) and CI 
(E2) methods are considered together, the average imputed levels of confidence for the unaided 
intervals for experienced and junior auditors are 49% and 56% (60% and 64% for the adjusted 
assisted intervals), respectively (not shown in Table 14). 
4.5.2 Comparison of the Unaided Judgment to Assisted Judgment with the Elicitation 
Methods (RQ 1) 
Implied confidence analysis given above indicates that, with the data available, the 
comparison of the aided to the unaided judgments can be accomplished for the confidence level 
of 50% (which is approximately the implied confidence for the unaided intervals). This 
confidence level corresponds to the narrowest interval under the CDF (E1) elicitation method 
(the interval formed with the 25% and 75% CDF fractiles), and the middle interval under the CI 
                                                     
68
 The imputation is performed using STATA 13 software. Out of 23 observations to be imputed, the procedure 
produces correct imputations (i.e., imputations falling in the correct confidence intervals) for 20 observations (for 19 
observations when adjusted assisted intervals are considered). For the three (four) remaining observations (marked 
with * in Table 14), the imputed number is replaced with the closest interval bound. 
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(E2) elicitation method. The comparison indicates that when all groups of the participants are 
considered together (not tabulated), the CDF method provides for an improvement over unaided 
judgment with the standard deviation of the interval widths of 41.90 for the aided intervals vs. 
the standard deviation of the interval widths of 45.52 for the unaided intervals. On the other 
hand, the CI (E2) method is not helpful for improving the consistency of the participants’ 
judgments (the standard deviation of the interval widths is 191.15 vs. 55.69, for the aided vs. 
unaided intervals respectively). Further analysis of the above findings performed via a 
breakdown of the participants into the three groups (experienced and junior auditors and 
valuation specialists) indicates that the results concerning the effectiveness of both the CDF (E1) 
and the CI (E2) method are primarily driven by the junior auditors’ group (see Table 13, Panels 
A and B). For example, Table 13, Panel A demonstrates that for a 50% confidence level, the 
CDF method provides for smaller standard deviation of the interval’s widths (as well as their 
upper and lower bounds) for junior auditors when aided judgment is compared to the unaided 
one, while the result does not hold for the experienced auditors.
69
 This analysis suggests that the 
CDF method appears to have a potential for improving unaided judgment regarding FV intervals, 
while the CI method appears not to have such a potential, answering RQ 1. 
The discussion above also indicates that the use of both of the elicitation methods 
encourages the participants to develop distributions for the valuation model input parameters for 
which no ranges were developed for the unaided auditor’s interval, thus providing for a better 
quantification of uncertainty. Table 15 reports the input parameters for which elicited 
distributions were developed but point estimates were used for the unaided auditor’s intervals.  
                                                     
69
 The results are not significant at conventional significance levels due to the small number of available 
observations. 
 105 
 
4.5.3 Comparison of the Effectiveness of CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods (RQ 2) 
Table 16 presents the comparison of results achieved with the use of CDF and CI 
elicitation methods, for each of the participants groups. Specifically, the narrowest (25% to 75% 
cumulative distribution) interval developed using the CDF method is directly comparable to the 
middle (50% confidence) interval developed using the CI method. A comparison of the 
appropriate cells in Panel A, Table 16 which reports the CDF method results, to the 
corresponding cells in Panel B, Table 16 which reports the CDF method results, leads to the 
following findings. For both experienced and junior auditors, the CDF method provides for 
narrower intervals for the resulting FV (on average) than the CI method. The standard deviation 
of the interval widths is smaller for the intervals obtained using the CDF method when compared 
to the standard deviation of the intervals obtained using the CI method, for both experienced and 
junior auditors. Additionally, the standard deviation of lower and upper bounds of the intervals 
for the resulting FV is smaller for the CDF method compared to the CI method, for both 
experienced and junior auditors (not reported in Table 16). On the contrary, for valuation 
specialists, interval widths for the resulting FV, as well as their standard deviations and the 
standard deviations of their lower and upper bounds are smaller for the CI method, compared to 
the CDF method (the results for lower and upper interval bounds is not tabulated). These 
findings indicate that the CDF method appears to be more effective for both experienced and 
junior auditors (as it produces narrower intervals with smaller standard deviations of their widths 
and upper and lower bounds), while the CI method is more effective for valuation specialists 
(using the same criteria), providing an answer to RQ 2 formulated above.
70
 Additional research 
                                                     
70
 Due to the small sample size employed in the study some of the results reported in Table 16 are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Results for standard deviations of upper interval bounds and standard deviations 
of interval widths for junior and experienced auditors, however, are statistically significant. For the experienced 
auditors group, the differences in standard deviations of upper interval bounds and standard deviations of interval 
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is needed to understand why the CDF method is more useful for auditors, but the CI method is 
more useful for valuation specialists. One of the possible reasons is that valuation specialists are 
much more proficient in the use of probability distributions than auditors (as discussed in the 
verbal protocols analysis part), which may reflect on the difference in effectiveness between the 
CDF and CI methods for auditors and valuation specialists.  
4.5.4 Comparison of the CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods with Regard to Their 
Susceptibility to the Anchoring Heuristics (H 1) 
To test H 1, it is necessary to have an estimate of the participants’ prior-held beliefs to 
determine the extent of the anchoring effect, if any. Since the process study and the elicitation 
study are run in one experimental session, one after the other, the point estimate or range for the 
input parameters entering the valuation model for the CGU RA developed by a participant in the 
process study can serve as an approximation of the participant’s prior-held beliefs about the 
model input parameters before attending to the elicitation routine. If this proxy for the prior-held 
beliefs is used, the analysis of verbal protocols and screen recordings indicates that the anchoring 
does take place, but as predicted, the two elicitation methods have a different level of 
susceptibility to it. Particularly, the analysis shows that for the discount rate distribution, two 
participants out of 14 (or 14%) who did the CDF method used their unaided interval for the 
range formed by either 1/99 or 25/75 fractiles, whereas nine participants out of 21 (or 43%) who 
did the CI method used their unaided interval for either 90% or 50% confidence intervals in the 
elicitation study. For the tax rate distribution, two participant out of 14 (or 14%) relying on the 
CDF method used their unaided interval for the range formed by either 1/99 or 10/90 fractiles, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
widths between CDF and CI methods are significant at 10% and 1%, respectively. For the junior auditors group, the 
differences in standard deviations of upper interval bounds and standard deviations of interval widths between CDF 
and CI methods are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively.  
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whereas six participants out of 21 (or 29%) relying on the CI method used their unaided interval 
for the 90% confidence intervals in the elicitation study. A similar result is observed for other 
DCF model input parameters including the revenue growth rate, variable operating expenses, 
fixed operating expenses, and financing charges.
71
  
Thus, as predicted in H 1, the CDF (E1) elicitation method is less susceptible to the 
anchoring effect than the CI (E2) method. This conclusion has high practical significance in real-
life audit settings since auditors or valuation specialists can have an opinion on the ranges of 
parameters entering the fair valuation model prior to performing the elicitation routine. The use 
of the CDF method provides more certainty that any prior-held beliefs will not influence the 
elicited parameters distributions. While the “interval” concept vs. the “value” concept theoretical 
argument used to support the development of H 1 appears to be plausible, future research is 
needed to determine any possible alternative explanations of the observed phenomenon. 
4.5.5 Comparison of the CDF (E1) and CI (E2) Elicitation Methods with Regard to Their 
Ability to Assist With Quantification of Uncertainty (RQ 4) 
Table 17 provides results of the frequency analysis of the words indicative of 
quantification of uncertainty in concurrent verbal protocols for the two probability elicitation 
methods. The procedure for identifying such words includes two steps. At the first step, all of the 
words containing in the verbal protocols are identified and their frequency of occurrence in the 
protocols is determined. At the second step, the words which are not indicative of quantification 
of uncertainty (neutral words) are removed from the analysis.
72
 The two elicitation methods are 
then compared using the frequencies of the resulting set of non-neutral words.  
                                                     
71
 The relationship is the least pronounced for the fixed operating expenses. 
72
 The full set of non-neutral words is presented in Table 17. One group of neutral words include pronouns (such as 
“we”, “they”, “them”, etc.), articles (“a”, “the”, etc.), auxiliary verbs (“will”, “would”, etc.), and other words of this 
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The results in reported in Table 17 suggest that CDF (E1) elicitation method appears to 
be more effective for assisting the participants in quantification of uncertainty, when compared 
to CI (E2) elicitation method, in the context of fair value impairment audit task. Particularly, out 
of 35 words identified as pointing to quantification of uncertainty, 23 are more frequent under 
the CDF (E1) method, while 12 are more frequent under the CI (E2) method. Thus, CDF (E1) 
method is more effective for quantification of uncertainty than CI (E2) method based on the 
frequencies of individual words per participant. If a composite index based on equal weighting of 
the frequencies of non-neutral words is used to proxy for effectiveness, CDF (E1) methods have 
the index of 85.4, while CI (E2) have the index of 54.1, again pointing to a higher effectiveness 
of CDF (E1) method compared to CI (E2) method. 
4.5.6 Between-Participants Comparison of the Elicited Distributions 
Visual inspection of the data in Table 16 also indicates significant differences in how 
participants view the distributions of the input parameters for the DCF model for the CGU 
recoverable amount. The inspection of the 35 participants who performed the elicitation routine 
indicates the presence of five outliers with distributions which are much more extreme (and with 
the respective auditor’s intervals which are much wider) than the remaining 30 participants. The 
outliers belong to all three of the participants groups (one junior auditor, three valuation 
specialists, and two experienced auditors). This result highlights a high degree of subjectivity 
currently present in model-based complex FV auditing practices. The outliers may be due to 
individual information processing features, insufficient understanding of the elicitation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
type. I use Provalis Research QDA Miner and WordStat for my analysis and rely on its functionality to identify such 
words and place them in an automatically generated exclusion list. The other group of neutral words encompasses 
regular nouns, adjectives, and verbs which are unlikely to be used in the quantification of uncertainty process. I use 
my own judgment to separate such words from non-neutral words which are indicative of the quantification of 
uncertainty. Some examples would include nouns like “audit”, “thing”, “work”, “management”, adjectives such as 
“good”, “pretty”, etc. 
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instrument, or other possible factors. However, the fact that two participants from this outliers 
group who developed an auditor’s range in the process analysis study also feature abnormally 
wide unassisted auditor’s ranges, compared to other participants who developed unassisted 
auditor’s ranges, suggests that incorrect understanding of the elicitation methods is unlikely to be 
a contributing factor to the observed extreme distributions. 
4.5.7 Analysis of the Unaided and Aided Intervals from the Perspective of Audit 
Materiality 
The data in Table 16, analyzed from the perspective of three scenarios introduced in 
Smieliauskas (2012), indicate that assisted ranges developed by the participants do not fit into 
the two acceptable scenarios, “Accounting estimate nirvana” (whereby the reasonable range of 
an estimate does not exceed the materiality), and “Estimate problem” (whereby the width of the 
reasonable range is greater than the materiality, but does not exceed twice the materiality). The 
results are best characterized by the “Estimate nightmare” scenario, which takes place when 
twice the materiality is smaller than the width of the reasonable range, meaning that all points 
inside or outside of the reasonable range have significant risks (Smieliauskas 2012, p. 279). 
Indeed, Table 16, Panel A demonstrates that even for the narrowest interval developed with the 
help of the CDF elicitation method (the interval formed by .25 and .75 CDF fractiles, 
corresponding to 50% confidence level), the average interval width is 88.33, 129.69, and 78.55 
times the audit materiality for experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and junior auditors, 
respectively. Table 16, Panel B shows that for the narrowest interval developed with the help of 
the CI elicitation method (25% confidence level interval), the average interval width is 58.80, 
39.39, and 63.13 times the audit materiality for experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and 
junior auditors, respectively.  
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For the unaided intervals, the average width is 69.40, 75.50, and 85.99 times the audit 
materiality for experienced auditors, valuation specialists, and junior auditors, respectively (not 
tabulated). None of the participants produced either unaided or assisted interval which is smaller 
than twice the audit materiality. 
4.5.8 Other Findings Resulting From Concurrent Verbal Protocols Analysis 
An important finding of the elicitation methods study is that currently both junior and 
experienced auditors and valuation specialists do not have a clear understanding of what a 
required level of confidence for the model input parameter for FVs should be. Even though at the 
final stage of the study all of the participants are notified that the auditor’s interval for the CGU 
recoverable amount based on the elicited parameters distributions corresponds to intervals 
formed by 25%/75% distributional fractiles (25% confidence intervals) for the input parameters 
for the CDF method (the CI method), only a very small number of participants contests or 
otherwise discusses the suggested confidence level for the input parameters. Specifically, only 
one experienced and one junior auditor indicate that a 25% confidence for the input parameters 
would be insufficient for obtaining assurance on a model-based fir value estimate, and state that 
the required confidence level should approach 90%. One of the valuation specialists reports that 
in practice the numerical values of confidence levels for the model input parameters are not 
considered, while simultaneously admitting that different levels of confidence would be 
appropriate in different circumstances. 
73
 
Two of the participants provide comments on the decision aids which are used in current 
audit practice to deal with the input parameters for model-based FVs. One experienced auditor 
                                                     
73
 E.g., more confidence for the discount rate input parameter is required if the auditee does not fit into the existing 
WACC industry studies, if the company is not in a mature/stable industry, or if it is close to the impairment/no 
impairment threshold in the current year audit. 
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suggests that their group uses a Microsoft Excel-based decision aid which is intended to calculate 
point estimates for the input parameters using weighted-average probabilities method. 
7475
 This 
decision aid is a relatively close analogy for the suggested elicitation decision aid, as it also takes 
into consideration probabilities when calculating point estimates of the input parameters. 
However, the elicitation procedures provide for more information as they explicitly quantify the 
levels of confidence attributable to the specified ranges of input parameters, while the weighted-
average method does not. This distinction may be important as the verbal protocols show that the 
majority of participants have difficulty with specifying a required level of confidence for the 
input parameters. One valuation specialist suggests that their group utilizes an Excel-based 
decision aid which calculates the sensitivity of fair valuation model to the input parameters, 
without considering their probability distributions. This is a remote analogy of the suggested 
decision aid as the sensitivity aid does not take into account probabilities of the parameters 
values. 
The participants’ subjective opinion with regard to the usefulness of the two elicitation 
methods reveals that the majority of those who expressed their opinion see the methods as being 
useful for estimating the parameters distributions. Specifically, for the CDF (CI) method, one 
(seven) participants indicate that the method is useful, while one (one) participant indicates that 
the method is useful for judgmental parameters (such as discount and revenue growth rate) only, 
none (one) of the participants indicate that the method is probably useful, and none (one) of the 
participants say that they need to use the method for some time to ascertain its usefulness, 
respectively. None of the participants suggest that either of the method is not useful.  
                                                     
74
 The participant refers to IAS 36 requirement to calculate weighted average probabilities when determining VIU as 
a justification for this decision aid. However, IAS 36 refers to weighted average calculation applied to future cash 
flows, as opposed to model input parameters such as discount rate, etc. 
75
 The experienced auditor also suggests that the aid use should be delegated to the auditee’s management, if the 
management’s qualifications so permit, to preserve the auditor’s independence. 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
Quantitative analysis of the assisted and unassisted auditor’s ranges from the perspective 
of audit materiality indicates that currently auditor’s intervals for complex model-based FVs are 
excessively wide and fall into “Accounting estimate nightmare” category defined in 
Smieliauskas (2012), meaning that any point in the reasonable range have a significant 
estimation risk, as defined in ISA 540 (IAASB 2008). This result confirms that concerns raised 
in Christensen et al. (2012) and Menzefricke and Smieliauskas (2012a and 2012b) based on the 
analysis of certain fair valuation models translate into a practical problem encountered during 
audits of complex model-based FVs. Moreover, this study discovers that the problem of 
excessively wide auditor’s ranges persists across all of the main constituencies in FV audits, 
including both experienced and junior auditors and valuation specialists. 
A within-participant comparison of assisted and unassisted intervals reveals a significant 
inconsistency in the degree of confidence that they place on the input parameters’ intervals when 
developing their unassisted auditor’s ranges. The study reports a so called “implied level of 
confidence” for the participants’ unaided intervals which is calculated based on “fitting” the 
unaided intervals developed by the participants in the process study to the elicited distributions 
of the respective input parameters produced in the elicitation study. The data obtained on implied 
confidence demonstrates that experienced auditors generally require a lower level of confidence 
for the input parameters when compared to junior auditors (60% vs. 64% imputed levels of 
confidence, respectively). This result indicates that auditors’ expertise (proxied by experience) 
might have an effect on the auditors’ levels of confidence when auditing model-based FVs. 
Investigating the mechanism(s) and the magnitude of this effect is a topic for future research. 
The inconsistency of confidence levels among auditors also pose a question about what the 
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desired level of confidence for fair valuations model input parameters in audit engagement 
settings should be. As this level of confidence is not specified in current financial reporting, 
auditing, or valuation standards, the answer might be of significant interest to the regulators and 
standard setters. Further, the use of elicitation methods, coupled with the specified desired level 
of confidence, can introduce a necessary degree of standardization in the FV auditing process. 
Since elicitation methods enable auditors to produce probability distributions for the input 
parameters, auditors or valuation specialists can then use the prescribed level of confidence to 
determine the parts of the parameters distributions that should be entering the valuation model. 
The data obtained in this study indicates that if a 50% confidence level is considered for 
the valuation model input parameters, the CDF method produces results superior to the unaided 
judgment because it provides for more consistency among the participants (that is, for a smaller 
standard deviation of the interval widths) when compared to the unaided judgment. This finding 
appears to be driven by the junior auditors group. On the other hand, the CI method does not 
seem to produce an improvement over the unaided judgment similar to the CDF method.  
A comparison of the CDF and CI elicitation methods indicates that the CDF method 
proves to be superior relative to the CI method for both experienced and junior auditors, whereas 
the opposite is true for valuation specialists. Specifically, for the comparable interval (25% to 
75% cumulative distribution under the CDF and 50% confidence interval under the CI), the CDF 
method provides for narrower intervals for the resulting FV (on average) than the CI method, as 
well as for a smaller standard deviation of the interval widths and lower and upper bounds, thus 
leading to a better compliance with IAS 540 and to a higher consistency of judgment among 
auditors. On the contrary, for valuation specialists, interval widths for the resulting FV, as well 
as their standard deviations and the standard deviations of their lower and upper bounds are 
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smaller for the CI method, compared to the CDF method. Why the CDF method is more useful 
for auditors, while the CI method is more useful for valuation specialists is a topic for future 
research. This study suggest one potential explanation: a higher proficiency of valuation 
specialists with the use of probability distributions, compared to auditors. As the comparison of 
the CDF and CI methods reveals different levels of effectiveness, future studies should continue 
the search for elicitation methods which might be more effective in FV audit settings than the 
methods investigated in this paper. This includes both fine-tuning the CDF and CI methods (such 
as using alternative distribution fractiles or confidence intervals, using different numbers of 
distribution fractiles/intervals, etc.) and testing other types of elicitation methods. Additionally, 
alternative interfaces for the practical implementation of elicitation methods may be designed 
and tested as a part of future research, in addition to Excel-based template implementations 
suggested in this study. Future research may also involve investigating elicitation biases such as 
overconfidence in FV audit settings. 
In summary, the quantitative analysis performed in this study indicates that the CDF 
elicitation method has a potential to improve the participants’ judgment regarding FV intervals, 
at least for junior auditors, while the CI method does not yield similar improvement. Also, when 
the two methods are compared to each other, the CDF method proves to be more effective for 
experienced and junior auditors, while the opposite is true for valuation specialists. 
The qualitative analysis relying on verbal protocols methodology suggest that the CDF 
method is more effective than the CI method for helping auditors and valuation specialists with 
quantification of estimation uncertainty inherent in complex FVs such as goodwill impairments. 
The results are based on calculating the frequency of occurrence of words indicative of 
quantification of uncertainty. Specifically, the verbal protocols analysis finds that for the set of 
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35 words pointing to the quantification of uncertainty process, the CDF method is characterized 
by higher frequencies of 23 of such words, while the CI method has higher frequencies for the 
remaining 12 words. A composite measure constructed through equal weighting of the 
frequencies of occurrence of the 35 words is also higher for the CDF method when compared to 
the CI method (85.4 vs. 54.10). 
The CDF probability distribution elicitation method is found to be less susceptible to the 
anchoring heuristic when compared to the CI method. The most likely explanation is related to 
the fact that the CI method questions operate in “interval” terms, making it easier for the 
participants prior-held beliefs about the parameters intervals to enter the elicitation process, 
while the CDF method questions wording is based on a “value” (a distributional fractile) concept 
instead of the “interval” concept, making it more difficult to incorporate such beliefs. Future 
research is needed to determine other possible reasons for this finding, if any.  
The suggested elicitation methods provide an advantage over the currently used decision 
aids
76
 for the fair valuation models input parameters (including those which take into 
consideration probabilistic characteristics of the parameters, such as the weighted-average 
probability-based decision aid) in that they explicitly quantify the parameters confidence levels. 
This is important because neither auditors nor valuation specialists appear to have a clear 
understanding of what the required level of confidence for the input parameters for model-based 
FVs should be in an audit. Finally, the majority of the participants indicate that, in their opinion, 
elicitation methods are helpful for a better understanding of the distributions of model input 
parameters for complex FVs, and for developing more precise auditor’s ranges for such FVs. 
This holds for both experienced and junior groups of participants.  
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 As discussed above, the use of such methods is not widespread. 
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Overall, the study finds that certain probability distribution elicitation techniques have a 
potential to serve as a decision aid for auditors and valuation specialists verifying complex, 
forward-looking FV estimates. FV auditing appears to be a natural area for applying elicitation-
based decision aids because such aids directly address uncertainties inherent in the task. Both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses performed in the study suggest that generally, the CDF 
method surpasses the CI method as a FV auditing decision aid.  
The study contributes to the academic literature by bringing together auditing research 
and elicitation research in a FV auditing setting. From a practical perspective, the paper has the 
potential to improve current audit practices related to auditing of goodwill impairment and 
possibly other complex FVs. This is accomplished by providing information valuable for the 
development of decision aids useful in FV audits.  
A limitation of the study is that its results may not fully generalize to FV auditing tasks 
involving types of valuation models different from DCF models, such as valuation models for 
complex financial instruments. Other potential limitations may arise from the fact that the 
process study and the elicitation study are run in one experimental session, one after the other. 
This includes the possibility of anchoring on the point estimate or range for the CGU recoverable 
amount developed by the same participant in the process study. Data in the verbal protocols 
suggests that some of the participants use their unaided parameters intervals as a starting point 
for constructing their respective elicited distributions.
77
 Finally, since both studies are limited to 
an experimental session which would not typically exceed a two hour period, the limitation on 
time available to perform the task may impact the results. 
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 However, as discussed above, this research design also helps to investigate the susceptibility of different 
elicitation methods to the anchoring bias. 
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Chapter 5  - Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Contribution   
5.1.1 Contribution to Academic Literature 
The process study contributes to the academic literature by obtaining direct experimental 
evidence on auditors’ and valuation specialists’ process when they perform a FV auditing task, 
and investigating the process differences between auditors and experts, as well as between 
auditors of different levels of expertise. The experimental study supplies much more detailed 
process information when compared to the extant interview-based research, which provides a 
“bigger picture” view on FV auditing. One of the main reasons for this is that a concrete context 
of the impairment case provides the participants an opportunity to think about fine details of the 
auditing and FV estimation processes, resulting in obtaining rich process information which is 
not possible to collect in interview studies which are lacking specific context.  
The process study is also the first to apply the verbal protocols methodology in FV audit 
settings, a method that has been used in the extant auditing literature to obtain detailed evidence 
about and understanding of the processes that auditors follow when performing various types of 
tasks, and which is particularly suitable for analyzing complex tasks. It thus supplements and 
provides a valuable addition to prior verbal protocol studies of the audit analytical review, 
internal control evaluation, and audit scope determinations.   
Another process study contribution is in overcoming one of the limitations of the existing 
studies of the FV auditing process, in that the extant studies provide little direct evidence of how 
valuation specialists approach the FV auditing tasks. The interview-based studies discussed 
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above have either a very limited input from valuation specialists, or are based solely on 
interviewing auditors, with no feedback from valuation specialists. On the other hand, 22% of 
the process study’s sample is comprised of valuation specialists. As a result, it provides a 
significant amount of incremental evidence about the valuation specialists’ involvement in FV 
audits, including the factors influencing such involvement as well as the interplay between 
valuation and audit standards/guidance. 
The elicitation study contributes to the academic literature by bringing together auditing research 
and elicitation research in a FV audit setting. Distribution elicitation has been researched in the auditing 
context using experimental methodology with regard to the choice of an attribute sample size, the 
consistency of elicited priors, the comparison of distributions elicited from individual auditors vs. those 
elicited from audit teams, the calibration of the auditors’ prior probability distributions of account 
balances, and the impact of contextual factors on the calibration of probabilistic judgments by the 
auditors. However, all of the above studies apply elicitation methods in relation to auditing of historical 
cost, rather than FV accounts.   
The elicitation study also offers three new methods for establishing the effectiveness of the 
elicitation methods in FV audit settings:  an econometric method, an expert panel method, and a method 
based on the analysis of verbal protocols. This represents an important contribution since there is no 
previously tested way to gauge the effectiveness of elicitation methods in FV audits. Moreover, prior 
literature does not provide any definitive guidance on how to establish the quality of auditors’ judgments 
related to ranges for complex FVs, with or without a reference to elicitation methods. 
5.1.2 Contribution to Audit Practice 
From a practical perspective, both the process and elicitation studies have a potential to 
improve current audit practices related to auditing of goodwill impairment and possibly other 
complex FVs. The process study’s main contribution is in identifying problematic areas of the 
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current practice along several dimensions: 1) audit and fair valuation methodology, 2) financial 
reporting, auditing, and fair valuation standards, 3) judgmental shortcuts arising in the course of 
the auditing process, and 4) estimation uncertainties inherent in the task.  The identification of 
such problematic practice areas may help to develop appropriate corrective actions. 
The main practical contribution of the elicitation study is in providing information on a 
class of techniques (probability distribution elicitation methods) which may serve as a basis for 
developing decision aids for dealing with FV estimation uncertainty (one of the problematic 
areas identified in the process study).  Two elicitation methods – CDF method and CI method – 
are experimentally tested and compared in goodwill impairment audit settings. The practical 
need to develop decision aids useful for dealing with FV estimation uncertainty is highlighted by 
some of the participants mentioning ad-hoc decision aids which are used in current audit practice 
to deal with the input parameters for model-based FVs. One example is a Microsoft Excel-based 
decision aid which is intended to calculate point estimates for the input parameters using 
weighted-average probabilities method, which provides a relatively close analogy for the 
suggested elicitation decision aid, as it also takes into consideration probabilities when 
calculating point estimates of the input parameters. However, the elicitation procedures provide 
for more information as they explicitly quantify the levels of confidence attributable to the 
specified ranges of input parameters, while the weighted-average method does not. Another 
example is an Excel-based decision aid which calculates the sensitivity of FV model to the input 
parameters, without considering their probability distributions. This is a remote analogy of the 
suggested decision aid as the sensitivity aid does not take into account probabilities of the 
parameters values. 
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5.1.3 Contribution to Regulation and Standard Setting 
From the point of view of standard setters, both the process and elicitation studies 
provide several useful insights. The results of the process study show that inter-firm differences 
in accounting for the forecast (projection) risk in projected CFs lead to difficulties in comparing 
discount rates used in fair valuation models by different audit firms. Therefore, valuation and FV 
auditing practice may benefit from introducing a degree of standardization in the treatment of the 
forecast risk, to increase comparability among firms. Possibly, CAS 540 may be expanded to 
reflect what appears to be the preferred treatment for the majority of public accounting firms, 
whereby the forecast risk is included as a component of the discount rate. Another area where the 
standards may be revisited is the IFRS requirement to apply a pre-tax discount rate in VIU 
models, as specified in IAS 36. The practice appears to demonstrate that using a post-tax 
discounting may represent a more natural choice, given the availability of observable economic 
inputs into the valuation process. 
The process study also draws attention to the interplay between the ISA and CICBV 
guidance. The CICBV guidance offers two approaches to fair valuation, an “estimate” 
(performed for M&A, tax, and financial reporting (audit) engagements and assuming a limited 
amount of work) and a “comprehensive valuation” (performed for litigation support and fairness 
opinion engagements and assuming an extensive amount of work). This classification of the 
approaches to business valuation give rise to a possible problem whereby in audit engagements, 
which are supposed to provide the highest level of assurance to the financial statements users, a 
less stringent approach is applied when compared to several other types of valuation 
engagements. This finding suggests that the quality of FV estimates on the audited financial 
statements, which has been subject to much criticism and discussion in recent years, may in 
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principle be increased by applying a more stringent approach to valuation by the valuation 
specialists involved in FV audits, which is ultimately a question of audit cost efficiency.  
The results of the process study also indicate that certain aspects of application of ISA 
540 by the valuation specialists, such as the choice between testing management’s estimate and 
developing auditor’s own estimate or range, may be affected by the interaction between ISA 540 
and CICBV guidance.  Specifically, the finding that valuation specialists have a preference to 
classify their actions as “testing management’s estimate” may be explained not only by the 
choice factors specified in ISA 540 and the auditor’s independence considerations, but also by 
the fact that in the opinion of valuation specialists, only the comprehensive valuation, which is 
never done for audit purposes, represents a “true development” of an independent FV estimate. 
Finally, the elicitation study reports a so called “implied level of confidence” for the 
participants’ unaided intervals which is calculated based on “fitting” the unaided intervals 
developed by the participants in the process study to the elicited distributions of the respective 
input parameters produced in the elicitation study. The study demonstrates that experienced (vs. 
junior) auditors generally require a lower level of confidence for the input parameters, as well as 
general inconsistency of confidence levels among auditors belonging to the same expertise 
group. Given that this level of confidence is not specified in the current financial reporting or 
auditing standards, these results point to a need to develop guidance within the auditing 
standards regarding the required level of confidence for input parameters for complex FVs, 
which may possibly be linked to the existing guidance on audit risk or AM, or both. 
5.1.4 Contribution to Education 
The results of the process study reveal that auditors are generally not well-versed in the 
valuations methodology. The most prominent example where many auditors have difficulty is 
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the classification and application of different valuations methods, such as levered vs. debt-free 
method, which is very important since it has a direct bearing on the understanding of cash flow 
components which should be included into the valuation model. Other issues which cause 
difficulties include the necessity of circular calculation of the value of equity and the difference 
between pre-tax and post-tax discounting methods. This situation represents a problem since ISA 
620, which governs the use of the work of an auditor’s expert, prescribes that the auditor should 
be able to understand the field of expertise of the expert (e.g., business valuation) in order to both 
determine the nature, scope and objectives of that expert’s work for the auditor’s purposes, and 
evaluate the adequacy of that work (ISA 620.10). While the suggested decision-aid-related 
response to this problem is described in the audit practice contribution discussion above, a 
possible educational response would include strengthening of the valuations component of the 
auditors’ education, with a particular emphasis on the problematic areas which are identified in 
the paper.   
The other process study result which has educational implications is general unfamiliarity of the 
junior auditors with the role that valuation specialists play in audit engagements involving valuations 
issues. This is illustrated by the junior auditors not providing any comments regarding either the 
involvement of internal valuation specialists in the audit or the division of responsibilities between the 
specialists and the auditors in the course of the audit. This result points to a need to better educate 
auditing students with regard to the role of valuation and other specialists in audit engagements. 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research   
The process and elicitation studies suggest several issues which may warrant future 
research. One such issue is how to assist auditors with narrowing their range for complex FV 
estimates to meet ISA 540 requirements. While one of the means to address this issue 
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(probability distribution elicitation methods) is suggested and tested to some extent in the 
elicitation study, the other possible ways may also be identified and investigated.  
The other issue is searching for the ways to alleviate dysfunctional behavioral shortcuts 
revealed in the auditing process. Those include, but are not limited to, the tendency of some of 
the valuation specialist to apply the concepts of estimation uncertainty and audit materiality in 
isolation, the tendency of the auditors to rely on mainstream accounting performance measure 
rather than on pro-forma performance measures when addressing the possible management’s 
bias from the compensation perspective, etc. 
Several future research questions are related to a so called “implied level of confidence” 
for the participants’ unaided intervals which is calculated based on “fitting” the unaided intervals 
developed by the participants in the process study to the elicited distributions of the respective 
input parameters produced in the elicitation study. The data obtained on implied confidences 
demonstrates that expertise (proxied by experience) might have an effect on the auditors’ levels 
of confidence when auditing model-based FVs. Investigating the mechanism(s) and the 
magnitude of this effect is a topic for future research. The inconsistency of confidence levels 
among auditors poses an additional question about what the desired level of confidence for fair 
valuations model input parameters in audit engagement settings should be, given that it is not 
specified or even discussed in current financial reporting or auditing standards.  
A comparison of the CDF and CI elicitation methods indicates that the CDF method 
proves to be superior relative to the CI method for both experienced and junior auditors, whereas 
the opposite is true for valuation specialists. Why the CDF method is more useful for auditors, 
while the CI method is more useful for valuation specialists is a topic for future research. The 
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elicitation study suggest one potential explanation: a higher proficiency of valuation specialists 
with the use of probability distributions, compared to auditors.  
As the comparison of the CDF and CI methods reveals different levels of effectiveness, 
future studies should continue the search for elicitation methods which might be more effective 
in FV audit settings than the methods investigated in this paper. This includes both fine-tuning 
the CDF and CI methods (such as using alternative distribution fractiles or confidence intervals, 
using different numbers of distribution fractiles/intervals, etc.) and testing other types of 
elicitation methods. Additionally, alternative interfaces for the practical implementation of 
elicitation methods may be designed and tested as a part of future research, in addition to Excel-
based template implementations suggested in this study. Future research may also involve 
investigating elicitation biases such as overconfidence in FV audit settings. 
Additional research is also needed to address the issue of why the CDF elicitation method 
is less susceptible to the anchoring heuristic when compared to the CI method. The elicitation 
paper suggests a possible explanation, which may be related to the CI method operating in 
“interval” terms, making it easier for the participants prior-held beliefs about the parameters 
intervals to enter the elicitation process, compared to the CDF method operating in “value” 
terms, making it more difficult to incorporate such beliefs. Future research is needed to find the 
actual reasons of the observed phenomenon.  
Finally, additional research is needed on how to gauge the quality of auditors’ judgments related 
to ranges for complex FVs, with or without a reference to elicitation methods. While the elicitation study 
offers three new methods for establishing the effectiveness of the elicitation methods in FV audit settings, 
other methods for evaluating auditors’ FV interval judgment can be designed and tested.  
 125 
 
5.3 Limitations   
A limitation of both studies is that their results may not fully generalize to FV auditing 
tasks involving types of valuation models different from DCF models used for goodwill 
valuation, such as valuation models for complex financial instruments and actuarial (pension) 
liabilities. Another limitation relevant for both studies is the time constraint: since both studies 
are limited to an experimental session which would not typically exceed a two hour period, the 
limitation on time available to perform the task may impact the results.  
Some of the limitations of the process study originate from the use of concurrent verbal 
protocols methodology, which include possible side effects of verbalizing requirement on the 
cognitive process under examination, concerns about completeness of the resulting report, and 
issues with coding procedure subjectivity. As discussed, prior research on the verbal protocols 
demonstrated that these limitations can be effectively countered with the appropriate safeguards. 
One limitation of the elicitation study arises from the fact that the process study and the 
elicitation study are run in a single experimental session, one after the other. This entails the 
possibility of anchoring on the point estimate or range for the CGU recoverable amount 
developed by the same participant in the process study. Data in the verbal protocols suggests that 
some of the participants use their unaided parameters intervals as a starting point for constructing 
their respective elicited distributions. However, this limitation also serves as an advantage in the 
sense that it helps to gauge the susceptibility of the tested elicitation methods to the anchoring 
heuristics. 
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TABLE 1 Current Financial Reporting and Auditing Regulation on Fair Values 
  
Jurisdiction Governing Body Type of Standard Standard/Document Title Effective Date Comments 
USA FASB Financial Reporting SFAS No. 157 FV Measurements For financial 
statements issued 
for fiscal years 
beginning after 
November 15, 2007, 
and interim periods 
within those fiscal 
years 
 
USA FASB Financial Reporting Staff Position No. 
FAS 157-3  
Determining the FV 
of a Financial Asset 
When the Market 
for That Asset Is 
Not Active 
Same with  
Statement of 
Financial 
Accounting 
Standards No. 157 
This FASB Staff 
Position (FSP) 
clarifies the 
application of FASB 
Statement No. 157, 
Fair Value 
Measurements, in a 
market that is not 
active 
USA PCAOB (SEC) Auditing (issuers) SAS No. 101 / AU 
Section 328 
Auditing FV 
Measurements and 
Disclosures 
For audits of 
financial statements 
for periods 
beginning on or 
after June 15, 2003 
 
USA PCAOB (SEC) Auditing (issuers) SAS No. 92 / AU 
Section 332 
Auditing Derivative 
Instruments, 
Hedging Activities, 
and Investments in 
Securities 
For audits of 
financial statements 
for fiscal years 
ending on or after 
June 30, 2001. Early 
application is 
permitted 
 
USA PCAOB (SEC) Auditing (issuers) SAS No. 73 / AU 
Section 336 
Using the Work of a 
Specialist 
For audits of periods 
ending on or after 
December 15, 1994 
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USA PCAOB (SEC) Auditing (issuers) SAS No. 57 / AU 
Section 342 
Auditing 
Accounting 
Estimates 
For audits of 
financial statements 
for periods 
beginning on or 
after January 1, 
1989, unless 
otherwise indicated 
 
USA ASB (AICPA) Auditing (non-
issuers) 
AU  540 Auditing 
Accounting 
Estimates, 
Including FV 
Accounting 
Estimates and 
Related Disclosures 
For audits of 
financial statements 
for periods 
ending on or after 
December 15, 2012 
Replaced  SAS No. 
101 /  AU Section 
328 
EU / Canada / 
Australia 
IASB Financial Reporting IFRS 13 FV Measurement January 1, 2013. 
Earlier application 
is permitted 
 
EU / Canada / 
Australia 
IASB Financial Reporting IAS 36 Impairment of 
Assets 
March 31, 2004 Amended in 2008 
and 2009 for 
“Annual 
Improvements to 
IFRSs 2007 and 
2008.” Initially 
released in June 
1998 
EU / Canada / 
Australia 
IASB Financial Reporting IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: 
Recognition and 
Measurement 
January 1, 2005.  
Earlier application 
is permitted 
 
EU / Canada / 
Australia 
IAASB (IAASB) Auditing ISA 540 Auditing 
Accounting 
Estimates, Including 
FV Accounting 
Estimates, and 
Related Disclosures 
Audits of financial 
statements for 
periods beginning 
on or after 
December 15, 2009 
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Canada CICBV Valuation Standard No. 110 Valuation Report 
Standards and 
Recommendations. 
June 17, 2009  
Canada CICBV Valuation Appendix B to 
Standard No. 110 
Valuation for 
Financial Reporting 
February 26, 2010  
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TABLE 2 Behavioral Studies on Fair Value Auditing 
  
Broad Topic Study Variables Research Design Results 
Biases in Auditors’ Judgment 
When Evaluating Fair Value 
Estimates 
Montague (2010)  “The 
effects of directional audit 
guidance on auditor 
confirmation bias and 
professional skepticism when 
evaluating fair value 
estimates” 
Independent variables: 
Audit guidance ( support 
management’s estimate,  
generate own estimate,  
disconfirm management’s 
estimate), uncertainty (low, 
high) 
Dependent variables: 
Confirmation bias, 
conservative bias, 
professional skepticism  
3 x 2 between-participants 
experimental design in which 
professional auditors and 
undergraduate auditing 
students acted as participants 
Auditors are subjected to 
more confirmation bias (i.e., 
auditor seeks more 
confirming than 
disconfirming evidence) 
when they are asked to 
counter (vs. support) 
management’s estimate or 
generate their own estimate, 
while this bias increases the 
professional skepticism. 
Confirmation bias is the 
highest in 
“counter/disconfirm” 
condition with high 
estimation uncertainty. 
 Cohen et al. (2016) “ The 
Effect of Framing on 
Information Search and 
Information Evaluation in 
Auditors’ Fair Value 
Judgments” 
Independent variables: three 
levels of guidance frame -   
“support” (positive frame), 
“support and oppose” 
(balanced frame), or 
“oppose” (negative frame) 
management’s assertions 
Dependent variables:  
auditors’ recommended fair 
value estimate (FVE) 
A single-factor experimental 
design, using experienced 
auditors as participants 
A balanced frame (vs. a 
positive or negative ones) 
causes auditors to use more 
evidence countering, rather  
than supporting 
management’s assertions, 
resulting in higher perceived 
RMM, and leading to lower 
fair value balances, implying 
that revising audit standards 
from positive to balanced 
frame leads to more 
conservative fair value 
audits. 
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 Maksymov et al. (2015) 
“Planning Audits of Fair 
Values: Effects of Procedure 
Frame and Perceived 
Procedure Verifiability” 
Independent variables:  
Audit procedure frame 
(positive/negative), 
efficiency pressure 
(low/high) 
Dependent variables:   
The number of audit hours 
that they budget for each of 
audit procedures, achieved 
audit risk 
In the experiment audit 
procedure frame is 
manipulated between 
participants and efficiency 
pressure is manipulated 
within participants 
The negative frame leads to 
planning for more audit 
hours, especially for 
procedures that are perceived 
as less verifiable. This 
implies that re-framing audit 
procedures from the (typical 
in practice) positive frame to 
a negative one would 
increase audit effort. 
Effect of 
Subjectivity/Management Bias 
in Fair Value Estimates  
on Auditors’ Judgment 
Griffin (2014) “ The Effects 
of Uncertainty and 
Disclosure on Auditors’ Fair 
Value Materiality Decisions” 
Independent variables:  
Subjectivity (Level 2, less 
subjective or Level 3, more 
subjective), imprecision 
(narrow, precise $250k range 
or wide, imprecise $1M 
range), and disclosure 
(whether or not additional 
supplemental information,  
e.g. key assumptions and 
range of possible outcomes, 
accompanies a standard 
footnote) 
Dependent variables: 
Likelihood of required 
adjustment 
Three independent variables 
are manipulated in 2 × 2 × 2 
between-participants design 
with  106 practicing auditors 
as participants 
When fair values are more 
subjective and imprecise in 
outcomes, auditors are more 
likely to recommend 
adjustments, but the effect is 
weakened when fair values 
are accompanied by 
additional disclosure. 
Auditors calculate the 
adjustment quantum by 
comparing management’s FV 
estimate to the nearest bound 
(vs. the midpoint) of the 
auditors’ range, implying a 
strict application of auditing 
standards. 
 Earley et al. (2014)  
“Auditors’ Role in Level 2 
versus Level 3 Fair-Value 
Classification Judgments” 
Independent variables: 
security type (mortgage 
backed security, or MBS) and 
an auction rate security, or 
ARS) and management’s 
preference (Level 2 and 
Level3) 
Dependent variables: 
Auditor’s skepticism 
2 x 2 x 2 mixed design, with 
two between-participants 
independent variables, 
security type and 
management’s preference 
For fair value auditing, the 
auditors are generally 
skeptical of the classification 
that the management's 
chooses. This is especially 
pronounced when the 
management settles on the 
more aggressive reporting 
option, suggesting that 
auditors incorporate 
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regulators’ warnings not to 
be lenient in such situations. 
The Use of Valuation Experts Carpentier et al. (2008) 
“Does Fair Value 
Measurement Provide 
Satisfactory Evidence for 
Audit? The Case of High 
Tech Valuation” 
Dispersion of FV estimates,  
methods used to value the 
investment, consistency of 
the valuation model input,  
relevance of the standards 
In a survey, Chartered 
Business Valuators (CBVs) 
are asked to value a 
high tech firm in the process 
of making an IPO, in 
accordance with the 
Canadian Venture Capital 
Association’s (CVCA’s) 
recommendations 
Methods and multiples used 
by valuation experts are 
highly heterogeneous, and 
the resulting FVMs for the 
same investment exhibit very 
significant variability. Post-
IPO verification reveals 
overstatement 
 Jamal et al. (2011) “Do 
Disclosure and Certification 
Exacerbate Bias From 
Conflict of Interest?” 
Independent variables:  
Type of conflict (with one 
agent vs. two agents), bias 
control (none, disclosure, 
certification) 
Dependent variables:  
Valuation bias 
161 professional accountants 
as participants in a 2x3+1 
between subject‘s design 
experiment that varies (1) the 
type of conflict of interest 
and (2) the bias control 
When only the selling party 
is present, conflict disclosure 
is dysfunctional as it 
produces bias. When both the 
buying and the selling parties 
are present, the bias is 
observed across all of the 
conditions. 
 Griffith (2014) “Auditing 
Complex Estimates: The 
Interaction of Audit-Team 
Specialists’ Caveats and 
Client Source Credibility” 
Independent variables: 
Presence or absence of a 
caveat in the audit-team 
specialist’s memo,  
perceptions of the source 
credibility of the preparer of 
the estimate 
Dependent variables:  
auditors’ elaboration on the 
evidence related to the 
estimate,  auditors’ concerns 
about the estimate, and the 
procedures they would 
perform to address them 
Experiment with 78 senior 
auditors from three Big 4 
firms as participants 
Auditors incorporate a caveat 
into evidence evaluation for a 
biased FV estimate when 
they perceive the preparer of 
an estimate to have relatively 
low source credibility. 
Auditors do not incorporate 
the caveat if they perceive 
the initial preparer to have 
relatively high source 
credibility. 
 Griffith (2015) “How Do 
Auditors Use Valuation 
Specialists when Auditing 
N/A Interviews with 28 audit 
partners and managers with  
experience using valuation 
Auditors apply auditing 
standards’ guidance for 
external specialists to internal 
 132 
 
Fair Values?” specialists valuation specialists. If there 
is no relevant guidance, the 
auditors lead the specialists 
to comply with the audit 
team’s prevailing position. 
Main issues in the area are 
related to the complex fair 
values’ inherent uncertainty, 
which causes the auditors to 
rely on reports of valuation 
specialists that they cannot 
competently review or even 
understand.   
 Griffith (2016) “When Do 
Auditors Use Specialists’ 
Work to Develop Richer 
Problem Representations of 
Complex Estimates?” 
Independent variables: 
Presence or absence of a 
relational cue (manipulated) 
and auditors’ views of source 
credibility (measured) 
Dependent variables:   
Richness of auditors’ 
problem representations,  
auditors’ identification of 
potential issues in FV 
estimate 
Experiment with 78 senior 
auditors from three Big 4 
firms as participants 
A relational cue in a 
specialist’s work leads to 
improvement in auditors’ 
problem representations and 
estimate-related judgments.  
The improvement occurs 
only if client source 
credibility is low, meaning 
that auditors do not always 
respond to cues in specialists’ 
work. 
 Joe et al. (2015) “Use of 
Third Party Specialists’ 
Reports When Auditing Fair 
Value Measurements: Do 
Auditors Stay in Their 
Comfort Zone?” 
Independent variables:  
quantification level (low vs. 
high) and control 
environment risk (low vs. 
high) 
Dependent variables: time a 
participant allocates to a 
procedure scaled by the total 
hours allocated 
2 x 2, between-subjects 
design,  on the sample of 92 
“Big 4” audit seniors 
Auditors allocate less 
proportionate effort to testing 
the subjective inputs of 
management’s FV estimate 
when both the quantification 
evidence level and control 
risk are high.  
Other Studies on Fair Value Griffith et al. (2012) N/A Interviews of 24 experienced Auditors elect not to create 
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Audit “Auditing Complex 
Estimates: Understanding the 
Process Used and Problems 
Encountered” 
auditors who regularly deal 
with complex estimates, 
content analysis of recent 
PCAOB inspection reports to 
corroborate understanding of 
the most critical difficulties 
in auditing estimates 
an independent estimate or to 
rely on verification via 
subsequent events, but rather 
prefer to audit the 
management’s estimate 
details.  Auditors’ decision to 
verify management’s 
estimate may be based on 
effort and efficiency 
consideration, given their 
investment in understanding 
management’s model. 
 Griffith et al. (2015) “Audits 
of Complex Estimates as 
Verification of Management 
Numbers: How Institutional 
Pressures Shape Practice” 
N/A Interviews of 24 experienced 
auditors who regularly deal 
with complex estimates, 
content analysis of recent 
PCAOB inspection reports to 
corroborate understanding of 
the most critical difficulties 
in auditing estimates 
Auditors overwhelmingly 
elect testing management’s 
FV estimates rather than 
developing independent 
expectations or reviewing 
subsequent events.  There are 
two root causes of this 
situation: excessive focus on 
verifying management’s 
estimates in the standards and 
audit firms’ current 
distribution of knowledge 
between auditors and 
specialists, whereby the 
auditors do not know enough 
about valuation. 
 Cannon and Bedard (2015) 
“Auditing Challenging Fair 
Value Measurements: 
Evidence from the Field” 
Independent variables: 
Levels 3 FV, estimation 
uncertainty, inherent risk, 
control risk, etc. for different 
tests 
Dependent variables: 
inherent risk, auditors use of 
specialist, etc.  for different 
tests 
Field study based on a 
questionnaire of a sample of 
115 FVs, described by high-
level engagement team 
members from multiple audit 
firms (comprised mostly of   
Level 3 fair values such as 
financial instruments, asset 
impairments, etc.) 
Uncertainty in the estimates 
is positively related to the 
assessed inherent risk, but in 
a number of cases the 
estimate’s inherent risk is 
assessed below maximum 
even though the uncertainty 
leads to ranges that are larger 
than materiality. The use of a 
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valuation specialist by the 
client triggers the reliance on 
a specialist by the auditors. 
Thee auditors most 
frequently (in 53% of the 
cases) choose to develop 
their own independent 
estimate or range. 
 Glover et al. (2016) “Current 
Practices and Challenges in 
Auditing Fair Value 
Measurements and Complex 
Estimates: Implications for 
Auditing Standards and the 
Academy” 
N/A Survey of 32 audit partners The auditors more frequently 
choose to develop own 
estimates for financial 
instruments, compared to 
other FVs. Both 
management’s and audit 
team’s assumptions may be 
used when developing an 
independent estimate, while 
the use of audit team’s 
assumptions is more 
common. 
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TABLE 3 Detailed Audit Process Information for Impairment Testing of Goodwill and Related Research Questions 
Panel A: Expected Process Map 
 Relevant Financial Reporting 
Guidance – Excerpts from IFRS 
IAS 36 “Impairment of Assets” 
(IASB 2004a) 
Relevant Audit Guidance – 
Excerpts 
from ISA 540 “Auditing 
Accounting Estimates, Including 
Fair Value Accounting Estimates, 
and Related Disclosures” (IAASB 
2008) 
 
Predicted Audit Process for 
Impairment Testing of Goodwill  
(Audit of Supremex, Inc. for Fiscal 
2012) 
 
Research Questions About Audit 
Process Prepared Based on Prior 
Auditing and Psychology Literature 
Identifying an asset that may be 
impaired 
 
8 An asset is impaired when its 
carrying amount exceeds its 
recoverable amount. Paragraphs 12–
14 describe some indications that an 
impairment loss may have occurred. 
If any of those indications is present, 
an entity is required to make a formal 
estimate of recoverable amount. 
Except as described in paragraph 10, 
this Standard does not require an 
entity to make a formal estimate of 
recoverable amount if no indication of 
an impairment loss is present.  
 
9 An entity shall assess at the end of 
each reporting period whether 
there is any indication that an asset 
may be impaired. If any such 
indication exists, the entity shall 
estimate the recoverable amount of 
the asset. 
 
12 In assessing whether there is any 
indication that an asset may be 
impaired, an entity shall consider, 
as a minimum, the following 
 The “Management Memo” mentions 
that Supremex’s management 
established at the end of the reporting 
period that there are indications that 
goodwill may be impaired. 
Specifically, the “Management 
Memo” states that “During the fourth 
quarter of 2012, several new 
indicators have shown that the 
volume decrease in North America’s 
envelope industry was higher than 
expected and that this decline was 
expected to continue in the upcoming 
years.” 
 
The auditor will likely point out that 
according to Paragraph 10 of IAS 36 
“Impairment of Assets”, irrespective 
of whether there is any indication of 
impairment, an entity must test any 
goodwill acquired in a business 
combination for impairment annually, 
in accordance with paragraphs 80–99 
of the same IAS. 
 
Next, the auditor will observe that 
Supremex has a material goodwill 
balance on its balance sheet. 
Materiality for the audit is set at 
RQ 1. Do the participants recognize 
the necessity to test goodwill for 
impairment annually as prescribed in 
IAS 36, irrespective of the existence 
of indicators of impairment? Do the 
participants recognize that indicators 
of impairment are present/consider 
indicators of impairment? 
 
 
RQ 2.  Do the participants attempt to 
verify the sources of goodwill, 
specifically that the goodwill arose 
from past business combinations? 
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indications: 
 
External sources of information 
 
(a) during the period, an asset’s 
market value has declined 
significantly more than would be 
expected as a result of the passage 
of time or normal use. 
(b) significant changes with an 
adverse effect on the entity have 
taken place during the period, or 
will take place in the near future, in 
the technological, market, economic 
or legal environment in which the 
entity operates or in the market to 
which an asset is dedicated. 
(c) market interest rates or other 
market rates of return on 
investments have increased during 
the period, and those increases are 
likely to affect the discount rate 
used in calculating an asset’s value 
in use and decrease the asset’s 
recoverable amount materially. 
(d) the carrying amount of the net 
assets of the entity is more than its 
market capitalization. 
 
Internal sources of information 
 
(e) evidence is available of 
obsolescence or physical damage of 
an asset. 
(f) significant changes with an 
adverse effect on the entity have 
taken place during the period, or 
are expected to take place in the 
near future, in the extent to which, 
or manner in which, an asset is 
$600,000 according to the Case 
Instructions, while the balance of the 
goodwill is $75,751,125, a highly 
material amount. Therefore, the 
auditor will need to make sure that 
Supremex’s management performed 
annual goodwill impairment testing in 
according with IAS 36, and verify 
management’s conclusion about the 
impairment. 
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used or is expected to be used. 
These changes include the asset 
becoming idle, plans to discontinue 
or restructure the operation to 
which an asset belongs, plans to 
dispose of an asset before the 
previously expected date, and 
reassessing the useful life of an asset 
as finite rather than indefinite. 
(g) evidence is available from 
internal reporting that indicates 
that the economic performance of 
an asset is, or will be, worse than 
expected. 
 
13 The list in paragraph 12 is not 
exhaustive. An entity may identify 
other indications that an asset may be 
impaired and these would also require 
the entity to determine the asset’s 
recoverable amount or, in the case of 
goodwill, perform an impairment test 
in accordance with paragraphs 80–99. 
 
14 Evidence from internal reporting 
that indicates that an asset may be 
impaired includes the existence of: 
 
(a) cash flows for acquiring the asset, 
or subsequent cash needs for 
operating or maintaining it, that are 
significantly higher than those 
originally budgeted; 
(b) actual net cash flows or operating 
profit or loss flowing from the asset 
that are significantly worse than those 
budgeted; 
(c) a significant decline in budgeted 
net cash flows or operating profit, or a 
significant increase in budgeted loss, 
 138 
 
flowing from the asset; or 
(d) operating losses or net cash 
outflows for the asset, when current 
period amounts are aggregated with 
budgeted amounts for the future. 
 
Identifying the cash-generating unit 
to which an asset belongs 
 
66 If there is any indication that an 
asset may be impaired, recoverable 
amount shall be estimated for the 
individual asset. If it is not possible to 
estimate the recoverable amount of 
the individual asset, an entity shall 
determine the recoverable amount of 
the cash-generating unit to which the 
asset belongs (the asset's cash-
generating unit). 
 
 The Case Instructions state that 
Supremex’s management has 
determined that there is only one cash 
generating unit (CGU) – the envelope 
business. Further, the auditor is asked 
to assume, for the purposes of this 
case, that he or she concurs with the 
management’s identification of the 
CGUs.  
 
Therefore, the auditor will consider 
one CGU for the purposes of 
impairment testing – the envelope 
business and will not perform further 
investigation into whether smaller 
CGUs exist within Supremex (as the 
existence of smaller CGUs will 
normally imply a larger amount of 
impairment and smaller total assets 
and net income).  
 
Otherwise, the issue of CGU 
determination is not trivial in this 
CGU impairment case, as “Overview 
of the Business” states that Supremex 
has multiple geographic locations in 
six provinces. Each of these locations 
can potentially be considered as a 
candidate for a separate CGU. 
 
RQ 3.  Do the participants recognize 
the need to obtain assurance on the 
CGU determination as a part of the 
auditing task and explain that further 
investigation is not necessary because 
of the instructions to concur with the 
management CGU determination? Do 
the participants recognize the need to 
understand at what level goodwill is 
tested (CGU or other)? 
 Risk Assessment Procedures and 
Related Activities 
 
8. When performing risk assessment 
As a part of risk assessment activities, 
in accordance with ISA 540.8, the 
auditor will likely obtain an 
understanding of how management 
RQ 4.  Do the participants assess the 
RMM (risk of material misstatement) 
related to the CGU/goodwill 
impairment, including inherent risk 
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procedures and related activities to 
obtain an understanding of the entity 
and its environment, including the 
entity’s internal control, as required 
by ISA 315,4 the auditor shall obtain 
an understanding of the following in 
order to provide a basis for the 
identification and assessment of the 
risks of material misstatement for 
accounting estimates: (Ref: Para. 
A12) 
 
(a) The requirements of the applicable 
financial reporting framework 
relevant to accounting estimates, 
including related disclosures. (Ref: 
Para. A13–A15) 
(b) How management identifies those 
transactions, events and conditions 
that may give rise to the need for 
accounting estimates to be recognized 
or disclosed in the financial 
statements. In obtaining this 
understanding, the auditor shall make 
inquiries of management about 
changes in circumstances that may 
give rise to new, or the need to revise 
existing, accounting estimates. (Ref: 
Para. A16–A21) 
(c) How management makes the 
accounting estimates, and an 
understanding of the data on which 
they are based, including: (Ref: Para. 
A22–A23) 
(i) The method, including where 
applicable the model, used in making 
the accounting estimate; (Ref: Para. 
A24–A26) 
(ii) Relevant controls; (Ref: Para. 
A27–A28) 
makes the CGU impairment estimate, 
and an understanding of the data on 
which the CGU impairment estimate 
is based.  
 
This will include understanding the 
details of the DCF model used to 
calculate the recoverable amount of 
the CGU, which is given in the 
Management Spreadsheet”.  Further, 
the auditor will gain an understanding 
of the relevant control system 
surrounding the preparation of the 
CGU impairment estimate, by 
studying the “Corporate Governance” 
and “Internal Controls” documents 
included in the case. The auditor will 
likely observe that the relevant 
internal controls have a weakness 
related to segregation of duties among 
the top management personnel, 
namely that the Supremex’s CEO and 
CFO are the same person. The auditor 
will likely conclude that corporate 
governance is strong because there is 
a majority of independent directors on 
the Board, the Board’s Audit 
Committee is in place, and financial 
expertise of the Audit 
Committee/Board members is 
reasonably advanced. The auditor will 
also obtain an understanding of the 
assumptions underlying the CGU 
impairment estimate surrounding the 
input parameters of management’s 
DCF model and are discussed in the 
“Management Memo”.  The auditor 
may note that Supremexe’s 
managements did not use a valuation 
specialist. 
and control risk? 
 
 
RQ 5.  Do the participants assess the 
degree of estimation uncertainty 
related to the CGU/goodwill 
impairment? 
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(iii) Whether management has used 
an expert; (Ref: Para. A29vA30) 
(iv) The assumptions underlying the 
accounting estimates; (Ref: Para. 
A31–A36) 
(v) Whether there has been or ought 
to have been a change from the prior 
period in the methods for making the 
accounting estimates, and if so, why; 
and (Ref: Para. A37) 
(vi) Whether and, if so, how 
management has assessed the effect 
of estimation uncertainty. (Ref: Para. 
A38) 
 
9. The auditor shall review the 
outcome of accounting estimates 
included in the prior period financial 
statements, or, where applicable, their 
subsequent reestimation for the 
purpose of the current period. The 
nature and extent of the auditor’s 
review takes account of the nature of 
the accounting estimates, and whether 
the information obtained from the 
review would be relevant to 
identifying and assessing risks of 
material misstatement of accounting 
estimates made in the current period 
financial statements. However, the 
review is not intended to call into 
question the judgments made in the 
prior periods that were based on 
information available at the time. 
(Ref: Para. A39–A44) 
 
 
 
With regard to the degree of 
information uncertainty and 
significant risk related to the CGU 
impairment amount, the case specifics 
are such that the CGU impairment 
amount is determined using a 
company-developed model (the DCF 
model), for which some of the inputs 
are unobservable (e.g., the discount 
rate and the timing and amount of 
future cash flows). It is open to 
interpretation whether a DCF-type 
model can be characterized as a 
“highly specialized” model, as 
referred to in ISA 540.A47. However, 
according to ISA 540.A47, the CGU 
impairment amount is highly 
dependent upon judgment, because 
the amount and timing of future cash 
flows is conditional on uncertain 
events that may or may not occur 
many years in the future. Therefore, 
since a number of conditions 
specified in ISA 540.A47 are met, the 
participant is likely to point out that 
the CGU impairment amount contains 
high estimation uncertainty, and 
therefore can give rise to significant 
risks. 
 
Based on the above considerations, 
the auditor is likely come to a 
conclusion that the control risk 
around the goodwill impairment 
estimate is low-to-medium, while the 
inherent risk is medium-to-high. 
 
 Identifying and Assessing the Risks 
of Material Misstatement 
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10. In identifying and assessing the 
risks of material misstatement, as 
required by ISA 315,5 the auditor 
shall evaluate the degree of estimation 
uncertainty associated with an 
accounting estimate. (Ref: Para. A45–
A46) 
 
11. The auditor shall determine 
whether, in the auditor’s judgment, 
any of those accounting estimates that 
have been identified as having high 
estimation uncertainty give rise to 
significant risks. (Ref: Para. 
A47vA51) 
 
Application and Other Explanatory 
Material 
 
Risk Assessment Procedures and 
Related Activities (Ref: Para. 8) 
 
Assumptions (Ref: Para. 8(c)(iv)) 
 
A31. Assumptions are integral 
components of accounting estimates. 
Matters that the auditor may consider 
in obtaining an understanding of the 
assumptions underlying the 
accounting estimates include, for 
example: 
 
• The nature of the assumptions, 
including which of the assumptions 
are likely to be significant 
assumptions. 
• How management assesses whether 
the assumptions are relevant and 
complete (that is, that all relevant 
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variables have been taken into 
account). 
• Where applicable, how management 
determines that the assumptions used 
are internally consistent. 
• Whether the assumptions relate to 
matters within the control of 
management (for example, 
assumptions about the maintenance 
programs 
that may affect the estimation of an 
asset’s useful life), and how they 
conform to the entity’s business plans 
and the external environment, or to 
matters that are outside its control (for 
example, assumptions about interest 
rates, mortality rates, potential 
judicial or regulatory actions, or the 
variability and the timing of future 
cash flows). 
• The nature and extent of 
documentation, if any, supporting the 
assumptions. 
 
Assumptions may be made or 
identified by an expert to assist 
management in making the 
accounting estimates. Such 
assumptions, when used by 
management, become management’s 
assumptions. 
 
Identifying and Assessing the Risks 
of Material Misstatement 
 
High Estimation Uncertainty and 
Significant Risks (Ref: Para. 11) 
 
A47. Examples of accounting 
estimates that may have high 
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estimation uncertainty include the 
following: 
 
• Accounting estimates that are highly 
dependent upon judgment, for 
example, judgments about the 
outcome of pending litigation or the 
amount and timing of future cash 
flows dependent on uncertain events 
many years in the future. 
• Accounting estimates that are not 
calculated using recognized 
measurement techniques. 
• Accounting estimates where the 
results of the auditor’s review of 
similar accounting estimates made in 
the prior period financial statements 
indicate a substantial difference 
between the original accounting 
estimate and the actual outcome. 
• Fair value accounting estimates for 
which a highly specialized entity 
developed model is used or for which 
there are no observable inputs. 
 
Fair value less costs to sell  
 
25 The best evidence of an asset’s fair 
value less costs to sell is a price in a 
binding sale agreement in an arm’s 
length transaction, adjusted for 
incremental costs that would be 
directly attributable to the disposal of 
the asset. 
 
26 If there is no binding sale 
agreement but an asset is traded in an 
active market, fair value less costs to 
sell is the asset’s market price less the 
costs of disposal. The appropriate 
Responses to the Assessed Risks of 
Material Misstatement 
 
12. Based on the assessed risks of 
material misstatement, the auditor 
shall determine: (Ref: Para. A52) 
 
(a) Whether management has 
appropriately applied the 
requirements of the applicable 
financial reporting framework 
relevant to the accounting estimate; 
and (Ref: Para. A53–A56) 
(b) Whether the methods for making 
the accounting estimates are 
According to ISA 540.13, the auditor 
will need to decide either to test how 
management produced the accounting 
estimate and the data on which it is 
based (ISA 540.13b), or develop a 
point estimate or a range to evaluate 
management’s point estimate (ISA 
540.13d). In addition, the auditor will 
need to choose between fully 
substantive approach and combined 
approach to testing of accounting 
estimates (ISA 540.13c). 
 
ISA 540.A84 suggests that testing the 
operating effectiveness of the controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 6.  Do the participants use 
combined or pure substantive audit 
 144 
 
market price is usually the current bid 
price. When current bid prices are 
unavailable, the price of the most 
recent transaction may provide a basis 
from which to estimate fair value less 
costs to sell, provided that there has 
not been a significant change in 
economic circumstances between the 
transaction date and the date as at 
which the estimate is made. 
 
27 If there is no binding sale 
agreement or active market for an 
asset, fair value less costs to sell is 
based on the best information 
available to reflect the amount that an 
entity could obtain, at the end of the 
reporting period, from the disposal of 
the asset in an arm’s length 
transaction between knowledgeable, 
willing parties, after deducting the 
costs of disposal. In determining this 
amount, an entity considers the 
outcome of recent transactions for 
similar assets within the same 
industry. Fair value less costs to sell 
does not reflect a forced sale, unless 
management is compelled to sell 
immediately. 
 
Value in use 
 
30 The following elements shall be 
reflected in the calculation of an 
asset’s value in use: 
 
(a) an estimate of the future cash 
flows the entity expects to derive 
from the asset; 
(b) expectations about possible 
appropriate and have been applied 
consistently, and whether changes, if 
any, in accounting estimates or in the 
method for making them from the 
prior period are appropriate in the 
circumstances. (Ref: Para. A57–A58) 
 
13. In responding to the assessed risks 
of material misstatement, as required 
by 
ISA 330,6 the auditor shall undertake 
one or more of the following, taking 
account of the nature of the 
accounting estimate: (Ref: Para. A59–
A61) 
(a) Determine whether events 
occurring up to the date of the 
auditor’s report provide audit 
evidence regarding the accounting 
estimate. (Ref: Para. A62–A67) 
(b) Test how management made the 
accounting estimate and the data on 
which it is based. In doing so, the 
auditor shall evaluate whether: (Ref: 
Para. A68–A70) 
(i) The method of measurement used 
is appropriate in the circumstances; 
and (Ref: Para. A71–A76) 
(ii) The assumptions used by 
management are reasonable in light of 
the measurement objectives of the 
applicable financial reporting 
framework. (Ref: Para. A77–A83) 
(c) Test the operating effectiveness of 
the controls over how management   
made the accounting estimate, 
together with appropriate substantive 
procedures. (Ref: Para. A84–A86) 
(d) Develop a point estimate or a 
range to evaluate management’s point 
over how Supremex’s management 
makes the estimate of the CGU 
impairment amount is appropriate 
when there are strong controls in 
place and functioning, e.g. when the 
CGU impairment estimate is reviewed 
and approved by appropriate levels of 
management and/or those charged 
with governance, or when the 
estimate is derived from the routine 
data processing by the accounting 
system. The case materials provide 
information on the strength of 
Supremex’s internal controls over 
financial reporting in the “Internal 
Controls” document, as well as 
information on Supremex’s corporate 
governance details in the “Corporate 
Governance” document. As indicated 
in the discussion of the predicted risk 
assessment process, the auditor is 
likely to come to a conclusion that the 
control risk is low-to-medium, which 
makes it possible to use the combined 
approach and reduce the substantive 
testing by relying on the internal 
controls. On the other hand, the nature 
of the CGU impairment estimate is 
such that it is not derived from routine 
data processing by the accounting 
system of Supremex (e.g., discounted 
cash flow analysis for calculating 
VIU of the envelope business CGU, 
as described in Supremex’s 
“Management Memo” on impairment 
of the CGU). Therefore, the auditor is 
may choose to assume a fully 
substantive approach to auditing of 
impairment of the envelope business 
CGU. 
approach when auditing the 
CGU/goodwill impairment?  
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variations in the amount or timing 
of those future cash flows; 
(c) the time value of money, 
represented by the current market 
risk-free rate of interest; 
(d) the price for bearing the 
uncertainty inherent in the asset; 
and 
(e) other factors, such as illiquidity, 
that market participants would 
reflect in pricing the future cash 
flows the entity expects to derive 
from the asset. 
 
31 Estimating the value in use of an 
asset involves the following steps: 
 
(a) estimating the future cash inflows 
and outflows to be derived from 
continuing use of the asset and from 
its ultimate disposal; and 
(b) applying the appropriate discount 
rate to those future cash flows. 
 
Basis for estimates of future cash 
flows 
 
33 In measuring value in use an 
entity shall: 
 
(a) base cash flow projections on 
reasonable and supportable 
assumptions that represent 
management’s best estimate of the 
range of economic conditions that 
will exist over the remaining useful 
life of the asset. Greater weight 
shall be given to external evidence. 
(b) base cash flow projections on 
the most recent financial 
estimate. For this purpose: (Ref: Para. 
A87–A91) 
(i) If the auditor uses assumptions or 
methods that differ from 
management’s, the auditor shall 
obtain an understanding of 
management’s assumptions or 
methods sufficient to establish that 
the auditor’s point estimate or range 
takes into account relevant variables 
and to evaluate any significant 
differences from management’s point 
estimate. (Ref: Para. A92) 
(ii) If the auditor concludes that it is 
appropriate to use a range, the auditor 
shall narrow the range, based on audit 
evidence available, until all outcomes 
within the range are considered 
reasonable. (Ref: Para. A93–A95) 
 
14. In determining the matters 
identified in paragraph 12 or in 
responding to the assessed risks of 
material misstatement in accordance 
with paragraph 13, the auditor shall 
consider whether specialized skills or 
knowledge in relation to one or more 
aspects of the accounting estimates 
are required in order to obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence. 
(Ref: Para. A96–A101) 
 
Application and Other Explanatory 
Material 
 
Responses to the Assessed Risks of 
Material Misstatement (Ref: Para. 
12) 
 
Application of the Requirements of 
 
ISA 540.13 permits two approaches to 
auditing accounting estimates. As 
described in ISA 540.13.b, the auditor 
can test how management made the 
accounting estimate and the data on 
which it is based. Alternatively, as 
described in ISA 540.13.d, the auditor 
can develop a point estimate or a 
range to evaluate management’s point 
estimate.  
 
When auditing the impairment of the 
envelope business CGU, the auditor 
may choose to follow the approach 
suggested in ISA 540.13.d, which is 
developing the auditor’s own estimate 
or range. The case contains a number 
of factors mentioned in ISA 540. A87 
which can lead the auditor to develop 
their own estimate or range. First, the 
accounting estimate is not derived 
from the routine processing of data by 
the Supremex’s accounting system. It 
is based on the management’s future 
cash flow forecast, and the 
management’s estimate of the 
applicable discount, growth, and tax 
rates as well as a projection of the 
future Supremex’s cost structure, as 
described in the “Management 
Memo” on impairment of the CGU.  
Second, there are alternative outside 
sources of relevant data available to 
the auditor that can be used in 
developing their own point estimate 
or range. These sources are described 
in “External Information on 
Significant Assumptions section” and 
include external data from the 
RQ 7.  Do the participants elect to test 
management’s estimate or to develop 
their own estimate or range when 
auditing the CGU/goodwill 
impairment? What factors influence 
the participants’ choice re: testing vs. 
developing the impairment estimate? 
 
 
 
 
RQ 8. Do the participants elect to use 
assumptions (model) alternative to 
management’s assumptions (model), 
or both?  
 
 
RQ 9. If a participant elects to use 
assumptions (model) alternative to 
management’s assumptions (model), 
what reasoning does the participant 
provide that in their view necessitates 
the application of the alternative 
assumptions (model), if any? 
 
RQ 10. If a participant elects to use 
assumptions (model) alternative to 
management’s assumptions (model), 
what source(s) of information does 
the participant use to support the 
alternative assumptions (model), if 
any?  
RQ 11.  Do the participants’ who 
developed a range attempt to narrow 
it down? Based on what audit 
evidence the participants’ range is 
narrowed? Do the participants factor 
in materiality when narrowing the 
range and making the conclusion 
about its reasonableness? 
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budgets/forecasts approved by 
management, but shall exclude any 
estimated future cash inflows or 
outflows expected to arise from 
future restructurings or from 
improving or enhancing the asset’s 
performance. Projections based on 
these budgets/forecasts shall cover a 
maximum period of five years, 
unless a longer period can be 
justified. 
(c) estimate cash flow projections 
beyond the period covered by the 
most recent budgets/forecasts by 
extrapolating the projections based 
on the budgets/forecasts using a 
steady or declining growth rate for 
subsequent years, unless an 
increasing rate can be justified. 
This growth rate shall not exceed 
the long-term average growth rate 
for the products, industries, or 
country or countries in which the 
entity operates, or for the market in 
which the asset is used, unless a 
higher rate can be justified. 
 
39 Estimates of future cash flows 
shall include: 
 
(a) projections of cash inflows from 
the continuing use of the asset; 
(b) projections of cash outflows that 
are necessarily incurred to generate 
the cash inflows from continuing 
use of the asset (including cash 
outflows to prepare the asset for 
use) and can be directly attributed, 
or allocated on a reasonable and 
consistent basis, to the asset; and 
the Applicable Financial Reporting 
Framework (Ref: Para. 12(a)) 
 
A56. The application of the 
requirements of the applicable 
financial reporting framework 
requires management to consider 
changes in the environment or 
circumstances that affect the entity. 
For example, the introduction of an 
active market for a particular class of 
asset or liability may indicate that the 
use of discounted cash flows to 
estimate the fair value of such asset or 
liability is no longer appropriate. 
 
Testing the Operating Effectiveness 
of Controls (Ref: Para. 13(c)) 
 
A84. Testing the operating 
effectiveness of the controls over how 
management made the accounting 
estimate may be an appropriate 
response when management’s 
process has been well-designed, 
implemented and maintained, for 
example: 
 
• Controls exist for the review and 
approval of the accounting estimates 
by appropriate levels of management 
and, where appropriate, by those 
charged with governance. 
• The accounting estimate is derived 
from the routine processing of data by 
the entity’s accounting system. 
 
A85. Testing the operating 
effectiveness of the controls is 
required when: 
Envelope Manufacturers Association 
Foundation (the EMA Foundation) 
and the Envelope Manufacturers 
Association (EMA). According to 
ISA 540.A87, those are factors 
indicating that development of the 
auditor’s own estimate or a range to 
evaluate management’s point estimate 
may be an appropriate approach.  
 
If the auditor elects to develop their 
own point estimate or range to 
evaluate management’s point 
estimate, ISA 540.13.d suggests that 
the auditor then proceeds with 
obtaining an understanding of 
management’s assumptions or 
methods, in order to take into account 
all of the relevant variables and to 
evaluate any significant differences 
from management’s point estimate 
(this happens if the auditor uses 
assumptions or methods that differ 
from the management’s). In 
Supremex’s case, since DCF analysis 
is a generally accepted technique for 
determining the value of a CGU, the 
auditor is likely to preserve the DCF 
technique in his or her own analysis, 
but use assumptions that are different 
from the management’s, especially in 
the light of availability of external 
data on some of the assumptions from 
the industry associations. 
 
The auditor, nonetheless, may elect to 
develop an alternative model within 
the class of DCF model generally 
accepted for business valuation 
purposes. While the management’s 
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(c) net cash flows, if any, to be 
received (or paid) for the disposal 
of the asset at the end of its useful 
life. 
 
44 Future cash flows shall be 
estimated for the asset in its current 
condition. Estimates of future cash 
flows shall not include estimated 
future cash inflows or outflows that 
are expected to arise from: 
 
(a) a future restructuring to which 
an entity is not yet committed; or 
(b) improving or enhancing the 
asset’s performance. 
 
50 Estimates of future cash flows 
shall not include: 
 
(a) cash inflows or outflows from 
financing activities; or 
(b) income tax receipts or 
payments. 
 
55 The discount rate (rates) shall be 
a pre-tax rate (rates) that reflect(s) 
current market assessments of: 
 
(a) the time value of money; and 
(b) the risks specific to the asset for 
which the future cash flow 
estimates have not been adjusted. 
 
 
(a) The auditor’s assessment of risks 
of material misstatement at the 
assertion level includes an expectation 
that controls over the process are 
operating effectively; or 
(b) Substantive procedures alone do 
not provide sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence at the assertion level. 
 
Developing a Point Estimate or Range 
(Ref: Para. 13(d)) 
 
A87. Developing a point estimate or a 
range to evaluate management’s point 
estimate may be an appropriate 
response where, for example: 
 
• An accounting estimate is not 
derived from the routine processing of 
data by the accounting system. 
• The auditor’s review of similar 
accounting estimates made in the 
prior period financial statements 
suggests that management’s current 
period process is unlikely to be 
effective. 
• The entity’s controls within and 
over management’s processes for 
determining accounting estimates are 
not well designed or properly 
implemented. 
• Events or transactions between the 
period end and the date of the 
auditor’s report contradict 
management’s point estimate. 
• There are alternative sources of 
relevant data available to the auditor 
which can be used in developing a 
point estimate or a range. 
DCF method represents levered 
approach when the cash flows include 
the debt service costs and are 
discounted using equity risk-adjusted 
discount rate (capitalization rate based 
on ROE), the case supplies sufficient 
information for the auditor to use an 
alternative unlevered or debt-free 
approach, whereby the cash flows 
exclude the interest costs and are 
discounted using WACC (i.e., the 
capitalization rate is based on 
WACC), with subsequent subtraction 
of long-term debt value 
 
The auditor’s choice between the two 
methods my depend on the size of the 
audit firms, where non-Big 4 firms 
auditors may gravitate towards the 
use of unlevered method as they tend 
to deal with smaller clients with little 
or no debt financing in their capital 
structure. Further, the auditor may 
point out that the application of the 
levered DCF approach currently use 
by the management is imperfect due 
to the management not making a 
leverage adjustment for imperfect 
capital structure.  
 
The case materials also allow for 
application of other types of DCF 
valuation methods. One of the 
examples is the use of earnings 
capitalization technique, under which 
the short-term cash flow forecast is 
unnecessary (the technique may rely 
either on levered or unlevered 
approaches). It is difficult to predict 
when the auditor may elect to use 
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Narrowing a Range (Ref: Para. 
13(d)(ii)) 
 
A93. When the auditor concludes that 
it is appropriate to use a range to 
evaluate the reasonableness of 
management’s point estimate (the 
auditor’s range), paragraph 13(d)(ii) 
requires that range to encompass all 
“reasonable outcomes” rather than all 
possible outcomes. The range cannot 
be one that comprises all possible 
outcomes if it is to be useful, as such 
a range would be too wide to be 
effective for purposes of the audit. 
The auditor’s range is useful and 
effective when it is sufficiently 
narrow to enable the auditor to 
conclude whether the accounting 
estimate is misstated. 
 
A94. Ordinarily, a range that has been 
narrowed to be equal to or less than 
performance materiality is adequate 
for the purposes of evaluating the 
reasonableness of management’s 
point estimate. However, particularly 
in certain industries, it may not be 
possible to narrow the range to below 
such an amount. This does not 
necessarily preclude recognition of 
the accounting estimate. It may 
indicate, however, that the estimation 
uncertainty associated with the 
accounting estimate is such that it 
gives rise to a significant risk. 
Additional responses to significant 
risks are described in paragraphs 
A102–A115. 
such alternative techniques as there is 
no prior auditing literature on this 
issue. 
 
Further, if the auditor decides to use a 
range, the auditor will narrow the 
range until all outcomes within the 
range are reasonable. According to 
ISA 540.A93–A95, the auditor will 
first separate the reasonable outcomes 
range from the possible outcomes 
range, since the latter is not useful for 
purposes of the audit due to it width. 
The narrowing of the range will be 
accomplished by removing those 
outcomes at the sides of the range 
judged by the auditor to be unlikely to 
occur based on audit evidence 
available. If the auditor is able to 
narrow the reasonable range to be 
equal to or less than performance 
materiality, the auditor then evaluates 
the reasonableness of management’s 
point estimate. If the auditor is not 
able to narrow the reasonable range to 
be equal to or less than performance 
materiality, the standard gives little 
guidance, except that this situation 
does not necessarily preclude 
recognition of the accounting estimate 
and that such estimate has the 
estimation uncertainty that gives rise 
to a significant risk. The auditor may 
respond to this significant risk by 
attempting to understand whether the 
management has assessed how 
estimation uncertainty may affect the 
accounting estimate (ISA 540.A102–
A115). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 12.  Do the participants recognize 
the need to calculate FVLCS of the 
CGU in addition to its VIU, to 
determine the recoverable amount? 
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A95. Narrowing the range to a 
position where all outcomes within 
the range are considered reasonable 
may be achieved by: 
 
(a) Eliminating from the range those 
outcomes at the extremities of the 
range judged by the auditor to be 
unlikely to occur; and 
(b) Continuing to narrow the range, 
based on audit evidence available, 
until the auditor concludes that all 
outcomes within the range are 
considered reasonable. In some rare 
cases, the auditor may be able to 
narrow the range until the audit 
evidence indicates a point estimate. 
 
 
If the auditor elects to test how 
management made the accounting 
estimate and the data on which it is 
based, ISA 540.13.b suggests that the 
auditor will evaluate whether the 
method of measurement used is 
appropriate in the circumstances and 
whether the assumptions used by 
management are reasonable in light of 
the measurement objectives of the 
applicable financial reporting 
framework. In Supremex’s case, since 
DCF analysis is a generally accepted 
technique for determining the value of 
a CGU, the auditor is likely not to 
question reasonableness of this 
method, while reasonableness of the 
management’s assumptions is likely 
to become the main subject of the 
auditor’s scrutiny. 
 
Extant auditing literature does not 
provide a definitive answer on 
whether the auditor will prefer to 
verify the management’s estimate or 
to develop their own estimate or rage 
for the CGU impairment amount. 
Griffith et al. (2012 and 2015) found 
that the auditors would 
overwhelmingly select to verify the 
management’s estimate, whereas 
Cannon and Bedard (2015) come to a 
different conclusion. 
 
Supremex’s management does not 
calculate fair value less costs to sell 
(FVLCS) of the envelope business 
CGU. The “Management Memo” on 
impairment of the CGU contains 
calculation of the value in use (VIU) 
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of the CGU. However, IAS 36 defines 
an asset’s recoverable amount (RA) 
as the maximum of FVLCS and VIU. 
The auditor may decide not to 
challenge the management’s decision 
to only calculate VIU  on the grounds 
that ISA 540 implies that the use of 
discounted cash flows to estimate the 
fair value of an asset or liability or a 
CGU is not appropriate only if an 
active market exist for such class of 
assets or liabilities (ISA 540.A56). On 
the other hand, the auditors may 
decide to use prior transactions from 
the industry and earnings multiples to 
calculate the FVLCS of the CGU. 
 
When assessing FVLCS, the auditor 
may also refer to the acquisition offer 
from Clarke, a majority (45%) 
shareholder of Supremex, to acquire 
the rest of the 
outstanding shares of Supremex, as 
the evidence  supporting 
determination of FVLCS. 
Particularly, the acquisition which 
features a price of $1.20 per share 
(close to the current stock exchange 
share price), which would translate in 
a total business value of about 
$35million (vs. $94.5M supplied by 
the valuation model).  
 
 Further Substantive Procedures to 
Respond to Significant Risks 
 
Estimation Uncertainty 
 
15. For accounting estimates that give 
rise to significant risks, in addition to 
Following ISA 540.15, the auditor 
may observe that the management 
performed sensitivity analysis of the 
CGU impairment amount with regard 
to several key inputs, indicating a 
high sensitivity of the impairment 
amount to these assumptions (this 
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other substantive procedures 
performed to meet the requirements 
of ISA 330,7 the auditor shall 
evaluate the following: (Ref: Para. 
A102) 
 
(a) How management has considered 
alternative assumptions or outcomes, 
and why it has rejected them, or how 
management has otherwise addressed 
estimation uncertainty in making the 
accounting estimate. (Ref: Para. 
A103–A106) 
(b) Whether the significant 
assumptions used by management are 
reasonable. (Ref: Para. A107–A109) 
(c) Where relevant to the 
reasonableness of the significant 
assumptions used by management or 
the appropriate application of the 
applicable financial reporting 
framework, management’s intent to 
carry out specific courses of action 
and its ability to do so. (Ref: Para. 
A110) 
 
16. If, in the auditor’s judgment, 
management has not adequately 
addressed the effects of estimation 
uncertainty on the accounting 
estimates that give rise to significant 
risks, the auditor shall, if considered 
necessary, develop a range with 
which to evaluate the reasonableness 
of the accounting estimate. (Ref: Para. 
A111–A112) 
 
Application and Other Explanatory 
Material 
 
analysis is contained in “Results of 
Operations - Notes to Financial 
Statements” document). The auditor 
may also observe that the 
management does not provide any 
discussion of how the sensitivity to 
the assumptions impacts the 
management’s judgment about the 
impairment amount. The auditor may 
therefore decide that the management 
has not adequately addressed the 
effects of estimation uncertainty on 
the CGU impairment amount 
estimate, and elect to develop a range 
with which to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the accounting 
estimate according to ISA 540.16. 
 152 
 
Further Substantive Procedures to 
Respond to Significant Risks (Ref: 
Para. 15) 
 
A102. In auditing accounting 
estimates that give rise to significant 
risks, the auditor’s further substantive 
procedures are focused on the 
evaluation of: 
 
(a) How management has assessed the 
effect of estimation uncertainty on the 
accounting estimate, and the effect 
such uncertainty may have on the 
appropriateness of the recognition of 
the accounting estimate in the 
financial statements; and 
(b) The adequacy of related 
disclosures. 
 
Estimation Uncertainty  
 
Management’s Consideration of 
Estimation Uncertainty (Ref: Para. 
15(a)) 
 
A103. Management may evaluate 
alternative assumptions or outcomes 
of the accounting estimates through a 
number of methods, depending on the 
circumstances. One possible method 
used by management is to undertake a 
sensitivity analysis. This might 
involve determining how the 
monetary amount of an accounting 
estimate varies with different 
assumptions. Even for accounting 
estimates measured at fair value there 
can be variation because different 
market participants will use different 
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assumptions. A sensitivity analysis 
could lead to the development of a 
number of outcome scenarios, 
sometimes characterized as a range of 
outcomes by management, such as 
“pessimistic” and “optimistic” 
scenarios. 
 
A104. A sensitivity analysis may 
demonstrate that an accounting 
estimate is not sensitive to changes in 
particular assumptions. Alternatively, 
it may demonstrate that the 
accounting estimate is sensitive to one 
or more assumptions that then 
become the focus of the auditor’s 
attention. 
 
A105. This is not intended to suggest 
that one particular method of 
addressing estimation uncertainty 
(such as sensitivity analysis) is more 
suitable than another, or that 
management’s consideration of 
alternative assumptions or outcomes 
needs to be conducted through a 
detailed process supported by 
extensive documentation. Rather, it is 
whether management has assessed 
how estimation uncertainty may affect 
the accounting estimate that is 
important, not the specific manner in 
which it is done. Accordingly, where 
management has not considered 
alternative assumptions or outcomes, 
it may be necessary for the auditor to 
discuss with management, and request 
support for, how it has addressed the 
effects of estimation uncertainty on 
the accounting estimate. 
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 Indicators of Possible Management 
Bias 
 
21. The auditor shall review the 
judgments and decisions made by 
management in the making of 
accounting estimates to identify 
whether there are indicators of 
possible management bias. Indicators 
of possible management bias do not 
themselves constitute misstatements 
for the purposes of drawing 
conclusions on the reasonableness of 
individual accounting estimates. (Ref: 
Para. A124–A125) 
 
Indicators of Possible Management 
Bias (Ref: Para. 21) 
 
A124. During the audit, the auditor 
may become aware of judgments and 
decisions made by management 
which give rise to indicators of 
possible management bias. Such 
indicators may affect the auditor’s 
conclusion as to whether the 
auditor’s risk assessment and related 
responses remain appropriate, and the 
auditor may need to consider the 
implications for the rest of the audit. 
Further, they may affect the auditor’s 
evaluation of whether the financial 
statements as a whole are free from 
material misstatement, as discussed in 
ISA 700.26 
 
A125. Examples of indicators of 
possible management bias with 
respect to accounting estimates 
Since impairment of the envelope 
business CGU is a fair value estimate 
based on a DCF model, two issues 
described in the auditing standards 
become particularly relevant to the 
auditor’s consideration of the possible 
management bias in the accounting 
estimate. These issues are selection or 
construction of significant 
assumptions that yield a point 
estimate favorable for management 
objectives, and use of an entity’s own 
assumptions for fair value accounting 
estimates when they are inconsistent 
with observable marketplace 
assumptions (ISA 540.A125).  
 
Since proposing a highly material 
goodwill impairment charge may 
serve as an indicator suggesting to the 
auditor that Supremex’s management 
has “big bath” plans for fiscal 2012, 
the auditor may consider what 
assumptions in the DCF model 
potentially lead to an artificially 
depressed carrying value of the 
envelope business CGU, with a 
resulting higher amount of CGU 
impairment. In this case, the “big 
bath” intention makes a higher CGU 
impairment amount the point estimate 
favorable for management objectives. 
The auditor may challenge 
unobservable inputs into the DCF 
model such as the discount rate and 
other inputs such as the perpetual 
decline rate, as an elevated discount 
rate as well as the perpetual decline 
assumption contribute to a lower 
RQ 13. How do the participants factor 
in any indicators of management’s 
bias that in their view are present 
when drawing their conclusion about 
the reasonableness of the 
management’s estimate or developing 
their own estimate or range, if at all? 
 
RQ 14. Do the participants review 
management’s compensation 
information when considering 
indicators of possible management 
bias, if at all? If yes, do they consider 
different components of 
management’s compensation and the 
impact of CGU/goodwill impairment 
on these components in the short- and 
long-terms? 
 
 
 
RQ 15.  What judgmental heuristics 
(such as anchoring-and-adjustment, 
availability, or representativeness) 
influence the participants’ selection of 
the alternative assumptions (model), 
if any? 
 
 
 
RQ 16.  What judgmental heuristics 
influence the participant’s judgment 
in the process of narrowing their own 
range? 
 
RQ 17. Are there indications of any 
deliberate biases in the participant’s 
process of selecting the alternative 
assumptions (model)? 
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include: 
 
• Changes in an accounting estimate, 
or the method for making it, where  
management has made a subjective 
assessment that there has been a 
change in circumstances. 
• Use of an entity’s own assumptions 
for fair value accounting estimates 
when they are inconsistent with 
observable marketplace assumptions. 
• Selection or construction of 
significant assumptions that yield a 
point estimate favorable for 
management objectives. 
• Selection of a point estimate that 
may indicate a pattern of optimism or 
pessimism. 
 
value of the carrying amount of the 
CGU and a higher amount of 
impairment.  
 
When considering indicators of the 
possible management’s bias of 
Supremex’s management when 
auditing the CGU impairment 
amount, the auditor is likely to review 
the management compensation 
information available in the 
“Management Compensation” 
document. The auditor will likely 
consider different components of the 
management compensation, such as 
base salary, bonus and management 
profit sharing plan. The auditor may 
point out that the bonus and the 
management profit plan are based on 
return on capital employed (ROCE), 
which nominator is derived from 
EBITDA and which denominator 
includes goodwill carrying value. 
Therefore, the management may have 
an incentive to take a “big bath” 
because of the long-term increasing 
effect of goodwill impairment on the 
ROCE. The auditor may also observe 
that the incentive to take a “big bath” 
in 2012 becomes more likely because 
the management’s bonus and profit 
sharing in that year has already been 
reduced by 20% upon a special 
agreement with the management 
because of the declining sales. 
 
In addition to the possibility of the 
management’s bias which is 
addressed in the auditing standards, 
there is a possibility of the auditor’s 
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bias which the auditing standards are 
silent about. When auditing complex 
fair value estimates, particularly the 
impairment of Supremex’s envelope 
business CGU, the auditor is likely to 
be subjected to a number of 
judgmental shortcuts/biases because 
of the individual information 
processing limitations (Bratten et al. 
2013). For the Supremex’s CGU 
impairment scenario, the auditor is 
likely to anchor on the management’s 
provided model/assumptions if the 
auditor chooses to verify the 
management’s model/assumptions. 
The anchoring on the management’s 
model/assumptions is also likely to 
happen when the auditor chooses to 
develop their own alternative 
model/assumptions. Other auditor’s 
biases may also be relevant such as 
availability and representativeness.  
 
Recognizing and measuring an 
impairment loss 
 
59 If, and only if, the recoverable 
amount of an asset is less than its 
carrying amount, the carrying 
amount of the asset shall be 
reduced to its recoverable amount. 
That reduction is an impairment 
loss. 
 
104 An impairment loss shall be 
recognized for a cash-generating 
unit (the smallest group of 
cash-generating units to which 
goodwill or a corporate asset has 
been allocated) if, and only if, the 
Evaluating the Reasonableness of 
the Accounting Estimates, and 
Determining Misstatements 
 
18. The auditor shall evaluate, based 
on the audit evidence, whether the 
accounting estimates in the financial 
statements are either reasonable in the 
context of the applicable financial 
reporting framework, or are misstated. 
(Ref: Para. A116–A119) 
 
 
Supremex’s “Management Memo” on 
impairment of the CGU provides the 
management’s calculation of the 
impairment amount of the envelope 
business CGU.  
 
The auditor will likely re-perform the 
management’s calculation of the 
impairment amount of the envelope 
business CGU. Since Supremex’s 
management determined that there is 
only one CGU, and the auditor is 
asked to concur with the 
management’s determination, the 
auditor is likely to observe that 
calculation of the impairment amount 
of the envelope business CGU is 
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recoverable amount of the unit 
(group of units) is less than the 
carrying amount of the unit (group 
of units). The impairment loss shall 
be allocated to reduce the carrying 
amount of the assets of the unit 
(group of units) in the following 
order: 
 
(a) first, to reduce the carrying 
amount of any goodwill allocated to 
the cash-generating unit 
(group of units); and 
(b) then, to the other assets of the unit 
(group of units) pro rata on the basis 
of the carrying amount of each asset 
in the unit (group of units). 
 
These reductions in carrying amounts 
shall be treated as impairment losses 
on individual assets and recognized in 
accordance with paragraph 60. 
straightforward and does not involve 
any judgment calls such as allocation 
of the corporate assets. Therefore, the 
re-performance becomes a trivial task. 
 
The auditor will likely mention that in 
accordance with IAS 36.104, the 
impairment amount of the CGU needs 
to be allocated to reduce the carrying 
value of goodwill, and then to other 
assets in the unit if the impairment 
amount exceeds the carrying value of 
goodwill. 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Panel B: Process Study – Research Questions 
 Research Question 
 
RQ 1 Do the participants recognize the necessity to test goodwill for impairment annually as prescribed in IAS 
36, irrespective of the existence of indicators of impairment? Do the participants recognize that 
indicators of impairment are present/consider indicators of impairment? 
 
RQ 2 Do the participants consider the sources of goodwill, specifically that the goodwill arose from past 
business combinations? 
 
RQ 3 Do the participants recognize the need to obtain assurance on the CGU determination as a part of the 
auditing task and explain that further investigation is not necessary because of the instructions to concur 
with the management CGU determination? Do the participants recognize the need to understand at what 
level goodwill is tested (CGU or other)? 
 
RQ 4 Do the participants assess the RMM (risk of material misstatement) related to the CGU/goodwill 
impairment, including inherent risk and control risk? 
 
RQ 5 Do the participants assess the degree of estimation uncertainty related to the CGU/goodwill impairment? 
 
RQ 6 Do the participants use combined or pure substantive audit approach when auditing the CGU/goodwill 
impairment?  
 
RQ 7 Do the participants elect to test management’s estimate or to develop their own estimate or range when 
auditing the CGU/goodwill impairment? What factors influence the participants’ choice re: testing vs. 
developing the impairment estimate? 
 
RQ 8 Do the participants elect to use assumptions (model) alternative to management’s assumptions (model), 
or both?  
 
RQ 9 If a participant elects to use assumptions (model) alternative to management’s assumptions (model), 
what reasoning does the participant provide that in their view necessitates the application of the 
alternative assumptions (model), if any? 
 
RQ 10 If a participant elects to use assumptions (model) alternative to management’s assumptions (model), 
what source(s) of information does the participant use to support the alternative assumptions (model), if 
any?  
 
RQ 11 Do the participants’ who developed a range attempt to narrow it down? Based on what audit evidence 
the participants’ range is narrowed? Do the participants factor in materiality when narrowing the range 
and making the conclusion about its reasonableness? 
 
RQ 12 Do the participants recognize the need to calculate FVLCS of the CGU in addition to its VIU, to 
determine the recoverable amount? 
 
RQ 13 How do the participants factor in any indicators of management’s bias that in their view are present 
when drawing their conclusion about the reasonableness of the management’s estimate or developing 
their own estimate or range, if at all? 
 
RQ 14 Do the participants review management’s compensation information when considering indicators of 
possible management bias, if at all? If yes, do they consider different components of management’s 
compensation and the impact of CGU/goodwill impairment on these components in the short- and long-
terms? 
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RQ 15 What judgmental heuristics (such as anchoring-and-adjustment, availability, or representativeness) 
influence the participants’ selection of the alternative assumptions (model), if any? 
 
RQ 16 What judgmental heuristics influence the participant’s judgment in the process of narrowing their own 
range? 
 
RQ 17 Are there indications of any deliberate biases in the participants’ process of selecting the alternative 
assumptions (model)? 
 
RQ 18 Are there indications of any deliberate biases in the participants’ process of narrowing their own range? 
 
RQ 19 How are various specialists involved in the CGU/goodwill impairment audit? 
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Table 3B Threats to Validity and Possible Safeguards of the Verbal Protocol Analysis 
Methodology (per Biggs and Mock’s (1983) Methodological Note) 
Validity Threats Possible Safeguards Implementation of the Safeguards 
in the Study 
 
Possible side effects of verbalizing 
requirement on the cognitive process 
under examination 
Biggs and Mock (1983) cite research 
evidence that concurrent (as opposed 
to retrospective) verbalizing does 
not affect the process 
 
The study uses concurrent verbal 
protocols, which are shown not to 
affect the participants’ process 
Completeness of the resulting report  Biggs and Mock (1983) note that the 
possible incompleteness of the 
report does not invalidate the 
information that is reported 
 
The incompleteness can be battled 
by the researcher being present 
during the session and urging the 
subject to “think aloud” after he or 
she falls silent for certain period of 
time (Blocher and Cooper 1988, p. 
4) 
 
To counter incompleteness, if the 
participants fall silent for a period of 
time over about one minute, they are 
prompted to speak by the researcher 
with the phrases “please tell me 
what you are thinking” or “please 
speak more about what you are 
doing” 
Coding procedure subjectivity Biggs and Mock (1983) suggest that 
safeguards against the subjectivity of 
the coding procedure include: 
 
1) Defining coding rules for the 
behavioral operators before the 
coding, 
 
2) Employing more than one coder 
and measuring reliability via the 
consensus, 
 
3) Making the coding rules 
accessible to the readers, and 
 
4) Using customized computer 
software to perform the coding 
 
However, Biggs and Mock (1983) 
note that the computer program 
option may not be suitable for 
complex tasks (which is the case 
with the fair value auditing task) 
 
Since the fair value auditing task 
represents a complex type of task, 
the computer program coding 
method is not applicable in the 
study’s settings 
 
Both the author and a research 
assistant (who is an accounting 
faculty holding a CPA and 
possessing several years of auditing 
experience) independently coded 
responses for a randomly selected 
subsample of nine participants (three 
experienced auditors, three valuation 
specialists, and three junior 
auditors). The independent coding is 
restricted to a subsample of the full 
sample due to the volume of the 
verbal protocols and the time 
consuming nature of the coding 
process. Inter-rater agreement for the 
subsample was 85.11 percent, with 
Cohen’s Kappa of 0.54. Cohen’s 
Kappa of 0.54 may be described as 
“moderate” based on the 
authoritative literature (Landis and 
Koch 1977). Further, a rule of thumb 
is that Kappa measures between 0.40 
and 0.70 are acceptable (Neuendorf 
2002) 
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TABLE 4 Selected Demographic Information for the Participants – Process Study 
Participant Audit 
Firm 
Group Rank Accounting 
Designation 
Other 
Designations 
/ Credentials 
# of 
Impairment 
Analyses 
Performed 
in the Last 
Two Years 
EA Big 4 #1.1 Big 4 #1 Assurance Senior Staff 
Accountant 
CPA, CA   4 
EA Big 4 #1.2 Big 4 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   11 
EA Big 4 #1.3 Big 4 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA   2 
EA Big 4 #1.4 Big 4 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   *
78
 
EA Big 4 #2.1 Big 4 #2 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA MBA 4 
EA Big 4 #2.2 Big 4 #2 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 4 #3.1 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior manager CPA, CA   3 
EA Big 4 #3.2 Big 4 #3 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 4 #3.3 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 4 #3.4 Big 4 #3 Assurance Experienced 
Manager 
CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 4 #3.5 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   1 
EA Big 4 #3.6 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior Manager CPA   2 
EA Big 4 #3.7 Big 4 #3 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   * 
EA Big 6 #1.1 Big 6 #1 Assurance - 
National 
Assurance 
Standards 
Group 
Senior Manager CPA, CA   11 
EA Big 6 #1.2 Big 6 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 6 #1.3 Big 6 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   1 
EA Big 6 #1.4 Big 6 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 6 #1.5 Big 6 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   6 
EA Big 4 #2.3 Big 4 #2 Advisory - 
Complex 
Accounting & 
Transaction 
Expertise Group 
Partner CPA,CA CFA 5 
EA Big 4 #1.5 Big 4 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   8 
EA Big 4 #1.6 Big 4 #1 Assurance - 
Professional 
Practice 
Partner FCPA, FCA Lawyer 11 
Total 
Number, EA 
21    Average #, 
EA 
4.3  
VS Big 4 #1.1 Big 4 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Senior Manager CPA, CA CBV 10 
VS Big 4 #1.2 Big 4 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Vice President 
Valuations 
CPA, CA CBV 11 
VS Big 4 #1.3 Big 4 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Vice President 
Valuations 
CPA, CA CBV 8 
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 “*” denotes that the participant performed impairment analyses in the period before the most recent 2-year period. 
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VS Big 4 #1.4 Big 4 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Senior Manager   MBA, CBV, 
Accredited 
Senior 
Appraiser 
11 
VS Big 4 #2.1 Big 4 #2 Valuation 
Specialist 
Director 
Valuations 
CPA, CA CBV 11 
VS Big 4 #2.2 Big 4 #2 Valuation 
Specialist 
Senior Manager CA, CPA CBV 11 
VS Big 6 #1.1 Big 6 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Manager CA,CPA CBV 11 
VS Big 6 #1.2 Big 6 #1 Valuation 
Specialist 
Senior Manager CPA CBV, CFA 11 
VS Big 4 #2.3 Big 4 #2 Valuation 
Specialist 
Senior Manager CPA, CA CBV, CFA * 
Total 
Number, VS 
9    Average #, 
VS 
9.3 
JA #1 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Associate     0 
JA #2 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Intermediate 
Staff Accountant 
    2 
JA #3 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Intermediate 
Staff Accountant 
    2 
JA #4 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Staff Accountant     1 
JA #5 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Staff Accountant      2 
JA #6 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Associate     11 
JA #7 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Senior Staff 
Accountant 
    3 
JA #8 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Intermediate 
Associate, 
Returning as 
Senior Associate 
    0 
JA #9 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Experienced 
Associate 
    2 
JA #10 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Second Year 
Staff Accountant  
    3 
JA #11 MAcc 
Student 
N/A Intermediate 
Staff Accountant 
    1 
Total 
Number, JA 
11    Average #, 
JA 
2.5 
Total Number 41    Average # 4.9 
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TABLE 5 Outline of the Experimental Case Content 
Case 
Component 
Process Study and Elicitation Study Length of the 
Document 
Instructions Instructions for the first part of the study include three-paragraph introduction briefly outlining the case scenario. 
The introduction part also contains  a request to the participants, for the purposes of the study, to concur with the 
management’s identification of the CGUs.   
 
The next part of the instructions outlines the task. The participants are asked to perform an audit of the CGU 
recoverable amount (and the resulting goodwill impairment charge) suggested by the management. Based on the 
materials provided  on the next page of the survey, the participants are asked to decide whether they will: - test the 
management's estimate for the CGU recoverable amount  or - develop your own auditor’s estimate or range for the 
CGU recoverable amount  (as defined in ISA 540 “Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting 
Estimates, and Related Disclosures”). According to their decision, the participants are then asked to either: - test the 
management's estimate for the CGU recoverable amount or - develop your own auditor’s estimate or range for the 
CGU recoverable amount. 
 
Note: In order to reduce unnecessary variability not directly related to the fair value auditing process, the participants 
are supplied with the materiality number that they should use in their analysis. The materiality is set at 5% of pre-tax 
income before extraordinary items (the same materiality is obtained when it is calculated as 0.5% of revenue) in the 
year under audit, consistent with Big 4 materiality practices. 
1 page in Qualtrics 
interface 
Management 
spreadsheet 
The management Excel spreadsheet contains the DCF analysis that supports the management’s CGU impairment 
amount. In addition, I introduced several data entry fields for alternative values of the model’s input parameters (pre-
tax discount rate, tax rate, and six other inputs) in order to facilitate the participants’ calculation of their own 
independent estimate or range. This is needed because of the limited time (about an hour for each part of the study) 
that will be available for the participants to do the task. The practitioners who reviewed the study confirmed the 
validity of this approach – particularly, it is not expected to distort the participants’ thinking process compared to the 
actual audit settings.
79
 
2 tabs in an Excel 
spreadsheet 
Management 
memo  
Description of how the management came up with the impairment amount. 3 pages in a PDF file 
External Info on 
Significant 
Assumptions 
Information on the industry cost structure, revenue trends, etc. from external sources. 2 pages in a PDF file 
Results of 
Operations - 
Financial 
Statements 
Consolidated financial statements of the company for the last five years, including the year under audit. 7 pages in a PDF file 
                                                     
79
 A set of tabs for entering elicited probability distribution information for each of the model input parameters is added. Also, a tab with the resulting range for 
the CGU recoverable amount is provided for the participants’ review. 
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Results of 
Operations - 
Notes to 
Financial 
Statements 
Notes to consolidate financial statements of the company for the year under audit. 9 pages in a PDF file 
Results of 
Operations - 
Comparison to 
Prior Year 
Twelve-month period under audit compared with the previous twelve-month period. 2 pages in a PDF file 
Overview of the 
business 
Overview, overall performance, and key factors affecting the business. 2 pages in a PDF file 
Risk Factors Discussion of the company’s risk factors. 5 pages in a PDF file 
Corporate 
Governance 
Description of the company’s corporate governance. 2 pages in a PDF file 
Internal 
Controls 
Description of the company’s internal controls. 1 pages in a PDF file 
Management 
Compensation 
Description of the company’s management compensation 2 pages in a PDF file 
International 
Accounting 
Standard 36 
IAS 36 (IASB 2004a) “Impairment of Assets” is included for reference purposes. 30 pages in a PDF 
file 
International 
Standard on 
Auditing 540 
ISA 540 (IAASB 2008) “Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting Estimates, and Related 
Disclosures.” Is included for reference purposes. 
45 pages in a PDF 
file 
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TABLE 6 Factors Influencing Test Management’s Estimate vs. Develop Auditor’s Estimate or 
Range Choice 
Factors Influencing Test vs. Develop Choice Total 
Participants 
Participants 
by Group 
Develop if disagree to some degree with the management’s valuation 6 2 EA, 3 VS, 
1JA 
Develop if management is not competent 3 1 EA, 2 VS
80
 
Develop if internal controls around the estimate are weak or absent 3 2 EA, 1JA 
Develop if company not using services of external valuation specialists 2 1VS, 1 JA 
Develop if highly material amount 2 1 EA, 1 JA 
Test if client documentation supporting assumptions is good 1 1 EA 
Test if client is public  1 1 VS 
Test if client internal risk rating is high risk (because of independence 
considerations) 
1 1 VS 
Test if internal client risk rating is high risk (as testing gives a more specific 
estimate, while developing a range creates latitude) 
1 1 EA 
Develop if estimation uncertainty is high 1 1 EA 
Develop if estimate is highly sensitive to input parameters 1 1 EA 
Test if company is unique (not enough comparable entities) to develop own 
independent cash flows  
1 1 EA 
Test if company has unique circumstances (e.g., postal strike) making it difficult to 
develop own independent cash flow 
1 1 EA 
Test if there is no recent market transactions 1 1 EA 
Develop if inherent risk is high 1 1 JA 
Test if highly material amount 1 1 EA 
 
  
                                                     
80
 “A” stands for “experienced auditor”, VS stands for “valuation specialist”, and “JA” stands for “junior auditor”. 
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TABLE 7 Reasons for Developing an Alternative Model and Assumptions 
Panel A: Reasons for Developing an Alternative Model
81
 
Reason for Developing Alternative Model Total 
Participants 
Participants 
by Group 
Use after-tax equity discount rate under levered approach, then report pre-tax to 
comply with IFRS 
8 7 VS, 1 EA 
Use mid-period discounting instead of end of year discounting 6 6 VS 
Include CapEx in the model 6 3 EA, 3 VS 
Include working capital changes in the model 4 1 EA, 3 VS 
Account for CCA tax shield/tax amortization benefits 4 3 EA, 1 VS 
Use debt-free instead of levered approach 3 3 VS 
Use finite number of year CF forecast instead of perpetual forecast 2 1 EA, 1 VS 
Include cash taxes based on CCA groups/pools rather than book base taxes based 
on depreciation 
2 1 EA, 1 VS 
Incorporate cyclical patterns in the model 2 1 EA, 1 VS 
Include exchange rate factors in the model 2 1 EA, 1 VS 
Exclude anything not relating to current state of company (e.g., planned reduction 
in pension costs, expansion plans) 
2 2 EA 
 
  
                                                     
81
 Only frequencies >= 2 are reported in the Panel. 
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TABLE 7 Continued 
Panel B: Reasons for Developing Alternative Assumptions
82
 
Reason for Developing Alternative Assumptions Total 
Participants 
Participants 
by Group 
Discount Rate   
Insufficient support for equity risk premium calculation 8 6 EA, 2 VS 
Use CAPM to calculate discount rate rather than build-up 7 1 EA, 6 VS 
Recalculate discount rate 6 2 EA, 2 VS, 2 
JA 
Confirm BBB is a good approximation of company borrowing rate 5 1 EA, 4 VS 
Include company specific (projection, forecast) risk into discount rate 4 4 VS 
Use longer than 10-year horizon for risk-free rate since VIU 4 3 EA, 1 VS 
Risk of changes in revenues/operating costs (projection, forecast risk) should be 
included in discount rate, to avoid double counting 
4 1 EA, 3 VS 
Tax Rate   
Tax rate influenced by US sales/countries where company operates 5 2 EA, 3 JA 
Use tax rate which is closer to historical effective tax rates 4 1 EA, 1 VS, 2 
JA 
Growth Rate   
Historical revenue decrease larger than forecasted decrease 12 6 EA, 5 VS, 1 
JA 
Industry forecast indicates management is optimistic 10 4 EA, 1 VS, 5 
JA 
Terminal (l/t) growth rate of -3 percent seem too high/optimistic 5 4 EA, 1 JA 
Historical revenue decrease larger than industry forecasted decrease 4 1 EA, 1 VS, 2 
JA 
Variable Operating Expenses   
Breakdown of variable and fixed op expenses on financial statements is unknown 9 6 EA, 1 VS, 2 
JA 
Fixed Operating Expenses   
Decline in fixed operating expenses larger than revenue decline 7 5 EA, 1 VS, 1 
JA 
Investigate/correct for forecasted decline 6 4 EA, 2 JA 
SG&A Expenses   
Historical SGA larger than forecasted SGA 6 2 EA, 4 JA 
Investigate/correct for forecasted decline 5 4 EA, 1 JA 
Financing Charges   
Recalculate financing charges as a percentage of revenue against actual debt 
interest in contracts/financials 
5 4 EA, 1 JA 
Determine/quantify how derivatives influence fin charges 5 1 EA, 4 JA 
Financing charges may be overstated 5 1 EA, 4 JA 
 
 
  
                                                     
82
 Only frequencies >= 4 are reported in the Panel. 
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TABLE 8 Information Used to Evaluate/Develop Alternative Model Assumptions 
Panel A: Sources of Information Used for Model Assumptions
83
 
Sources of Information Used for Model Assumptions Total 
Participants 
Discount Rate  
Use industry information 24 
Use management memo 7 
Use management discussion of risk factors information 5 
Use company-specific information on risks to determine which side of industry range it is at 3 
Tax Rate  
Use industry information 17 
Use management memo 11 
Use historical information 4 
Growth Rate  
Use industry information 32 
Use historical information 14 
Use management discussion of risk factors information 10 
Use comparison to prior year information 4 
Use management memo 4 
Use economic information (inflation, etc.) 3 
Variable Operating Expenses  
Use industry information 30 
Use historical information 15 
Use management memo 8 
Use management discussion of risk factors information 3 
Fixed Operating Expenses  
Use industry information 16 
Use historical information 10 
Use management memo 9 
Use discussion (inquiry) with management 4 
Use economic information (inflation, etc.) 3 
Use management memo - specifically pension costs 3 
SG&A Expenses  
Use industry information 18 
Use historical information 16 
Use management memo 6 
Use economic information (inflation, etc.) 4 
Financing Charges  
Use historical information 11 
Use management memo 8 
Use management discussion of risk factors information 6 
                                                     
83
 Only frequencies >= 3 are reported in the Panel. 
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Use F/S (current vs. historical) 4 
Use CFS 3 
Use notes to the F/S 3 
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TABLE 8 Continued 
Panel B: Use of Industry Sources When Developing Alternative Model Assumptions
84
 
Industry Information Used to Develop Alternative Model Assumptions Total 
Participants 
Use 55/53 percent (industry range) for terminal (l/t) variable operating expenses 12 
Use 16.9/13.4 percent (industry range) for discount rate 10 
Use 55/53 percent (industry range) for s/t variable operating expenses 10 
Use 27/24 percent (industry range) for tax rate 9 
Use -4.25/-3.25 percent (widest range based on 2 industry sources) for s/t growth rate 7 
Do not use any industry ranges for unaided ranges 6 
Use -4.25/-3.25 percent (widest range based on 2 industry sources) for terminal (l/t) growth rate 4 
Use 16.9/15.6 percent (industry/management) for discount rate 2 
Use -4.3/-3.3 percent (approximately widest range based on 2 industry sources) for s/t growth rate 2 
Use -4/-3.25 percent (EMAF range) for s/t growth rate 2 
 
 
                                                     
84
 Only frequencies >= 2 are reported in the Panel. 
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TABLE 9 Width of the Participants' Range and Its Relation to Audit Materiality 
 
Participant 
Developed 
Range 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Range Width 
Times 
Materiality 
 Experienced 
Auditors 
     
1 EA Big 4 #1.1 No $114,175,376 $130,654,367 $16,478,991 27.46 
2 EA Big 4 #1.2 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 EA Big 4 #1.3 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 EA Big 4 #1.4 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5 EA Big 4 #1.5 Yes  $27,424,062   $91,662,352  $64,238,290  107.06 
6 EA Big 4 #1.6 Yes  $74,890,708   $107,669,111  $32,778,403  54.63 
7 EA Big 4 #2.1 Yes $44,101,297 $90,439,036 $    46,337,739 77.23 
8 EA Big 4 #2.2 Yes $60,192,229 $95,784,291 $    35,592,062 59.32 
9 EA Big 4 #2.3 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 EA Big 4 #3.1 Yes $71,733,533 $108,463,465 $36,729,932 61.22 
11 EA Big 4 #3.2 Yes $86,034,255 $94,699,081 $8,664,826 14.44 
12 EA Big 4 #3.3 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
13 EA Big 4 #3.4 Yes $18,862,614 $182,778,352 $163,915,738 273.19 
14 EA Big 4 #3.5 Yes $68,185,926 $106,520,592 $38,334,666 63.89 
15 EA Big 4 #3.6 Yes $70,212,350 $82,861,102 $12,648,752 21.08 
16 EA Big 4 #3.7 Yes $74,518,521 $95,784,291 $21,265,770 35.44 
17 EA Big 6 #1.1 Yes $68,920,551 $107,563,414 $38,642,863 64.40 
18 EA Big 6 #1.2 Yes $65,704,355 $102,703,602 $36,999,247 61.67 
19 EA Big 6 #1.3 Yes $71,918,051 $111,268,881 $39,350,830 65.58 
20 EA Big 6 #1.4 Yes $66,998,990 $108,307,020 $41,308,030 68.85 
21 EA Big 6 #1.5 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
   
Average: $41,641,446   69.40  
 
   
Average excluding 
two extreme 
observations: 
$34,772,395   57.95  
 Valuation 
Specialists      
1 VS Big 4 #1.1 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 VS Big 4 #1.2 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 VS Big 4 #1.3 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 VS Big 4 #1.4 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5 VS Big 4 #2.1 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6 VS Big 4 #2.2 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7 VS Big 4 #2.3 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 VS Big 6 #1.1 Yes $67,282,680 $112,705,129 $45,422,449 75.70 
9 VS Big 6 #1.2 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
   
Average: $45,422,449 75.70 
 
   
Average excluding 
two extreme 
observations: 
N/A N/A 
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 Junior 
Auditors      
1 JA #1 Yes $79,018,288 $110,793,129 $31,774,841 52.96 
2 JA #2 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 JA #3 Yes $33,012,846 $142,294,142 $109,281,296 182.14 
4 JA #4 Yes $58,958,360 $89,766,676 $30,808,316 51.35 
5 JA #5 Yes $2,902,469 $62,773,942 $59,871,473 99.79 
6 JA #6 Yes $61,252,380 $93,430,985 $32,178,605 53.63 
7 JA #7 Yes $69,731,968 $103,205,438 $33,473,471 55.79 
8 JA #8 Yes $73,406,947 $114,895,935 $41,488,988 69.15 
9 JA #9 Yes $63,896,931 $103,188,208 $39,291,277 65.49 
10 JA #10 Yes $43,887,514 $130,067,730 $86,180,216 143.63 
11 JA #11 No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
   
Average: $51,594,276 85.99 
 
   
Average excluding 
two extreme 
observations: 
$46,322,696 77.20 
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TABLE 9B Summary of the Finding for Each of the Research Questions 
 Research Question 
 
Findings in Summarized Form 
RQ 1 Do the participants recognize the necessity to test 
goodwill for impairment annually as prescribed in 
IAS 36, irrespective of the existence of indicators 
of impairment? Do the participants recognize that 
indicators of impairment are present/consider 
indicators of impairment? 
 
A large proportion of participants across all of the 
groups consider goodwill impairment indicators. 
Industry- and company-level revenue decline due to 
a technology change is the most frequently noted 
indicator of impairment. Among the related factors 
raised are interconnections between goodwill and 
intangible assets impairment indicators, and the 
necessity to pay close attention to impairments of 
intangibles as a result of that. Other factors 
considered include implications for impairment of 
specific long-lived assets belonging to the envelope 
business CGU, consistency of the indicators of 
goodwill impairment with certain economic facts 
presented elsewhere in the case materials, 
consistency of the current indicators with those used 
in prior periods impairment testing, disclosure 
quality of the impairment indicators, and others.   
 
RQ 2 Do the participants consider the sources of 
goodwill, specifically that the goodwill arose 
from past business combinations? 
 
A small proportion of participants across all of the 
groups consider verifying the source of goodwill (i.e. 
that it arose from past business combinations). This 
may be explained by Supremex being a continuing 
client, so that most of the participants implicitly 
assume that they can rely on prior audits regarding 
the source of recorded goodwill. 
 
RQ 3 Do the participants recognize the need to obtain 
assurance on the CGU determination as a part of 
the auditing task and explain that further 
investigation is not necessary because of the 
instructions to concur with the management CGU 
determination? Do the participants recognize the 
need to understand at what level goodwill is 
tested (CGU or other)? 
 
The experienced auditors pay more attention to CGU 
determination when compared to valuation 
specialists, which may be explained by another 
finding of this study, whereby the division of labor 
between auditors and valuation specialists assumes 
that the former are primarily responsible for the 
issue. Junior auditors do not consider CGU 
determination, and the reasons for that remain to be 
investigated. 
 
RQ 4 Do the participants assess the RMM (risk of 
material misstatement) related to the 
CGU/goodwill impairment, including inherent 
risk and control risk? 
 
The factors related to RMM are considered almost 
exclusively by auditors and include primarily internal 
control considerations, which is somewhat surprising 
given that the same participants suggest that pure 
substantive approach is most frequently used to test 
goodwill impairments and that this approach is also 
applicable in the case of Supremex. 
 
RQ 5 Do the participants assess the degree of 
estimation uncertainty related to the 
CGU/goodwill impairment? 
 
Only a small proportion of experienced auditors and 
valuation specialists elaborate on the issue of 
estimation uncertainty, which is unexpected given 
that the case is an audit of a complex accounting 
estimate (the most frequent consideration is that high 
estimation uncertainty requires developing a range). 
 
RQ 6 Do the participants use combined or pure The choice between a combined and a fully 
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substantive audit approach when auditing the 
CGU/goodwill impairment?  
 
substantive approach to CGU impairment audit is 
primarily discussed by senior auditors. Of those, 
some propose to use a fully substantive approach for 
Supremex, while also suggesting that in general a 
vast majority of impairment audits are substantive. 
No one proposes taking a combined approach in 
Supremex’s case. Some participants say that testing 
certain controls, in principle, may lead to a reduction 
of substantive work (review controls over the 
impairment are most frequently mentioned as a 
specific example). 
 
RQ 7 Do the participants elect to test management’s 
estimate or to develop their own estimate or range 
when auditing the CGU/goodwill impairment? 
What factors influence the participants’ choice re: 
testing vs. developing the impairment estimate? 
 
The choice across the three groups split among 
developing an auditor’s own estimate or range, 
testing the management’s estimate, and a 
combination of the two approaches. Some of the 
experienced auditors and valuation specialists appear 
to have difficulty when classifying their actions into 
the two mutually exclusive categories prescribed by 
the standards. 
 
RQ 8 Do the participants elect to use assumptions 
(model) alternative to management’s assumptions 
(model), or both?  
 
The valuation specialists overwhelmingly elect to 
make modifications to the management’s model. On 
the other hand, auditors are less critical of the 
management’s model. They tend to develop 
alternative assumptions or verify the management-
suggested assumptions, while leaving the 
management-suggested model either largely intact or 
with less significant modifications than those 
proposed by the valuation specialists. 
 
RQ 9 If a participant elects to use assumptions (model) 
alternative to management’s assumptions 
(model), what reasoning does the participant 
provide that in their view necessitates the 
application of the alternative assumptions 
(model), if any? 
 
The most frequent reasons for changing the model 
include the use of alternative types of discounting 
methods, the need to include certain items omitted 
from the forecast such as capital expenditure cash 
outlays, CCA tax shield/tax amortization benefits, 
and working capital changes, and the application of 
debt-free (vs. levered) valuation approach.  
 
The reasons for developing an alternative set of 
assumptions vary depending on the input parameter, 
e.g. for the discount rate the most frequently cited 
reasons for modification include insufficient support 
for the equity risk premium calculation, the use of 
CAPM (vs. build-up) method, the need to recalculate 
the discount rate, the need to include company 
specific (projection, forecast) risk into the discount 
rate, and others.  
 
RQ 10 If a participant elects to use assumptions (model) 
alternative to management’s assumptions 
(model), what source(s) of information does the 
participant use to support the alternative 
assumptions (model), if any?  
 
The main source of information for all of the 
participants who develop an alternative model 
appears to be their general valuation knowledge. The 
valuation specialists’ sources choice is wider 
compared to the auditors, as they draw on the firm’s 
pool of valuation methods and techniques, such as 
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pre-set valuation model templates. With regard to the 
assumptions, both auditors and valuation specialists 
use multiple sources of information, including but 
not limited to external information not originating 
from the company (industry information), long time-
series of the company-specific comparatives 
(historical information), and internal sources such as 
management’s memo or management’s analysis of 
risk factors. 
 
RQ 11 Do the participants’ who developed a range 
attempt to narrow it down? Based on what audit 
evidence the participants’ range is narrowed? Do 
the participants factor in materiality when 
narrowing the range and making the conclusion 
about its reasonableness? 
 
For all of the participants who developed a range 
(with no exceptions), the width of the range is many 
times the audit materiality, consistent with concerns 
raised in Christensen et al. (2012) about the 
auditability of complex FVs.  Since there is only one 
interval available for the valuation specialists, a 
reliable comparison of this group of participants to 
the other two groups is problematic. However, the 
data suggests that auditors’ intervals for the 
experienced auditors are narrower on average than 
those for junior auditors. These may indicate that 
increase in auditor’s expertise leads to narrowing of 
the auditor’s range. Overall, the results are best 
characterized by Smieliauskas’ (2012) “Estimate 
nightmare” scenario, which takes place when twice 
the materiality is smaller than the width of the 
reasonable range, meaning that all points inside or 
outside of the reasonable range have a significant 
risk. 
 
RQ 12 Do the participants recognize the need to 
calculate FVLCS of the CGU in addition to its 
VIU, to determine the recoverable amount? 
 
Relatively more valuation specialists, compared to 
auditors, recognize the necessity to calculate VFLCS 
of the CGU in addition to its VIU calculation. The 
limited attention to this issue from the auditors may 
be explained by the majority of case facts pertaining 
to calculation of VIU, indicating that the auditors 
may be anchoring on management’s method of 
calculation of the RA. The valuation specialists, on 
the other hand, are less likely to anchor since they are 
more familiar with the different ways to calculate 
FVs. An alternative explanation would be that the 
auditors are generally less concerned with a possible 
overstatement of the impairment, compared to its 
understatement, thus creating an opportunity for the 
management to take a “big bath” or to implement an 
income smoothing strategy. 
 
RQ 13 How do the participants factor in any indicators 
of management’s bias that in their view are 
present when drawing their conclusion about the 
reasonableness of the management’s estimate or 
developing their own estimate or range, if at all? 
 
Some of experienced auditors, valuation specialists, 
and junior auditors consider possible management’s 
bias due to factors other than management’s 
compensation (making the company look better for a 
possible acquisition is the most frequently cited 
reason). One valuation specialist also considers the 
possibility of the Board’s bias due to the potential 
acquirer presence on the Board of Supremex (subject 
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to the Board’s involvement in the goodwill valuation 
process). 
 
RQ 14 Do the participants review management’s 
compensation information when considering 
indicators of possible management bias, if at all? 
If yes, do they consider different components of 
management’s compensation and the impact of 
CGU/goodwill impairment on these components 
in the short- and long-terms? 
 
Participants across all of the groups appear to factor-
in, to some degree, information about management’s 
compensation when considering possible 
management’s bias. However, a significant 
proportion of the auditors do not appear to fully 
recognize how the goodwill impairment impacts 
certain drivers of management compensation. 
RQ 15 What judgmental heuristics (such as anchoring-
and-adjustment, availability, or 
representativeness) influence the participants’ 
selection of the alternative assumptions (model), 
if any? 
 
The results reveal that both the experienced auditors 
and the valuation specialists tend to gravitate toward 
their firm’s commonly used methodology. One 
example of availability heuristics (as well as of an 
apparent deficiency in the current valuation 
methodology application in audit settings) is the use 
of “+/- 10%” interval when determining the valuation 
specialists’ range for a FV, which is developed based 
on their point estimate for that FV. In addition to 
being a possible example of availability, the 
application of the “+/-10% rule” demonstrates that 
some of the valuation specialists consider uncertainty 
inherent in FVs as a concept separate from that of 
audit materiality, as the rule’s application typically 
leads to FV ranges wider than the materiality. 
 
RQ 16 What judgmental heuristics influence the 
participant’s judgment in the process of 
narrowing their own range? 
 
One heuristic that arises in the process of arriving 
from the auditor’s range to a point estimate of the 
CGU RA is taking the average of the range as a point 
estimate, exhibited by almost half of the auditors 
who developed a range for the CGU RA.  This 
approach appears to be based on availability and is 
not suggested in auditing or accounting standards, 
except as a simplified strategy in certain situations. 
Many auditors who developed a range do not 
mention that the auditor’s range should be narrowed 
down to be within the AM, and use a range which is 
many times the size of the materiality to arrive at 
their conclusion about the management’s estimate. 
 
RQ 17 Are there indications of any deliberate biases in 
the participants’ process of selecting the 
alternative assumptions (model)? 
 
No indication of such deliberate biases 
RQ 18 Are there indications of any deliberate biases in 
the participants’ process of narrowing their own 
range? 
 
No indication of such deliberate biases 
RQ 19 How are various specialists involved in the 
CGU/goodwill impairment audit? 
 
The experienced auditors and valuation specialists 
involve tax specialists to examine the tax rate and for 
other tax-related parameters such as CCA groups and 
R&D tax credit relevant to the CF forecast; involve 
their actuarial specialists to examine the pension 
liability; and involve their complex securities 
  
177 
 
specialists to deal with the financial liability. 
 
Most frequently mentioned responsibility of the 
auditors are examining the management’s CF 
forecast and examining the expenses. Some of the 
participants say that auditors are better equipped to 
examine the CF forecast and expenses since they 
know the company and/or the industry better than 
valuation specialists. On the other hand, the primary 
responsibility of valuation specialists appears to be 
examining or developing the discount rate. The 
second most frequently cited responsibility of the 
valuation specialists is examining the valuation 
model. 
 
The involvement of 3rd party (external) valuation 
specialists is primarily discussed by the valuation 
specialists, who will ask the client to hire an external 
valuator if the management lacks qualifications to do 
their own valuation. Some of the valuation specialists 
suggest that this request will be communicated to the 
management/audit committee and that they will have 
a conversation with the 3rd party specialists 
regarding the shortcomings of the management’s 
analysis. 
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TABLE 10 Probability Distribution Elicitation Methods 
Elicitation Method Abbreviated name Examples of Studies 
Judgmental point estimate elicitation/forecasting 
 
 Lawrence et al. (2006) (Economics/Management) 
Cumulative distribution function (CDF) elicitation 
technique or “variable interval method” 
CDF technique Crosby (1980) (Auditing) 
 
Crosby (1981) (Auditing) 
 
Solomon (1982) (Auditing) 
 
Tomassini et al. (1982) (Auditing) 
 
Solomon et al. (1985) (Auditing) 
 
Shephard and Kirkwood (1994) (Management) 
 
Dominitz (1998) (Economics) 
 
Laws and O' Hagan (2002) (Auditing) 
 
Berg (2006) (Economics) 
 
Budescu and Du (2007) (Finance) 
Credible interval elicitation CI technique Teigen and Jorgensen (2005) (Psychology) 
 
McKenzie et al. (2008) (Management) 
 
Hansson et al. (2008) (Psychology) 
 
Lambert et al. (2012) (Psychology/Economics) 
Elicitation methods involving real or hypothetical 
payoffs (influenced by individuals' utility 
functions), such as lotteries, scoring rules, and 
promissory notes 
 
 Kadane and Winkler (1988) 
(Economics/Management) 
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TABLE 11 Illustration of the Elicitation Methods Used in the Study 
Panel A: CDF Elicitation Method Illustration (Fractiles Chosen as in Tomassini et al. 1982) 
Questions Asked to Experts 
 
Resulting CDF 
Please identify a median amount (in appropriate units of measurement) such 
that it is equally likely that the true population value (i.e., account balance, 
interest rate, growth rate, etc.) would be above or below the amount 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .50 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 25% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 75% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .25 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 75% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 25% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .75 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 10% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 90% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .10 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 90% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 10% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .90 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 1% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 99% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .01 fractile 
 
Please identify a value such that there is a 99% chance that the true value is 
actually lower than the value and a 1% chance that it is actually higher 
 
This amount would represent the expert's .99 fractile 
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TABLE 11 Continued 
Panel B: Credible Interval Elicitation Method Illustration 
Questions Asked to Experts Resulting Credible (Confidence) Interval 
Please identify a lower bound for the 90% confidence interval for the true 
population value (in appropriate units of measurement) 
This amount would represent the lower bound for the expert's 90% confidence 
interval 
Please identify a lower bound for the 50% confidence interval for the true 
population value 
This amount would represent the lower bound for the expert's 50% confidence 
interval 
Please identify a lower bound for the 25% confidence interval for the true 
population value 
This amount would represent the lower bound for the expert's 25% confidence 
interval 
Please identify a median amount such that it is equally likely that the true 
population value would be above or below the amount 
This amount would represent the expert's median 
Please identify an upper bound for the 25% confidence interval for the true 
population value 
This amount would represent the upper bound for the expert's 25% confidence 
interval 
Please identify an upper bound for the 50% confidence interval for the true 
population value 
This amount would represent the upper bound for the expert's 50% confidence 
interval 
Please identify an upper bound for the 90% confidence interval for the true 
population value 
This amount would represent the upper bound for the expert's 90% confidence 
interval 
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TABLE 12 Selected Demographic Information for the Participants – Elicitation Study 
Participant Audit Firm Group Rank Accounting 
Designation 
Other 
Designations 
/ Credentials 
# of Impairment 
Analyses 
Performed in the 
Last Two Years 
EA, Method E1       
EA Big 4 #1.2 Big 4 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   11 
EA Big 4 #3.3 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 6 #1.3 Big 6 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   1 
EA Big 6 #1.4 Big 6 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 4 #2.3 Big 4 #2 Advisory - Complex 
Accounting & Transaction 
Expertise Group 
Partner CPA,CA  CFA 5 
EA Big 4 #1.5 Big 4 #1 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   8 
EA Big 4 #1.6 Big 4 #1 Assurance - Professional 
Practice 
Partner FCPA, FCA  Lawyer 11 
Total Number, 
EA E1 7    
Average #, 
EA E1 6.1 
VS, Method E1       
VS Big 4 #1.1 Big 4 #1 Valuation Specialist Senior Manager CPA, CA CBV 10 
VS Big 4 #1.2 Big 4 #1 Valuation Specialist Vice President Valuations CPA, CA CBV 11 
VS Big 6 #1.2 Big 6 #1 Valuation Specialist Senior Manager CPA CBV, CFA 11 
VS Big 4 #2.3 Big 4 #2 Valuation Specialist Senior Manager CPA, CA CBV, CFA *
85
 
Total Number, 
VS E1 4    
Average #, 
VS E1 8.0 
JA, Method E1       
JA #1 MAcc Student N/A Associate     0 
JA #2 MAcc Student N/A Intermediate Staff Accountant     2 
JA #3 MAcc Student N/A Intermediate Staff Accountant     2 
Total Number, 
JA E1 3    
Average #, 
JA E1 1.3 
Total Number, 14    Average #, 5.6 
                                                     
85
 “*” denotes that the participant performed impairment analyses in the period before the most recent 2-year period. 
  
182 
 
E1 E1 
EA, Method E2       
EA Big 4 #1.3 Big 4 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA   2 
EA Big 4 #1.4 Big 4 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   * 
EA Big 4 #2.1 Big 4 #2 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA  MBA 4 
EA Big 4 #2.2 Big 4 #2 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 6 #1.1 Big 6 #1 Assurance - National 
Assurance Standards Group 
Senior Manager CPA, CA   11 
EA Big 6 #1.2 Big 6 #1 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 4 #3.1 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior manager CPA, CA   3 
EA Big 4 #3.2 Big 4 #3 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   2 
EA Big 4 #3.4 Big 4 #3 Assurance Experienced Manager CPA, CA   5 
EA Big 4 #3.5 Big 4 #3 Assurance Senior Manager CPA, CA   1 
EA Big 4 #3.7 Big 4 #3 Assurance Manager CPA, CA   * 
Total Number, 
EA E2 11      
Average #, 
EA E2 3.2 
VS, Method E2       
VS Big 6 #1.1 Big 6 #1 Valuation Specialist Manager CA,CPA CBV 11 
VS Big 4 #2.2 Big 4 #2 Valuation Specialist Senior Manager CA, CPA CBV 11 
Total Number, 
VS E2 2    
Average #, 
VS E2 11.0 
JA, Method E2       
JA #4 MAcc Student N/A Staff Accountant     1 
JA #5 MAcc Student N/A Staff Accountant      2 
JA #6 MAcc Student N/A Associate     11 
JA #7 MAcc Student N/A Senior Staff Accountant     3 
JA #8 MAcc Student N/A Intermediate Associate, 
Returning as Senior Associate 
    0 
JA #9 MAcc Student N/A Experienced Associate     2 
JA #10 MAcc Student N/A Second Year Staff Accountant      3 
JA #11 MAcc Student N/A Intermediate Staff Accountant     1 
Total Number, 
JA E2 8    
Average #, 
JA E2 2.9 
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Total Number, 
E2 
21    Average #, 
E2 
3.8 
Total Number, 
EA E1 and E2 
18    Average #, 
EA E1 and 
E2 
4.3 
 
Total Number, 
VS E1 and E2 
6    Average #, 
VS E1 and 
E2 
9 
Total Number, 
JA E1 and E2 
11    Average #, 
JA E1 and 
E2 
2.5 
Total Number, 
E1 and E2 
35    Average #, 
E1 and E2 
4.5 
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TABLE 13 Comparison of Elicited Intervals to Unaided Intervals for Each Group of Participants 
Panel A: Results by Group, Elicitation Method E1 (CDF) – Comparison of Elicited to Unaided Intervals 
  Unassisted   Widest   Middle   Narrowest   
 Participant Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 
 EA, Method 
E1 
            
1 EA Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop            
2 EA Big 4 #3.3 Did not develop            
3 EA Big 6 #1.3 $    39,350,830 65.58  $        76,420,688 127.37  $     55,981,112 93.30  $      33,707,115 56.18  
4 EA Big 6 #1.4 $    41,308,030 68.85  $     348,015,637 580.03  $   183,884,424 306.47  $      85,360,459 142.27  
5 EA Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop            
6 EA Big 4 #1.5 $    64,238,290 107.06  $     257,676,398 429.46  $   165,376,493 275.63  $      93,552,888 155.92  
7 EA Big 4 #1.6 $    32,778,403 54.63  $     164,265,547 273.78  $   101,238,300 168.73  $      53,200,008 88.67  
 Average: $   44,418,888 74.03  $     211,594,567 352.66  $  126,620,082 211.03  $      66,455,117 110.76  
 St. Dev.: $   11,870,891 19.78  $     101,545,873 169.24  $    51,027,843 85.05  $      24,185,898 40.31  
 VS, Method E1             
1 VS Big 4 #1.1 Did not develop            
2 VS Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop            
3 VS Big 6 #1.2 Did not develop            
4 VS Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop            
 Average: N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  
 St. Dev.: N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  
 JA, Method E1             
1 JA #1 $    31,774,841 52.96  $     179,326,164 298.88  $     86,651,635 144.42  $      33,639,067 56.07  
2 JA #2 Did not develop            
3 JA #3 $ 109,281,296 182.14  $     242,812,619 404.69  $   161,901,331 269.84  $      86,499,440 144.17  
 Average: $   70,528,069 117.55  $     211,069,391 351.78  $  124,276,483 207.13  $      60,069,254 100.12  
 St. Dev.: $   38,753,227 64.59  $       31,743,228 52.91  $    37,624,848 62.71  $      26,430,186 44.05  
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TABLE 13 Continued 
Panel B: Results by Group, Elicitation Method E2 (CI) – Comparison of Elicited to Unaided Intervals 
  Unassisted   Widest   Middle   Narrowest   
 Participant Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 Range Width Times 
AM 
 
 EA, Method 
E2 
            
1 EA Big 4 #1.3 Did not develop            
2 EA Big 4 #1.4 Did not develop            
3 EA Big 4 #2.1 $    46,337,739 77.23  $     135,739,770 226.23  $     75,561,037 125.94  $      36,469,209 60.78  
4 EA Big 4 #2.2 $    35,592,062 59.32  $        47,927,767 79.88  $     31,418,582 52.36  $      14,516,894 24.19  
5 EA Big 6 #1.1 $    38,642,863 64.40  $        34,411,985 57.35  $     22,347,030 37.25  $         
7,076,150 
11.79  
6 EA Big 6 #1.2  $28,334,802 47.22  $        92,279,641 153.80  $     69,852,067 116.42  $      36,428,593 60.71  
7 EA Big 4 #3.1 $    36,729,932 61.22  $        25,692,483 42.82  $     12,753,489 21.26  $         
3,240,419 
5.40  
8 EA Big 4 #3.2 $      8,664,826 14.44  $        29,695,817 49.49  $     17,469,075 29.12  $         
6,956,804 
11.59  
9 EA Big 4 #3.4 $ 163,915,738 273.19  $     383,428,946 639.05  $   216,135,545 360.23  $    110,635,404 184.39  
1
0 
EA Big 4 #3.5 $    38,334,666 63.89  $        51,146,268 85.24  $     26,470,207 44.12  $      13,058,433 21.76  
1
1 
EA Big 4 #3.7 $    21,265,770 35.44  $     105,915,090 176.53  $     65,649,070 109.42  $      34,546,891 57.58  
 Average:  $46,424,266  77.37  $     100,693,085 167.82  $    59,739,567 99.57  $      29,214,311 48.69  
 StDev:  $42,853,129  71.42  $     106,230,277 177.05  $    59,766,975 99.61  $      31,446,029 52.41  
 VS, Method E2             
1 VS Big 6 #1.1 $    45,422,449 75.70  $        41,402,435 69.00  $     27,440,148 45.73  $      13,474,044 22.46  
2 VS Big 4 #2.2 Did not develop            
 Average: N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  
 StDev: N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  
 JA, Method E2             
1 JA #4 $    30,808,316 51.35  $        30,984,204 51.64  $     21,562,740 35.94  $      10,432,211 17.39  
2 JA #5 $    59,871,473 99.79  $     170,942,240 284.90  $     87,477,297 145.80  $      34,875,629 58.13  
3 JA #6 $    32,178,605 53.63  $        36,722,125 61.20  $     19,387,004 32.31  $         16.14  
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9,683,512 
4 JA #7 $    33,473,471 55.79  $        33,197,785 55.33  $     21,176,552 35.29  $         
9,879,031 
16.47  
5 JA #8 $    41,488,988 69.15  $        87,087,947 145.15  $     50,285,510 83.81  $      25,349,048 42.25  
6 JA #9 $    39,291,277 65.49  $        83,734,182 139.56  $     51,174,760 85.29  $      23,733,944 39.56  
7 JA #10 $    86,180,216 143.63  $  1,189,006,473 1981.68  $   495,731,421 826.22  $    170,155,130 283.59  
8 JA #11 Did not develop            
 Average: $   46,184,621 76.97  $     233,096,422 388.49  $  106,685,041 177.81  $      40,586,929 67.64  
 StDev: $   18,711,025 31.19  $     392,906,096 654.84  $  160,431,016 267.39  $      53,644,407 89.41  
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TABLE 14 Implied Confidence Levels for the Unaided Auditor’s Intervals for the CGU Recoverable Amount Computed via 
Comparison to the Assisted Auditor’s Intervals 
Panel A: Implied Confidence Levels by Group, Elicitation Method E1 (CDF) – Unadjusted Assisted Intervals 
  Unassisted Widest Middle Narrowest    
 Participant Times AM Times AM Times AM Times AM Relation of Unaided 
Interval to Elicited 
Intervals 
Implied Confidence 
Level (Interval Form) 
for Unaided Interval 
Imputed 
Confidence 
Level (Point 
Form) for 
Unaided Interval 
 EA, Method E1  98% 
Confidence 
80% 
Confidence 
50% 
Confidence 
   
1 EA Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop       
2 EA Big 4 #3.3 Did not develop       
3 EA Big 6 #1.3 65.58 127.37 93.30 56.18 Between narrowest 
and middle 
50% < Confidence 
level < 80% 
58% 
4 EA Big 6 #1.4 68.85 580.03 306.47 142.27 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level<50% 47% 
5 EA Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop       
6 EA Big 4 #1.5 107.06 429.46 275.63 155.92 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level<50% 45% 
7 EA Big 4 #1.6 54.63 273.78 168.73 88.67 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level<50% 45% 
 Average: 74.03 352.66 211.03 110.76   49% 
 St. Dev.: 19.78 169.24 85.05 40.31   5% 
 VS, Method E1        
1 VS Big 4 #1.1 Did not develop       
2 VS Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop       
3 VS Big 6 #1.2 Did not develop       
4 VS Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop       
 Average: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 St. Dev.: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 JA, Method E1        
1 JA #1 52.96 298.88 144.42 56.07 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level<50% 49%* (55%) 
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2 JA #2 Did not develop       
3 JA #3 182.14 404.69 269.84 144.17 Between narrowest 
and middle 
50% < Confidence 
level < 80% 
59% 
 Average: 117.55 351.78 207.13 100.12   54% 
 St. Dev.: 64.59 52.91 62.71 44.05   5% 
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel B: Implied Confidence Levels by Group, Elicitation Method E2 (CI) – Unadjusted Assisted Intervals 
  Unassisted Widest Middle Narrowest    
 Participant Times AM Times AM Times AM Times AM Relation of 
Unaided Interval 
to Elicited 
Intervals 
Implied Confidence 
Level (Interval Form) 
for Unaided Interval 
Imputed 
Confidence Level 
(Point Form) for 
Unaided Interval 
 EA, Method E2  90% 
Confidence 
50% 
Confidence 
25% 
Confidence 
   
1 EA Big 4 #1.3 Did not develop       
2 EA Big 4 #1.4 Did not develop       
3 EA Big 4 #2.1 77.23 226.23 125.94 60.78 Between narrowest 
and middle  
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
31% 
4 EA Big 4 #2.2 59.32 79.88 52.36 24.19 Between middle 
and widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
63% 
5 EA Big 6 #1.1 64.40 57.35 37.25 11.79 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
96% 
6 EA Big 6 #1.2 47.22 153.80 116.42 60.71 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level < 
25% 
12% 
7 EA Big 4 #3.1 61.22 42.82 21.26 5.40 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
99%* (121%) 
8 EA Big 4 #3.2 14.44 49.49 29.12 11.59 Between narrowest 
and middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
28% 
9 EA Big 4 #3.4 273.19 639.05 360.23 184.39 Between narrowest 
and middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
38% 
10 EA Big 4 #3.5 63.89 85.24 44.12 21.76 Between middle 
and widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
69% 
11 EA Big 4 #3.7 35.44 176.53 109.42 57.58 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level < 
25% 
12% 
 Average: 78.98 167.82 99.57 48.69   50% 
 StDev: 70.89 177.05 99.61 52.41   31% 
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 VS, Method E2        
1 VS Big 6 #1.1 75.70 69.00 45.73 22.46 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
97% 
2 VS Big 4 #2.2 Did not develop       
 Average: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 StDev: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 JA, Method E2        
1 JA #4 51.35 51.64 35.94 17.39 Between middle 
and widest 
(approximately 
equal to widest) 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
(approximately = 90%) 
86% 
2 JA #5 99.79 284.90 145.80 58.13 Between narrowest 
and middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
37% 
3 JA #6 53.63 61.20 32.31 16.14 Between middle 
and widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
80% 
4 JA #7 55.79 55.33 35.29 16.47 Larger than widest 
(approximately 
equal to widest) 
90% < Confidence 
level 
(approximately = 90%) 
91%* (89%) 
5 JA #8 69.15 145.15 83.81 42.25 Between narrowest 
and middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
42% 
6 JA #9 65.49 139.56 85.29 39.56 Between narrowest 
and middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
40% 
7 JA #10 143.63 1981.68 826.22 283.59 Smaller than 
narrowest 
Confidence level < 
25% 
22% 
8 JA #11 Did not develop       
 Average: 76.97 388.49 177.81 67.64   57% 
 StDev: 31.19 654.84 267.39 89.41   26% 
 
 
  
  
191 
 
TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel C: Implied Confidence Levels by Group, Elicitation Method E1 (CDF) – Adjusted Assisted Intervals 
  Unassisted Widest Middle Narrowest    
 Participant Times AM Times AM Times AM Times AM Relation of Unaided 
Interval to Elicited 
Intervals 
Implied Confidence 
Level (Interval Form) 
for Unaided Interval 
Imputed 
Confidence 
Level (Point 
Form) for 
Unaided Interval 
 EA, Method E1  98%  
Confidence 
80%  
Confidence 
50%  
Confidence 
   
1 EA Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop       
2 EA Big 4 #3.3 Did not develop       
3 EA Big 6 #1.3 65.58  107.93   79.37   48.56  Between narrowest and 
middle 
50% < Confidence level 
< 80% 
65% 
4 EA Big 6 #1.4 68.85  500.52   263.74   122.34  Smaller than narrowest Confidence level<50% 48% 
5 EA Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop       
6 EA Big 4 #1.5 107.06 345.08 215.40 125.24 Smaller than narrowest Confidence level<50% 49%* (50%) 
7 EA Big 4 #1.6 54.63 150.50 93.79 38.64 Between narrowest and 
middle 
50% < Confidence level 
< 80% 
59% 
 Average: 74.03 276.01 163.08 83.69   55% 
 St. Dev.: 19.78 157.46 78.55 40.26   7% 
 VS, Method E1        
1 VS Big 4 #1.1 Did not develop       
2 VS Big 4 #1.2 Did not develop       
3 VS Big 6 #1.2 Did not develop       
4 VS Big 4 #2.3 Did not develop       
 Average: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 St. Dev.: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 JA, Method E1        
1 JA #1 52.96 219.79 107.35 43.21 Between narrowest and 
middle 
50% < Confidence level 
< 80% 
58% 
2 JA #2 Did not develop       
3 JA #3 182.14 385.92 256.06 138.21 Between narrowest and 
middle 
50% < Confidence level 
< 80% 
61% 
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 Average: 117.55 302.85 181.70 90.71   59% 
 St. Dev.: 64.59 83.07 74.35 47.50   2% 
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel D: Implied Confidence Levels by Group, Elicitation Method E2 (CI) – Adjusted Assisted Intervals 
  Unassisted Widest Middle Narrowest    
 Participant Times AM Times AM Times AM Times AM Relation of Unaided 
Interval to Elicited 
Intervals 
Implied Confidence 
Level (Interval Form) 
for Unaided Interval 
Imputed 
Confidence Level 
(Point Form) for 
Unaided Interval 
 EA, Method E2  90% 
Confidence 
50% 
Confidence 
25% 
Confidence 
   
1 EA Big 4 #1.3 Did not develop       
2 EA Big 4 #1.4 Did not develop       
3 EA Big 4 #2.1 77.23 214.36 118.67 58.36 Between narrowest and 
middle  
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
33% 
4 EA Big 4 #2.2 59.32 79.88 52.36 24.19 Between middle and 
widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
63% 
5 EA Big 6 #1.1 64.40 57.35 37.25 11.79 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
96% 
6 EA Big 6 #1.2 47.22 143.49 109.78 57.48 Smaller than narrowest Confidence level < 
25% 
14% 
7 EA Big 4 #3.1 61.22 42.82 21.26 5.40 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
99%* (121%) 
8 EA Big 4 #3.2 14.44 14.44 8.70 2.93 Between middle and 
widest 
(approximately equal to 
widest) 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
(approximately = 90%) 
90%* (87%) 
9 EA Big 4 #3.4 273.19 378.12 243.88 110.06 Between middle and 
widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
62% 
10 EA Big 4 #3.5 63.89 64.27 34.30 17.55 Between middle and 
widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
89%* (90%) 
11 EA Big 4 #3.7 35.44 176.53 109.42 57.58 Smaller than narrowest Confidence level < 
25% 
12% 
 Average: 78.98 130.14 81.74 38.37   62% 
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 St. Dev.: 70.89 107.54 69.36 33.26   33% 
 VS, Method E2        
1 VS Big 6 #1.1 75.70 69.00 45.73 22.46 Larger than widest 90% < Confidence 
level 
97% 
2 VS Big 4 #2.2 Did not develop       
 Average: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 St. Dev.: N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
 JA, Method E2        
1 JA #4 51.35 51.64 35.94 17.39 Between middle and 
widest 
(approximately equal to 
widest) 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
(approximately = 90%) 
90%* (86%) 
2 JA #5 99.79 132.98 68.09 25.87 Between middle and 
widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
70% 
3 JA #6 53.63 53.83 28.23 14.10 Between middle and 
widest 
(approximately equal to 
widest) 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
(approximately = 90%) 
90% 
4 JA #7 55.79 55.33 35.29 16.47 Larger than widest 
(approximately equal to 
widest) 
90% < Confidence 
level 
(approximately = 90%) 
90%* (89%) 
5 JA #8 69.15 115.83 64.28 32.63 Between middle and 
widest 
50% < Confidence 
level < 90% 
54% 
6 JA #9 65.49 119.09 73.03 33.53 Between narrowest and 
middle 
25% < Confidence 
level < 50% 
48% 
7 JA #10 143.63 1028.94 516.97 199.87 Smaller than narrowest Confidence level < 
25% 
21% 
8 JA #11 Did not develop       
 Average: 76.97 222.52 117.40 48.55   66% 
 St. Dev.: 31.19 330.81 163.97 62.20   25% 
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TABLE 15 Valuation Model Input Parameters for Which Elicited Distributions Were Developed While Point Estimates Were Used 
for the Unaided Auditor’s Interval 
 Participant Model Input Parameters 
  CDF Elicitation Method (E1) 
E1 EA Big 6 #1.3 Variable operating expenses (short term); SG&A (short term) 
E1 EA Big 6 #1.4 SG&A (both short term and terminal value); financing charges (both short term and terminal value) 
E1 EA Big 4 #1.5 Fixed operating expenses (both short term and terminal value); financing charges (both short term and terminal value) 
E1 EA Big 4 #1.6 Growth rate (both short term and terminal value); fixed operating expenses (both short term and terminal value); SG&A (both short 
term and terminal value) 
E1 JA Growth rate (short term); variable operating expenses (short term); fixed operating expenses (short term); SG&A (both short term and 
terminal value); financing charges (both short term and terminal value) 
E1 JA Fixed operating expenses (both short term and terminal value) 
  CI Elicitation Method (E2) 
E2 EA Big 4 #2.1 Perpetual growth rate 
E2 EA Big 4 #2.2 Same
86
 
E2 EA Big 6 #1.1 Same 
E2 EA Big 6 #1.2 Variable operating expenses (short term) 
E2 EA Big 4 #3.1 Same 
E2 EA Big 4 #3.2 Disc rate; SG&A (both short term and terminal value) 
E2 EA Big 4 #3.4 Tax rate; perpetual growth rate; variable operating (terminal value) 
E2 EA Big 4 #3.5 Tax rate; fixed op expenses (both short term and terminal value); SG&A (terminal value) 
E2 EA Big 4 #3.7 Same 
E2 VS Big 6 #1.1 Same 
E2 JA Same 
E2 JA Disc rate; tax rate; variable operating expenses (terminal value); fixed op expenses (terminal value); SG&A term; financing charges 
(both short term and terminal value) 
E2 JA Fixed operating expenses both periods; financing charges (terminal value) 
E2 JA Same 
E2 JA Perpetual growth rate 
E2 JA Perpetual growth rate; fixed op expenses (terminal value); SG&A (both short term and terminal value) 
                                                     
86
 Intervals developed for the same input parameters in the process and elicitation studies 
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E2 JA Tax rate; variable operating expenses (terminal value); fixed operating expenses (both short term and terminal value); SG&A (terminal 
value); financing charges (terminal value) 
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TABLE 16 Comparison of Elicitation Methods for Each Group of Participants 
Panel A: Results by Group, Elicitation Method E1 (CDF) 
 Widest   Middle   Narrowest   
Participant Range Width Times AM Label Range Width Times AM Label Range Width Times AM Label 
EA, Method E1          
EA Big 4 #1.2 $     236,913,973 394.86  $   116,891,783 194.82  $      47,619,567 79.37  
EA Big 4 #3.3 $        54,155,928 90.26  $     38,711,000 64.52  $      22,992,549 38.32  
EA Big 6 #1.3 $        76,420,688 127.37  $     55,981,112 93.30  $      33,707,115 56.18  
EA Big 6 #1.4 $     348,015,637 580.03  $   183,884,424 306.47  $      85,360,459 142.27  
EA Big 4 #2.3 $     105,240,853 175.40  $     66,388,758 110.65  $      34,547,953 57.58  
EA Big 4 #1.5 $     257,676,398 429.46  $   165,376,493 275.63  $      93,552,888 155.92  
EA Big 4 #1.6 $     164,265,547 273.78  $   101,238,300 168.73  $      53,200,008 88.67  
Mean $     177,527,003 295.88  $  104,067,410 173.45  $      52,997,220 88.33 A 
Standard 
Deviation 
$       99,900,790 166.50  $    51,137,715 85.23  $      24,882,196 41.47 B 
VS, Method E1          
VS Big 4 #1.1 $  2,733,908,341 4556.51  $   466,174,133 776.96  $    156,828,684 261.38  
VS Big 4 #1.2 $        89,182,432 148.64  $     57,865,479 96.44  $      28,474,132 47.46  
VS Big 6 #1.2 $     698,337,614 1,163.90  $   220,751,052 367.92  $      74,881,036 124.80  
VS Big 4 #2.3 $     560,823,555 934.71  $   162,277,644 270.46  $      51,067,240 85.11  
Mean $ 1,020,562,985 1700.94  $  226,767,077 377.95  $      77,812,773 129.69 C 
Standard 
Deviation 
$ 1,014,668,860 1691.11  $  150,032,137 250.05  $      48,481,270 80.80 D 
JA, Method E1          
JA $     179,326,164 298.88  $     86,651,635 144.42  $      33,639,067 56.07  
JA $     100,812,571 168.02  $     45,455,934 75.76  $      21,259,030 35.43  
JA $     242,812,619 404.69  $   161,901,331 269.84  $      86,499,440 144.17  
Mean $     174,317,118 290.53  $    98,002,967 163.34  $      47,132,512 78.55 E 
Standard 
Deviation 
$       58,079,378 96.80  $    48,211,493 80.35  $      28,291,725 47.15 F 
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TABLE 16 Continued 
Panel B: Results by Group, Elicitation Method E2 (CI) 
 Widest   Middle   Narrowest   
Participant Range Width Times AM Label Range Width Times AM Label Range Width Times AM Label 
EA, Method E2          
EA Big 4 #1.3 N/A N/A  $     56,987,639 94.98  $      13,876,912 23.13  
EA Big 4 #1.4 $     317,892,864 529.82  $   197,185,414 328.64  $    111,280,484 185.47  
EA Big 4 #2.1 $     135,739,770 226.23  $     75,561,037 125.94  $      36,469,209 60.78  
EA Big 4 #2.2 $        47,927,767 79.88  $     31,418,582 52.36  $      14,516,894 24.19  
EA Big 6 #1.1 $        34,411,985 57.35  $     22,347,030 37.25  $         7,076,150 11.79  
EA Big 6 #1.2 $        92,279,641 153.80  $     69,852,067 116.42  $      36,428,593 60.71  
EA Big 4 #3.1 $        25,692,483 42.82  $     12,753,489 21.26  $         3,240,419 5.40  
EA Big 4 #3.2 $        29,695,817 49.49  $     17,469,075 29.12  $         6,956,804 11.59  
EA Big 4 #3.4 $     383,428,946 639.05  $   216,135,545 360.23  $    110,635,404 184.39  
EA Big 4 #3.5 $        51,146,268 85.24  $     26,470,207 44.12  $      13,058,433 21.76  
EA Big 4 #3.7 $     105,915,090 176.53  $     65,649,070 109.42  $      34,546,891 57.58  
Mean $     122,413,063 204.02  $    71,984,469 119.97 A $      35,280,563 58.80  
Standard 
Deviation 
$     120,009,172 200.02  $    67,013,189 111.69 B $      37,495,422 62.49  
VS, Method E2          
VS Big 6 #1.1 $        41,402,435 69.00  $     27,440,148 45.73  $      13,474,044 22.46  
VS Big 4 #2.2 $     102,949,447 171.58  $     55,978,209 93.30  $      33,791,369 56.32  
Mean $       72,175,941 120.29  $    41,709,178 69.52 C $      23,632,707 39.39  
Standard 
Deviation 
$       30,773,506 51.29  $    14,269,030 23.78 D $      10,158,663 16.93  
JA, Method E2          
JA $        30,984,204 51.64  $     21,562,740 35.94  $      10,432,211 17.39  
JA $     170,942,240 284.90  $     87,477,297 145.80  $      34,875,629 58.13  
JA $        36,722,125 61.20  $     19,387,004 32.31  $         9,683,512 16.14  
JA $        33,197,785 55.33  $     21,176,552 35.29  $         9,879,031 16.47  
JA $        87,087,947 145.15  $     50,285,510 83.81  $      25,349,048 42.25  
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JA $        83,734,182 139.56  $     51,174,760 85.29  $      23,733,944 39.56  
JA $  1,189,006,473 1981.68  $   495,731,421 826.22  $    170,155,130 283.59  
JA $        58,998,545 98.33  $     39,839,394 66.40  $      18,897,818 31.50  
Mean $     211,334,188 352.22  $    98,329,335 163.88 E $      37,875,790 63.13  
Standard 
Deviation 
$     372,012,720 620.02  $  151,689,063 252.82 F $      50,689,832 84.48  
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TABLE 17 Comparison of Frequency of Words Pointing to Quantification of Uncertainty 
 Word Absolute 
Frequency – 
CDF (E1) 
Method 
Frequency per 
Participant – 
CDF (E1) 
Method 
Absolute 
Frequency – 
CI (E2) 
Method 
Frequency per 
Participant – 
CI (E2) 
Method 
Difference 
       
1 Percent 340 24.29 246 11.71 12.57 
2 Rate 117 8.36 90 4.29 4.07 
3 Range 91 6.50 114 5.43 1.07 
4 Chance 90 6.43 0 0.00 6.43 
5 Lower 87 6.21 73 3.48 2.74 
6 Median 59 4.21 31 1.48 2.74 
7 Estimate 49 3.50 46 2.19 1.31 
8 Higher 41 2.93 22 1.05 1.88 
9 Probability 32 2.29 0 0.00 2.29 
10 Long 30 2.14 17 0.81 1.33 
11 Reasonable 26 1.86 20 0.95 0.90 
12 Iincrease 26 1.86 0 0.00 1.86 
13 Point 24 1.71 33 1.57 0.14 
14 Amount 20 1.43 17 0.81 0.62 
15 Change 20 1.43 24 1.14 0.29 
16 Negative 19 1.36 12 0.57 0.79 
17 Average 18 1.29 12 0.57 0.71 
18 Declining 18 1.29 0 0.00 1.29 
19 Highest 13 0.93 0 0.00 0.93 
20 Significant 12 0.86 0 0.00 0.86 
21 Narrow 11 0.79 0 0.00 0.79 
22 Rates 11 0.79 11 0.52 0.26 
23 Risk 10 0.71 12 0.57 0.14 
       
1 Bound 0 0.00 72 3.43 -3.43 
2 Upper 16 1.14 54 2.57 -1.43 
3 Interval 0 0.00 50 2.38 -2.38 
4 Confidence 0 0.00 50 2.38 -2.38 
5 Numbers 15 1.07 30 1.43 -0.36 
6 Minus 0 0.00 22 1.05 -1.05 
7 Difference 0 0.00 16 0.76 -0.76 
8 Ranges 0 0.00 16 0.76 -0.76 
9 Distribution 0 0.00 12 0.57 -0.57 
10 Equals 0 0.00 12 0.57 -0.57 
11 Level 0 0.00 12 0.57 -0.57 
12 Materiality 0 0.00 10 0.48 -0.48 
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Appendices 
Appendix A Experimental Case Selection Criteria  
The case is selected based on several criteria: 
1) Since the case is used in process analysis and information elicitation studies, it is 
important that it should be highly realistic and typical of current practices, so as to induce 
representative behavior from the participants during the studies. The realism is achieved by 
developing the case materials from an actual company’s financial statements, annual report, 
proxy circular, and other relevant documents.  
2) The company should not be in an industry requiring highly specialized industry 
expertise from the auditors and valuation specialists (such as mining), in order not to unduly 
narrow the participants pool.  
3) There preferably should be a single CGU. Given the limited time (about two hours for 
both studies combined) that busy professionals can devote to the task, it seems reasonable to 
limit the amount of uncertain judgment inherent in the case. Since the unique challenge with 
auditing fair values is in future event uncertainties (e.g., growth rates, discount rates, future cost 
structure), the issues with CGUs selection and related matters (e.g., allocation of the corporate 
assets), can naturally be omitted if only one CGU is present.  
4) The post-impairment goodwill balance should be material. This is needed to trigger the 
generation of participants’ own estimates/ranges, since immaterial remaining balance means that 
the entire goodwill is written off. The case was developed with the help of partner-level 
practitioners experienced with fair value impairment issues. 
